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CHAPTER I 
 
WHY VISUALS MATTER 
 
“A picture is worth a thousand words.” 
-Proverb 
 
 
In one of the most notorious acts of violence of the war in Iraq, four civilian 
American security contractors were murdered on March 31, 2004.  After their vehicles 
were ambushed and set ablaze in Fallujah, a jubilant crowd pulled their corpses from the 
vehicles, beat them and dragged them through the streets.  Eventually, the remains of two 
of the men were hung up on a bridge over the Euphrates River for all to see.  Camera 
crews captured the incident on film, and soon the horrific images spread worldwide.   
News networks in the United States faced a decision.  Should the public see such 
gruesome images?  The White House quickly issued a statement. 
“It is offensive.  It is despicable the way that these individuals have been treated.  
We hope everybody acts responsibly in their coverage of it.” 
          -Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary 
 
But what exactly does it mean to act responsibly?  A terrible incident happened and news 
programs need to convey that, but how much do they need to show?  The story indeed 
made headlines with every major news network, but there was much variation in each 
story’s visual content.   
Among cable news heavyweights, Fox News produced a tempered report, 
showing only images of the burning vehicles and jeering crowds.  CNN, on the other 
hand, argued that “some images are necessary to fully illustrate the extent of the 
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violence.”  In addition to the vehicles and crowds, CNN footage displayed short but 
graphic clips of the beating of the bodies, as well as two different angles of the corpses 
hanging from the bridge.  The contrast in images is striking.  For still photographs of the 
images, see figures 1-3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:   
Images of Violence on March 31, 2004:   
Killing of American Contractors, Evening News Program Images.   
Most severe image from Fox News. 
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Figure 2:   
Images of Violence on March 31, 2004:   
Killing of American Contractors, Evening News Program Images.   
Most severe image from CNN (1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:   
Images of Violence on March 31, 2004:   
Killing of American Contractors, Evening News Program Images.   
Most severe image from CNN (2). 
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The difference in the two networks’ handling of the story above exemplifies the 
considerable variation that sometimes occurs among networks in their televised images of 
war. Differences in the types of images shown today versus forty years ago is greater 
still.  And yet images matter greatly in how individuals perceive news about war.  People 
who saw CNN’s graphic images of the contractors’ burned bodies likely felt very 
differently after watching the story than those who viewed the tempered version on Fox 
News.   
 Communication media are especially important to the democratic public’s ability 
to make evaluations about war.  Because few individuals have first-hand knowledge of 
wars fought on foreign soil, individuals rely almost exclusively on media to gather 
information about military conflicts.  A large body of research has investigated how news 
media affect the public’s level of support for war.  While these studies have built a 
foundation for the study of war and public opinion, the vast majority of them focus solely 
on the spoken or written content of news1.  However, the visual information that is 
transmitted through television news programs is an essential component of the message 
received by television news consumers.  As television news increasingly has become 
inundated with images over the past fifty years, this omission deserves attention. 
Without a consideration of visuals, we capture only part of the causal story about 
why and when the public chooses to support war.  Emotion-laden imagery may evoke 
powerful reactions that are independent of a news story’s factual information (Sears 
1993; Brader 2006).  If television is the main venue through which most citizens learn 
about political dialogue (Mutz 2007), the visual presentations that accompany spoken 
words are critical to our understanding of public support.   
                                                 
1 Exceptions exist, see Baum 2003; Fan 1993; Iyengar and Simon 1994; Prior 2003. 
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 In this dissertation, I aim to answer the question of how televised images of 
violence affect public support for war.  My contributions are three-fold.  First, by 
developing a systematic and reproducible method of coding to measure news imagery, I 
seek to capture the power of war images on television.  Second, I use this method to 
conduct an original content analysis of the Vanderbilt Television News Archives that 
adds a rich and nuanced body of evidence, comparing portrayals of war from Vietnam to 
Iraq and across news networks.  Third, I test the relationship between violent imagery and 
public opinion using statistical models and a controlled, randomized experiment.  These 
methods allow me to examine the causal connection between varied depictions of war 
violence and the public’s support for war.   
 This introductory chapter will survey an array of theory and literature to show that 
disregarding the visual dimension of television news undermines our ability to 
understand shifts in the public’s support for war.  I then outline the plan of the 
dissertation. 
 
 
Importance of televised images of violence 
 Generally, images on television play an important role in shaping evaluations.  
Research shows this is especially true in regard to judgments of individuals.  As Doris 
Graber (1990, 138) states, “People draw a multitude of inferences from human physical 
appearance and movements….Many people infer personality characteristics from human 
physical features.”  Sometimes images in and of themselves can change assessments of 
events, as in the case of the 1960 Presidential debate between Richard Nixon and John F. 
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Kennedy.  Those that listened to the debate on the radio thought Nixon won, but because 
of Nixon’s disheveled appearance in contrast to Kennedy’s poise and good looks, those 
who watched on television indicated that Kennedy faired better (Druckman 2003).  
Though comparatively little work has been done on the role of violent images in 
influencing opinions about war, visuals exert some of the same basic forces to elicit 
opinion change in both circumstances.   
Much of what we know about the impact of visuals comes from research in the 
biological sciences.  In opposition to rational choice theory, which emphasizes logic and 
informed deliberation, biological research finds that the public utilizes visual experiences 
as the most prevailing method of learning (Barry 2005; Damasio 1999).  The centrality of 
the visual cortex within the brain makes the process of sight intimately associated with 
cognition.  Furthermore, the sense of sight is the most highly developed of all the senses.  
Fast and efficient, it sends information throughout the nervous system more quickly than 
data from sense of hearing, touch, smell or taste (Zimmerman 1989).  The brain processes 
images so rapidly that affective responses occur before an individual is conscious of their 
occurrence (Barry 2005).   
 This biological primacy of vision is important to the study of political news 
because an individual’s sense of perception does not easily distinguish the origin of a 
visual stimulus- be it from the physical world or the mediated world2.   Even when 
cognitive processes alert the brain of the symbolic nature of an image, the brain continues 
to react to media images as if they were real (Grabe and Bucy 2009).   When a televised 
image of a graphic war battle appears, for example, the human body responds 
physiologically with the release of adrenaline, accelerated heart rate, dilated pupils and 
                                                 
2 By mediated world, I mean the world as conveyed through news media.   
7 
 
other physical preparation for action (Gleitman, Reisberg and Gross 2007).  This 
predisposition to react to the physical and mediated worlds in the same way is known as 
the “media equation” (Reeves and Nass 1996).  When considering an individual’s 
reaction, real life and television are not as different as they might seem. 
 Individuals react to violence in a large number of ways, depending on type of 
violence with which they have contact.  While more severe effects of violence most often 
occur in direct victims, others who experience a connection to the victims or the event 
may be influenced as well, including those who see images of violence (Harvey and 
Tummala-Narra 2007).  The more realistic or graphic the images of violence, the more 
likely an effect will occur (Gunter and Harrison 1998).  Responses to violence may 
influence any part of a person’s being, including the cognitive, psychological, physical, 
spiritual or relational aspects of one’s life.  Figure 4 presents a list of potential reactions 
to violence and violent images (Liang et al 2005; 2007).    
 While images of violence evoke a range of reactions, the material surrounding a 
news report and its images may have great impact on how viewers interpret violence.  
What are the psychological mechanisms at work when news reports enter into viewers’ 
decision making calculus?  First, a large majority of viewers (nearly 78% in one 
experimental study, Cerulo 1998) consider violent acts in conjunction with the 
circumstance or person to which the story first exposed them.  This point of entry 
establishes a connection with a viewer.  While entry point does not necessarily dictate the 
way a viewer feels about it, the viewer usually frames an evaluation of the situation at 
hand in terms of the person or object first seen.  Grammatical voice also affects viewer 
judgments of violence.  Passive voice reports encourage a circular type of mental 
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Type of Effect Possible Reaction 
 
 
Cognitive 
Difficulty remembering things  
Hard time making decisions  
Confusion  
Distortion of time  
Difficulty concentrating  
Too many thoughts at once   
Intrusive images  
Flashbacks  
Replaying the event  
 
 
Psychological 
Feeling helpless, hopeless or powerless  
Grief/numbness  
Dread/fear/safety concerns  
Guilt  
Dependency  
Feeling overwhelmed or vulnerable  
Feeling not yourself  
Triggering of prior trauma or losses  
Emotional rollercoaster  
Nightmares 
 
 
Physical 
Fatigue/change in sleep habits  
Eating/appetite problems  
Stomach problems  
Vomiting/diarrhea  
Sweating, rapid pulse, chest pains  
Dizziness, headaches  
Back or neck pain  
Startle reactions  
Catch colds or flu 
 
Spiritual 
Loss of faith  
Spiritual doubts  
Withdrawal from church community  
Lapses in spiritual practice  
Despair  
Questioning old beliefs  
Sense of the world being changed, out of kilter  
 
 
Relational 
Withdrawing from, or clinging to, others  
Alienation from friends, family, co-workers who "don't understand" 
Breakdown in trust  
Changes in sexual activity  
False or distorted generalizations about others  
Doubts about relationships  
Alternately demanding or distant with others  
Irritability 
 
Figure 4:  Human Reactions to Violence 
9 
 
processing, pointing individuals backward to the subject of the story and adding a desired 
emphasis.  Active voice reports keep viewers moving forward as they reason, preventing 
overemphasis on any one aspect of a news story.  Exit points, or the last image a viewer 
encounters, are also important.  If viewers wish to justify violence, exit points are the 
most frequently cited source of validation (Cerulo 1998).  Television news producers use 
a combination of these tools in attempts to manipulate public opinion.  Hence, it is 
important to consider the material surrounding an image in connection with the image 
itself.   
 
 
Why television images deserve further study 
Given available data that images are influential in affecting a range of political 
experiences, including public support for war (Benjamin and Shapiro 2008; Lanzetta et 
al. 1985; Sullivan and Masters 1988; Todorov et al 2005), it is remarkable that 
scholarship has not systematically investigated the political visuals of network news 
stories. Nevertheless, the visual medium of communication is largely ignored in studies 
of war and public opinion.  The accepted theories of the influence of news on both 
agenda setting and media framing3 effectively overlook imagery in television news.  This 
omission deserves renewed attention given that the public takes into account a wide 
variety of sources when determining whether or not to support protracted military 
conflict.  If “the television age demands a reconsideration of our print-age value 
                                                 
3 Agenda setting is the media’s ability to determine which issues will be at the forefront of public discourse, 
influencing which issues are most important.  Framing is the process by which certain aspects of a 
perceived reality are made salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a certain view of 
the world or policy recommendation  (Entman 1993) 
10 
 
structure, which routinely prizes abstractions conveyed through words more than the 
realities and feelings conveyed through pictures,” as asserted by political scientist Doris 
Graber (1988, p. 174), a comprehensive study is long overdue.   Still, several 
methodological and practical challenges exist in studies of images that are not present in 
evaluations of text or transcripts.   
In particular, imagery does not adhere easily to concrete rules.  As Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart once alluded when asked to describe obscenity (“I know it when I 
see it.”), images are difficult to define.  Furthermore, the variation in interpretation of 
imagery among individuals is substantial.  While it is possible to codify images in 
rigorous and systematic ways, assessing these differences in perceptions necessitates 
much care, time, and thought (Grabe and Bucy 2009).   These considerations extend 
outside the realm of that needed for computerized content analysis of news databases.   
The methodological obstacles confronting a large-scale content analysis of 
television news coverage are particularly problematic.  Indeed, stumbling blocks are 
present in analyses of imagery that are largely missing in analyses of print news sources 
or verbal transcripts. Whereas a search for particular words or word combinations on 
Lexis Nexis yields quick and concrete results, no such search engine exists for images.  
Individuals must personally view and code images.  Researchers must also jump the 
hurdle of limited access of images.  The Vanderbilt Television News Archive is the only 
complete source of national nightly news programs from the major networks.  Even some 
of the networks themselves did not retain copies of newscasts from the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.   
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Previous means of studying images 
Several innovative techniques for coding television news visuals have been 
developed since strident calls for attention to imagery in the 1980s, but none of them has 
caught on in the profession in a meaningful way.  Masters and colleagues (Sullivan and 
Masters 1988; Masters 1989) evaluated multiple forms of leader displays, measuring 
attitudes and facial displays such as happiness and reassurance, anger and threat, and fear 
and evasion.  They found that viewers accurately distinguish expressions, and 
furthermore that emotional responses to facial displays of political candidates influenced 
the public more than cognitive variables such as issue agreement or party identification.  
Others specified the effects of camera techniques (Bucy and Newhagen 1999; Kepplinger 
1991).  Long shot viewpoints create space and detachment between viewers.  Close-up 
camera shots manipulate viewers by establishing intimacy without infringing of norms of 
personal space.  Extreme close-ups, on the other hand, may violate norms of face-to-face 
interactions, emphasizing flaws and causing viewer discomfort.  Camera angles also 
affect viewers.  Eye-level camera angles seem balanced, while low-angle views (looking 
upward) devote a sense of power to the subject.  Similarly, camera movements shape 
viewer comprehension, with zoom-in movement providing emphasis and intimacy while 
zoom-out movements de-emphasize and distance.   
Graber’s (2001, 2004) Gestalt procedure- named for its emphasis on totality of 
meaning- simplified coding by concentrating on the consequence of the whole of a news 
story rather than on individual and often complicated visual elements.  This method 
considered the following four broad story components: 
 The general political environment at the time of the broadcast. 
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 The anchor’s introduction and following anchor and reporter editorializing. 
 Audio-visual messages communicated by a mix of words, pictures and sounds. 
 The interaction between story elements within a single report or among reports in 
the same news cast.   
 
Nevertheless, later scholars found these methods difficult to reproduce and quantify.  As 
a result, content analyses of television news continued to rely on transcripts- omitting 
visuals, or using only rough categories of visuals that could be measured easily (Grabe 
and Bucy 2009; Coleman and Banning 2006).  Rough categories may be informative for 
some studies, but for the purpose of separating the effects of news images, much greater 
detail is required.   
Together, the many barriers to the study of news imagery yield a limited 
understanding for how media as a linking mechanism affects public support for war and 
public opinion as a whole.  While sophisticated arguments have explained the effects of 
television news on public opinion, my coding method goes beyond previous means to add 
a more comprehensive approach to the study of images.  The best way to study images is 
to utilize a specific and reproducible system of measurement.  I build from Graber’s 
(2004) model, combining her ideas of simplification of meaning with the specificity of 
research on video game ratings (Haninger, Ryan and Thompson 2004; Smith, Lachlan 
and Tamborini 2003).   
 
 
Plan of the dissertation 
The plan of the dissertation is as follows.  In Chapter 2, I develop a coding 
scheme for measuring violent war images in television news.  I then use the method to 
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analyze network television news coverage of war of Vietnam and Iraq.   My coding 
scheme springs from research on video game violence.  Video game research is useful to 
this study because of its meticulous definitions of degrees of violence.  Though these 
specifications were created to offer parents an explanation of how video game violence 
affects children, I use them to quantify the violence in war images.  Presentations of 
violence are rampant in television news reports of war, and the nature and context of war 
violence are important in shaping viewer opinions.   
The extensive content analysis of network television news of Vietnam and Iraq 
shows enormous differences in presentations of violence.  News coverage of Iraq tends to 
have three to four times the amount of violent imagery compared to coverage of Vietnam.  
Furthermore, today’s news reporters tend to offer more opinionated remarks that frame 
violence in news stories compared to relatively even-handed reporters of the Vietnam era.  
The data set resulting from this content analysis lends itself to the generation of precise 
hypotheses, testable in statistical and experimental models later in the dissertation.  
 In Chapter 3, I use the same coding scheme described in Chapter 2 to measure 
news imagery across cable networks CNN and Fox News.  Portrayal of war across 
networks is of significant interest to scholars in this age of increasing media polarization.  
Viewers have a choice when they decide where to go for television news, and that 
decision may affect their level of support for war.  By evaluating lead stories from CNN 
and Fox News during the Iraq War, I can determine actual differences between the 
presentation styles, content and imagery of the two networks, as well as how the 
ideological leanings of CNN and Fox News affect their visual presentations of war.  
Largely, the two cable networks offer viewers similar amounts and severity of war 
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violence.  The difference between networks is greatest in non-visual depictions of war, 
including tone, frame and story length. 
 In Chapter 4, I generate a set of hypotheses about how images of war violence are 
likely to affect the public.  Whereas violence typically wears a normative label of 
negativity, I argue that war violence is unique in that it can affect the public positively or 
negatively, depending upon how it is framed by news reporters.  In any case, severely 
violent images will act as a magnifying glass, drawing viewers’ attention to the story at 
hand and magnifying the impact of a reporter’s words.  I test these hypotheses through a 
regression model of public support for war.  I use public support data from aggregate 
public polls as the dependent variable and include independent variables from the data set 
generated in Chapter 2.  I find support for the hypotheses that violent images do shape 
public opinion, conditioned by frames. 
 In Chapter 5, I further investigate the causal relationship between violent war 
images and public support at the individual level through a randomized and controlled 
survey experiment.  I conduct the experiment through a well-known survey firm on a 
nationally representative sample.  The experimental treatments manipulate both the 
presence of violent imagery (high versus low violence) and the frame of violence 
(justified versus unjustified) in actual television news stories about events in the war in 
Afghanistan.   
By controlling both content and levels of exposure, I am able to isolate the precise 
effects of violent imagery on viewers’ levels of support for war.  Violent images and 
frame of story both have effects on individuals’ support for war.  Violent images and 
unjustified frames decrease support for war, while justified frames increase support for 
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war.  Viewers exposed to highly violent images expressed significantly less support for 
war than those exposed to low violence images within the same unjustified frame.  When 
stories are framed as displaying justified violence, individual-level effects are less 
pronounced because the positive influence of the frame counteracts the negativity of the 
violence.  Nevertheless, this chapter yields further evidence that visual information can 
and does influence the public’s opinions about war.   
 In Chapter 6, I conclude by discussing the contributions and broad implications of 
my findings.  Here I focus on the ways political science must reconsider media effects to 
include images as a source of political information.  I also discuss how images help in 
holding political leaders accountable and responsive to the public.  In particular, the 
chapter evaluates difficulties faced by policy makers as they struggle with finding the kinds 
of policies that the public will support.  Finally, I consider the ways images are likely to 
permeate political culture to an even further extent in the future as the younger generations 
share media over the Internet. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
NETWORK TELEVISION NEWS AND IMAGES OF WAR:   
A COMPARISON OF VIETNAM AND IRAQ  
 
 
 
 
A cursory glance at television news war coverage from the Vietnam era and today 
suggests vast changes have occurred over the past five decades.  The prototypical story of 
the Vietnam War revolves around a television news anchor at his studio desk.  He reads a 
report of the day’s events, with a map of Vietnam or updated casualty numbers projected 
over his right shoulder in black and white.  In contrast, current television news coverage 
on the Iraq war show a news anchor for just a few moments before cutting to video feed 
of action on the battlefield.  Along with the voiced-over news report, viewers are 
inundated with colorful and graphic displays of violence, accompanied by the sounds of 
arms fire or fleeing civilians.  While television news of both Vietnam and Iraq convey 
details of war time events, a noticeable disparity exists in the amount and type of visual 
information contained in the reports.  
As television news programs change in their visual presentations of war, the way 
the public thinks about war may also change.   The same battlefield event may affect 
viewers differently depending on how it is portrayed.  It may be that the message offered 
to media consumers matters less than the presentation of that message.  For example, one 
could imagine reading or hearing about the death of an American soldier might have a 
less powerful impact than learning that fact with a graphic visual background of the dead 
soldier.   
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The principal questions motivating this research are:  (1) How much has the 
degree of violence in television news presentations of war changed from the Vietnam 
War to Iraq?  (2)  How much has the amount of network news coverage of war changed 
from Vietnam to Iraq?   
In this study, I conduct an original content analysis of the Vanderbilt Television 
News Archives, evaluating lead stories about war from the national evening news (ABC, 
CBS and NBC) during the Vietnam War and current war in Iraq4.   Much speculation 
exists over how television news coverage has changed over the last fifty years.  Current 
media research assumes that the broader trend of shorter stories, shorter sound bites and 
more graphic content holds for news stories about war (Hallin 1992), but this has yet to 
be demonstrated in a quantifiable fashion.  We must know how and when television news 
war coverage has changed before we can make theoretical claims about how these 
changes affect public support.   
My research shows that coverage of the Iraq War is more explicit and graphic in 
its portrayal of violence and death than news stories of the Vietnam War.  As one of the 
first detailed content analyses of network television news coverage of war imagery, these 
data will make a rich empirical contribution to the fields of political communication and 
communication more broadly.   
                                                 
4 My data collection also included analysis of approximately one-half of the days of the Persian Gulf War.  
Because the Persian Gulf War is unlike most wars in American history, with its relatively short duration 
and low rate of casualties, I did not include a discussion of Persian Gulf images in this chapter.  Instead I 
will concentrate on the differences between Vietnam and Iraq since they are more analogous in regard to 
length of war and actual violence that took place.  It is difficult to determine if Persian Gulf television news 
coverage failed to show violence because of network decisions, lack of video footage, or simply because 
there was relatively little violence taking place.  Contact the author for results of data analysis of the 
Persian Gulf War.   
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The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I discuss expectations about differences in 
coverage between Vietnam and Iraq.  I next detail my original coding scheme to measure 
war images and report and discuss the results of the data collection.  Although I 
acknowledge that the audio aspect of television is important in shaping political 
knowledge and public opinion (Volgy and Schwartz 1980), I will largely focus on 
television’s visual element- specifically because it has been ignored as an informational 
resource.  I then report the results of my data analysis, highlighting severe differences 
between coverage of war violence in Vietnam and Iraq. 
 
 
Expectations of how Vietnam and Iraq War coverage should differ 
 
 Some severe differences between television news coverage of Vietnam and Iraq 
might be expected given the broader trend that media in the twenty-first century vary 
enormously from media during the Vietnam era.  These differences present themselves in 
a number of ways.  First, the media environment has grown and changed extensively.  In 
the late 1960s, television news consumers were offered only the three major networks, 
and only those for limited hours of the day.  Television programming ceased every 
evening at midnight and resumed the following morning around 6:00 a.m.  Compared to 
today’s 24-hour cable options, numbering in the hundreds of channels, competition 
between networks in the Vietnam era was greatly reduced.   
Also in regard to media environment, a much wider range of television content is 
now deemed acceptable compared to the 1960s.  Up until and extending through the first 
years of the Vietnam era, television producers were hesitant to show viewers even basic 
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human activities.  The television show I Love Lucy (late 1950s) depicted lead actors 
Lucille Ball and Desi Arnaz as having separate beds, despite the fact they were married in 
real life.  In The Brady Bunch (1969-1974), the bathroom shared by the six siblings 
lacked a toilet.  Such constraints were very likely to influence the types of images thought 
appropriate for nightly Vietnam news programs.  In contrast, today’s television 
entertainment offers viewers graphic representations of violence on such network shows 
as CSI, NCIS and Law and Order, paving the way for equally violent images on 
television news.  Society as a whole has become conditioned to high levels of violence 
through its presence in all types of media, including the internet, movies, magazines and 
video games.  It is only natural that society’s acceptance of heightened levels of violence 
would manifest itself through television news programs as well.   
Secondly, modern technological advances allow for greater availability of and 
access to images than existed during the Vietnam War.  The size, portability, and cost of 
video equipment during Vietnam severely limited the number of war events that were 
caught on film.  In contrast, today’s high-tech equipment is cheaper, smaller and 
omnipresent on the battlefield.  If more images of war exist, it stands to reason more 
images of war violence might infuse nightly news programs.   
 While the aforementioned reasons suggest a greater likelihood for television news 
networks to air images of violence in Iraq stories of war compared to Vietnam, 
characteristics of the two conflicts themselves would hint otherwise.  The actual amount 
of violence that occurred during Vietnam dwarfed the level of violence in Iraq.  Indeed, 
according to United States government statistics, 56,700 American troops died in the 
Vietnam War from 1963-1972.  In contrast, from 2003-2007 in the Iraq war, 3,907 U.S. 
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military deaths occurred.  Given that Vietnam had about fourteen deaths for every one 
death in Iraq, societal, technological and media-related forces may not be enough to 
outweigh the fact that Vietnam was the more violent conflict.  In this way, a comparison 
of news images between Vietnam and Iraq is a hard test.  If news networks display more 
images of violence for Iraq than Vietnam despite the disparity in actual level of violence, 
there will be convincing evidence that coverage of war today differs fundamentally from 
past news reports. 
 
 
Violent images in television news coverage of war:  Method and results 
 
How much has presentation of violence in television news coverage of war 
actually changed since the Vietnam War?  I design a coding scheme to evaluate empirical 
changes in presentation of war news5.  My coding scheme primarily evaluates visual 
presentations of war violence, although frame of violence, type of story and evaluative 
tone are also considered.  In order to quantify violence, I draw from coding schemes used 
in research on the effects of violence in video games. Video games are rated by the 
Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) for age appropriateness and labeled with 
content descriptors that indicate what content triggered a particular rating.  Research 
studies on the effects of video game violence (Haninger, Ryan and Thompson 2004; 
Smith, Lachlan and Tamborini 2003) utilize an even more detailed system for the 
quantification of violence.   
These studies question if violent video games cause increased aggression in those 
that play them.  Collectively, they offer a mixed bag in terms of their results of effects on 
                                                 
5 While the coding scheme developed is potentially applicable in studying a range of violent news events, I 
concentrate only on war in this chapter. 
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children, teens and adults.  A 1999 study by the United States government concluded that 
violence in video games is not fundamentally linked with aggression.  David Satcher, 
then Surgeon General, reacted to the study by saying, “We clearly associate media 
violence to aggressive behavior. But the impact was very small compared to other things 
(Wright 2004).”  However, more recent studies, including a panel study conducted by 
Iowa State University on American and Japanese children, have found that children 
become noticeably more aggressive after playing violent video games (Anderson et al 
2010).  On either side of the debate, few would argue that if an individual plays a violent 
video game, he will immediately go out and mimic the game’s violence.  A common 
ground position involves shaping norms and attitudes.  As those shift over time, the 
changes begin to emerge in a person’s behavior and beliefs.  In the same way, my 
research supposes violent images in television news will gradually shape the norms and 
attitudes of the American public. 
Just as violent video games rated for more mature audiences are thought to have 
relatively increased effects on aggression, more violent images in television news may be 
increasingly likely to influence opinions about war.  For the purposes of my study, video 
games like Pokeman, Mario Kart, PunchOut! or Wii Play- rated E (everyone) or E-10 
(everyone 10 and older)- correspond to no violence or very mild presentations of violence 
in television news, such as peace talks, or at worst a bomb exploding in the distance.  
Games like Infamous or UFC 3 earn a T (teen) rating, similar to moderate depictions of 
violence such as that seen from the firing of a missile at a building or the bandaging of a 
soldier’s wound.  Games rated M (mature), such as Gears of War 2, Fallout 3, or X-Men 
Origins, contain intense violence, blood and gore.  An equivalent in television news war 
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violence is the up-close image of a body carted away or a screaming, bloodied civilian.  
Ratings of AO (adults only) are rarer and often more sexual than violent in nature.  Grand 
Theft Auto- San Andreas received an AO rating for violence, equivalent to the image of a 
soldier or civilian’s moment of death.   
While to my knowledge no previous political science studies use video game 
research methods, the straightforward yet detailed measurements of violence available in 
video game research lend themselves simultaneously to replication and practicality.  
Hence, by translating this method for use by social scientists, this research allows for 
systematic inclusion of visuals in models of support for war.   
Specifically, my coding scheme combines core elements from Haninger, Ryan 
and Thompson’s  (2004; hereafter HRT) and Smith, Lachlan and Tamborini’s (2003; 
hereafter SLT) measures of violence in video games and alters them in ways that makes 
the measures appropriate for real life images (instead of graphical images present in 
video games).  I modify HRT’s definitions of categorical measures of “portrayal of 
violence” to measure the level of personal injury in news clips.  Modifications are 
necessary because HRT’s measure does not include the range of potential injuries that 
exist in images of harm on the battlefield.  For example, I add a new category not present 
in HRT’s measure for the measure for “assumed” violence.  I classify personal injury as 
assumed if no depiction of personal injury is seen, but can be inferred.  An example of 
this is the exploding of a bomb in a crowded marketplace.  While HRT might have 
deemed such a category irrelevant for video games, in real life, even assumed harm to 
others may influence the opinions of viewers.  I also expand HRT’s categories of “mild,” 
“moderate” and “strong” violence to include a larger number of potential injuries.  For 
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example, their method did not allow specifically for images of bruising, severed limbs or 
visible entrails.  
I borrow from SLT’s measures of explicitness and graphicness of violence. I 
deviate from the original measures of explicitness by adding a category of “not shown on 
screen” to the explicit measure.  Whereas SLT’s measure of graphicness was simplified 
to none, mild, moderate or extreme with no specifics as to what types of images fit into 
each category, I develop specific requirements for each category6.  I also add a separate 
category for the measurement of images of death, a category unused by both HRT and 
SLT.  Hence, by combining old methods of coding in new ways, adapting them to 
consider real-world images instead of video games, and adding new measures, my coding 
scheme offers an innovative and more highly-specified approach to the measurement of 
news images of violence. 
Using this coding scheme, discussed in further detail below, I conduct a large-
scale content analysis to evaluate news imagery between the Vietnam War and the Iraq 
War.  I selected the Vietnam and Iraq wars because they are analogous in many ways.  
Both wars were pre-emptive.  Both committed large numbers of American troops for long 
periods of time.  Both attempted to create and train a viable native military.  Public 
support for both conflicts started at relatively high levels only to fall dramatically over 
following years.  Finally, both were violent conflicts, resulting in significant military and 
civilian casualties.  Of these similarities, the latter is most important to this study.  By 
                                                 
6 Specifically, mild graphicness occurs when the only blood present is a small scrape or scratch, moderate 
graphicness involves noticeable blood or gore, covering significant portions of one’s body.  Puddles of 
blood on the ground is included in this category as well.  Extreme graphicness occurs when blood covers all 
or most of the body, and/or dismemberment is shown. 
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choosing wars that both imposed high levels of violence7, I can make comparative 
evaluations of images of war violence without a selection bias.    
  
Data 
All data were collected at the Vanderbilt Television New Archives.  The Archives 
are located in Nashville, Tennessee, on the campus of Vanderbilt University and contain 
the evening news programs of the three major networks (CBS, NBC, ABC), dating back 
to 1968.  Data are available on a secure network, accessible only in the archive office or 
at the central library.  
Of the 3,596 days of war in the population of my study, I sampled 953 days of 
news coverage.  The sample consisted of approximately one-fourth of the total days of 
the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts8.  Using a random number generator, I drew a sample of 
409 days from Vietnam and 437 days from Iraq.  Each sample was randomly divided 
between the networks of ABC, CBS and NBC.   Of the sampled days, archived news 
coverage was available on 786 days9.  I code only lead news stories, or the first two 
substantive news stories of a broadcast.  Since most Americans, the majority of the time, 
pay little attention to political news of any kind (Althaus 2007, Price and Zaller 1993), 
lead stories are most likely to reach the mass public.  Additionally, news networks order 
stories by importance. By evaluating lead stories instead of all stories, I am able to 
observe when war is most salient.  If lead stories are more important, images from lead 
                                                 
7 Although both wars involved high levels of violence, with attention to casualties, Vietnam was much 
more deadly.  This makes for an even harder test, as I find that presentations from Iraq are more violent 
even though fewer deaths occurred.   
8 Archive coverage is not available until August 5, 1968.  Consequently, coverage of Vietnam began at that 
time, concluding January 27, 1973.  The Iraq period of study was from March 20, 2003-December 31, 
2007. 
9 Archive footage is sometimes unavailable due to computer errors.  More often, unavailability results when 
a network does not air a news broadcast due to a sporting event or other television program.    
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stories are also more likely to reach the mass public in other ways, through the Internet or 
print media. 
 
Motivation for analyses 
In order to ensure that this content analysis is capturing the full arsenal of news 
images that may shape viewer opinions, it is crucial to consider a number of visual 
variables, as well as a lesser number of non-visual variables that are likely to condition 
the effects of images.  The data collected here, while interesting in their own right, will 
also be used in Chapter 4 to determine how news images of war affect aggregate public 
opinion.   
I devote attention to numerous categorical measures of violence for two reasons.  
First, it is theoretically possible that different types of violence may affect people in 
varying ways.  For example, might images of death be stronger influences on public 
opinion than images of personal injury?  The inclusion of multiple measures allows for 
the testing of this possibility.  Secondly, the large number of variables for measuring 
violence provides a highly specific and accurate measurement of the amount of violent 
imagery within a television news story.  An additive measure of all variables of violence 
will be used later in the dissertation to track how violent images influence public support 
for war over time.   
Other measures of images, such as perpetrators and targets of violence, also play a 
role in a viewer’s interpretation of visual information.  These data are considered in 
models of public support for war later in dissertation chapter 4.  Finally, the frame and 
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tone of the story may condition overall effects of violence.  I include measures for these 
characteristics in the content analysis as well.   
 
Measures of Violence 
To measure violence in its many forms as accurately as possible, I code violence 
using five different variables.  These variables include portrayal of personal injury, 
portrayal of death, explicitness of violence, graphicness of violence, and the amount of 
time violence appears in a news story.  Analyses of the data show the presentations of 
violence are indeed markedly different between Vietnam and Iraq.  Displays of violent 
images during television news stories on Iraq dwarf stories on the Vietnam War in almost 
every category, suggesting that violence in television news reports of war has increased 
since the Vietnam era.  Table 1 presents a summary of the data on violent images. These 
data reflect the percentage of war stories containing images of violence, divided by 
violence measure and war.  In the next sections, I will specifically describe each type of 
violence and its presentation in the data.   
 
Table 1:  
 Summary of Violent War Images in Television News Coverage of Vietnam and Iraq* 
 
Violence Measure Vietnam War Iraq War 
Images of Personal Injury 16.3% 56.38% 
Images of Portrayal of Death 7.07% 31.28% 
Images of Explicit Violence 16.84% 72.84% 
Images of Graphic Violence 10.33% 44.44% 
Average Length of Violent Images 5.89 seconds per story 18.22 seconds per story 
 
*These data reflect the percentage of war stories containing images of violence.  
All images in television news reports are included, regardless of severity.   
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Personal Injury 
First, I evaluate the portrayal of personal injury.  This is violence in its most basic 
definition, as intentional acts in which the aggressor causes or attempts to cause physical 
injury or death to another person (Haninger, Ryan and Thompson 2004).  This variable is 
coded on a five-point scale, from 0 to 4, with (0) being no violence whatsoever, (1) 
assumed violence, (2) mild violence, (3) moderate violence and (4) strong violence.  I 
code violence as “assumed” if no depiction of personal injury is seen, but a violent act 
occurs.  Camera shots from a distance- of ground fire, explosions, etc. - are often coded 
this way.  “Mild” violence occurs when the most severe depiction of violence involves 
minor auditory or visual representations of injury and pain that primarily serve to notify 
the viewer the person was harmed.  For example, a victim may grunt or stagger, but does 
not fall, scream or bleed.  If violence is “moderate,” the most severe depictions of 
violence involve moderate representations of injury and pain.  A person may scream, fall 
down, show visible bloodshed, bruising or other indication of injury.  The most extreme 
case of violence, coded “strong,” occurs with representations of injury and pain that 
exaggerate or focus attention on suffering.  An individual who screamed in agony or 
continued vocalization of pain, bled excessively when injured, had severed limbs, showed 
visible entrails or was otherwise physically tortured would be coded in this category. 
Figure 5 presents the results of data analysis of images of personal injury.  Less 
than 17% of Vietnam stories show any visual presentation of injury whatsoever.  Only 
1.6% of Vietnam stories show “strong” images of harm.  On the other hand, over 56% of 
news stories on Iraq contain violent images of injury, with almost 40% of stories 
containing “moderate” or “strong” violence.   
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Figure 5:  Images of personal injury in television news coverage of war 
 
Death 
Second, the portrayal of death may affect a viewer’s outlook of war.  Television 
news coverage may show death in three degrees of intensity.  (1) Dead bodies are alluded 
to, or blood and/or the site of death is shown.  (2)  One or more dead bodies are shown.  
(3)  The moment of a person’s death is shown on film.  I code (0) if no death is portrayed 
in a news story.  If a story shows more than one type of portrayal of death, I record the 
most severe portrayal.  I also compare the deaths reported in news casts to the actual 
number of casualties that occurred.   
Curiously, a stark difference exists between Vietnam and Iraq coverage of war 
casualties.  Empirically, thousands more American military deaths occurred in Vietnam 
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than in Iraq (see figure 6).10    When Vietnam news stories feature death reports, the 
number of deaths reported is much higher than Iraq reports of the same nature (see figure 
7.)  Nevertheless, death is still mentioned and shown more frequently in television news 
coverage of Iraq than Vietnam.  Indeed, casualties are reported in just 35% of all lead 
Vietnam War stories.  Iraq reports discuss casualties almost twice as often, in 66% of 
lead stories, even though there are fewer deaths to discuss (see figure 8).   To control for 
differences in ease of acquiring images, these data combine both verbal and visual 
representations of casualties.  Dead bodies are shown in less than 8% of Vietnam stories, 
while Iraq stories show death over 31% of the time (see figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 6:  U.S. military deaths:  Vietnam and Iraq 
                                                 
10 According to United States government statistics, 56,700 American troops died in the Vietnam War 
during the period of this study, 1963-1972.  In contrast, from 2003-2007 in the Iraq war, 3,907 U.S. 
military deaths occurred 
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Figure 7:  Reported U.S. military casualties:  Vietnam and Iraq 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Percentage of lead news stories reporting war casualties 
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Figure 9:  Percentage of television news stories showing images of death 
 
Several possibilities exist for the disparity.  First, the Vietnam War involved much 
more negotiation between states than Iraq, and lead Vietnam stories quite often covered 
current or upcoming peace talks that had more to do with the future than past or current 
events.  It may be that coverage of peace talks superseded coverage of casualties in 
importance in the minds of network executives and the public.  Second, remember that 
this study examines only lead stories of war.  Reports of casualties may have been present 
in Vietnam coverage, but more likely to occur later in the newscast.  This makes sense if 
the widespread nature of casualties during Vietnam somewhat jaded the public.  If many 
people die most days, does it remain as newsworthy?  The lesser frequency of casualties 
in Iraq may have made casualty reports more likely to lead news programming.  Finally, 
images likely add to the newsworthiness of casualty reports.  Such stories are more likely 
to attract the attention of the public if they include a visual of the reported violence.  
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Without imagery in the majority of Vietnam reports, discussions of casualties often took 
the same form time after time, arguably making them less interesting.   
 
Explicitness  
Third, the explicitness of violence may matter in presentations of violence, 
defined as the amount of distance with which physical aggression is shown.  I select the 
highest degree of explicitness shown throughout a story.  Violence may be (1) referenced 
but not shown on screen, (2) shown from a distance or (3) shown to the viewer from an 
up close camera perspective.  Again, I code (0) if no violence exists in a given news 
story.   
Results of data analysis show that over 60% of Iraq news stories show violence 
from an up close camera perspective.  This number more than triples the amount of 
violence shown on Vietnam news stories in any form, and only 11% of Vietnam stories 
show viewers violence up close.  The up close camera perspective has become the norm 
in bringing violence into viewers’ living rooms.  When Vietnam era producers made 
decisions on camera perspective, they chose a distance perspective about one-third of the 
time.  Television producers of Iraq stories are much less likely to choose a distance 
viewpoint, opting for long shot views in less than one-sixth of war stories.  Figure 10 
presents these data. 
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Figure 10:  Explicitness of television news images of war 
 
Graphicness 
Fourth, I evaluate the graphicness of violence, or the amount of blood, gore or 
dismemberment shown.  This variable is also measured on a four-point scale, from (0)  
none to (3) extreme graphic presentation.  (1) Mild graphic violence exists if an 
individual has only a small scrape or scratch.  (2) Graphicness is moderate if blood/gore 
is noticeable and/or covers significant parts of the body.  If a camera focuses on puddles 
of blood on the ground, I code this category as well.  Dismemberment is also included 
here if the wound is treated or bandaged.  (3)  Extreme graphic nature exists when blood 
or gore covers all or most of the body.  Dismemberment is noted here if the wound is 
exposed. 
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Results show that less than 11% of Vietnam news stories are graphic in nature 
(showing some degree of blood and gore), while over 44% of Iraq stories contain some 
graphic portrayal of violence.  While extremely graphic presentations are still not 
commonplace, they start to emerge as an option during coverage of the Iraq War.  No 
stories show extreme blood or gore during Vietnam reports, but in 7% of Iraq stories, 
producers allowed extremely graphic violence to air on the evening news.  Figure 11 
shows the disparity between Vietnam and Iraq in displays of graphic images. 
   
 
Figure 11:  Graphic violence in television news images of war 
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on screen provides another lens through which to assess aggressive images.  I measure 
time in seconds, as well as a percentage of total story length.  I evaluate total amount of 
time of violence, as well as three subcategories, including acts of violence (gun shooting, 
bomb exploding, etc.), precursor acts of violence (selecting a weapon, aiming), and 
depictions of injury after violence (person lying dead or wounded).  Precursor acts of 
violence must point to intent to commit a violent act in order to qualify.  For example, a 
soldier patrolling the streets with a gun in his possession, but not aiming it, would not 
qualify as a precursor to violence.  A soldier walking the streets, gun raised and aimed, 
however, is a precursor act of violence.   
Data analysis shows the mean amount of violence in Iraq war stories is 9.22 
seconds of violent acts, 2.8 seconds of precursor acts of violence and 6.2 seconds of 
images of injury.  Vietnam stories average less than 3 seconds of violence in every 
category, but this number does not tell the whole story.  Whereas most Iraq stories show 
some images of violence, most Vietnam stories do not.  In fact, less than 17% of Vietnam 
reports show any of the four measures of violence.  Averaged together with stories that 
contain no violent images, the means drop severely.  However, if a Vietnam story does 
contain violent images, it is likely to contain more of them than a story on Iraq.  For 
example, of those stories containing acts of violence, Vietnam stories average 23.23 
seconds of violent acts.  The mean of Iraq stories is lower, at 15.68 seconds.   
This finding fits with the type of coverage offered by networks during the 
Vietnam War.  Because securing video feed of war images was much more costly during 
Vietnam than Iraq, fewer camera crews were present to capture war events.  When a 
network did put forth the money and resources to take video of Vietnam, it wanted to 
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capitalize on each opportunity.  Why send a camera crew for only a few seconds of 
video?  Hence, when networks aired images from Vietnam, they usually aired several 
minutes at a time.  While violent images account for only a percentage of total images, 
the long duration of Vietnam video feeds often results in more violence (in seconds) per 
image segment.  Since the cost of securing war images today in Iraq is much lower, even 
commonplace, segments of all lengths are used at the discretion of the producers. 
 
Perpetrators and targets of violence 
The perpetrators and targets of violence may also matter greatly in how 
individuals assess their support for war.  If television news stories depict American 
soldiers engaged in justified violence, violent images could theoretically increase rather 
than deflate public support.  Conversely, if the targets of violence are civilians or 
Americans, support is likely to decrease in some cases as viewers see harm to innocents 
or their own people.  Perpetrators and targets of violence may be all American (or allies) 
forces, mostly American (or allies) forces, both American (or allies) and enemy forces, 
mostly enemy forces, all enemy forces, or unknown.  I also evaluate if civilians are 
involved.  I measure demographic information of both targets and perpetrators.  Women 
and children especially may have the ability to garner strong responses from television 
viewers. 
One of the more interesting findings in the difference between Vietnam and Iraq 
is whom news stories portray as the perpetrators and targets of violence.  While the 
enemy is the most often depicted perpetrator of violence in stories of both Vietnam and 
Iraq, violence by enemy forces is seen significantly more often during Iraq stories.  
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During Vietnam, the enemy is portrayed as the perpetrator of violence just 37% of the 
time.  For stories about the Iraq war, enemy forces are depicted as the perpetrator of 
violence in 53% of stories.  In about one-third of Vietnam stories, viewers see a mixed 
portrayal of violence, with violent acts committed by both American and enemy forces in 
the same story.  Conversely, stories with both American and enemy perpetrators are seen 
in only one-fifth of Iraq stories.   
The most frequent target of violence in stories during the Vietnam War is 
Americans.  Americans are the sole recipients of violence in 27% of Vietnam stories.  In 
contrast, Iraq stories seldom portray Americans as the sole target of violence (less than 
9% of reports).  Instead civilians are the most often reported target of Iraq War violence, 
singled out in 26% of all Iraq news broadcasts.  Reports that feature the enemy as sole or 
primary target of violence are similar for both Vietnam and Iraq, at about 21% of stories.   
Perpetrators and targets of violence matter because they may influence the way 
the public thinks about war.  If many Americans do not like to see their fellow citizens as 
the targets of violence, graphic images of wounded American soldiers are likely to 
demoralize public support for war.  On the other hand, images of triumph over the 
enemy, often accompanied by violence toward enemy combatants, may bolster American 
feelings of support.  However, the public’s reaction to violent images cannot be predicted 
by targets and perpetrators alone.  While certain targets and perpetrators of violence lend 
themselves to some frames more easily than others, the frame surrounding the visuals 
makes a considerable impact on the viewer.  Depending on the frame used, support may 
increase or decrease.   For detailed data on this and subsequent variables, see table 2 in 
appendix A. 
38 
 
Frame of violence 
While images are powerful and evocative of emotion, the frame surrounding an 
image often determines how a viewer responds.  A violent image may draw a viewer’s 
attention and increase response, but without context, we cannot accurately predict what 
kind of response will occur.  Accordingly, I note whether violence is “justified” or 
“unjustified,” as determined by the frame of the story.  The most general criterion is 
whether the violence seeks to promote equality and freedom.   Other questions may help 
determine the frame as well.  Are the motives of the perpetrator selfish or altruistic?  Are 
civilians purposively harmed?  Do the news reporters use condemning language toward 
the perpetrator of violence?    
Data analysis shows that network evening news programs are more likely to 
frame images of war in a normative fashion during the Iraq War than during reports of 
Vietnam.  During the Vietnam War, over one-third of war images aired without being 
framed as justified or unjustified violence.  For the Iraq War, just 12% of visuals were 
unframed in this way, dropping the amount of neutral image coverage by almost two-
thirds compared to Vietnam.  
The type of frame most commonly employed by news networks changed from 
Vietnam to Iraq as well.  Although Vietnam and Iraq are comparable in regard to 
downward trends in public opinion, images of the Iraq war are more than twice as likely 
to contain a frame of unjustified violence.  Over 66% of violent Iraq war images are 
framed as unjustified, compared to just 29% of Vietnam images.  Images of justified 
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violence are significantly more likely during the Vietnam War, at 36%, than during the 
war in Iraq, at 22%.11   
The impact of framing can be seen perhaps most clearly when the same images 
are used and reused to tell two completely different stories.  Networks do reuse video 
feed.  The images shown do not necessarily come from the story being told.  Anecdotal 
evidence of the reuse of video feed presented itself during coding.  ABC evening news 
aired two stories in 2003 that used identical images.  The video featured several 
American soldiers surrounding a group of Iraqi men.  The Americans had their guns 
aimed at the Iraqis, while Iraqi men held their hands high in surrender.  In the first story, 
shown at the beginning of the war in March, the reporter spoke approvingly of the 
Americans soldiers.  She said it was “a good day” for U.S. troops, and proceeded to tell 
of the American soldiers’ capture of the rogue Iraqis, keeping them from inflicting future 
harm on American troops and innocent civilians.  The second story aired months later in 
November, after a noticeable drop in public support for the war.  This time the reporter 
spoke of the U.S. troops in a disparaging tone, indicating that the capture of these 
“innocent” Iraqi men was nothing but a self-glorifying witch hunt.   Clearly, the viewer is 
led to entirely different conclusion about war events depending on which story is seen.   
 
Evaluative tone 
 The evaluative tone of the television news reporter may also influence the impact 
of imagery.  Frame and evaluative tone often move together (data are correlated at 0.42), 
such that frames of unjustified violence coincide with negative evaluative tones, or 
                                                 
11 For detailed data on frame of violence and other variables not discussed at length in this chapter, see 
Table 2 in the appendix.   
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frames of justified violence work in tandem with positively toned reports.  Nevertheless, 
they are distinct story elements.  I measure tone as positive, negative or neutral in relation 
to the stated position of the President.  There are advantages and disadvantages to 
measuring tone in this way.  An important benefit of this measure is that it increases the 
ability to measure television news approval of the President. This will be particularly 
useful in Chapter 4 as I evaluate how television news influences public support for the 
President and his wars.   On the other hand, it is possible for a story to be positive or 
negative, and yet coded as neutral provided the normative tone is directed at someone or 
something else other than the President and his administration.  This measure does not 
code for those nuances in tone. 
Data analysis of the wars shows little variation in positive tone.  In both wars, 
networks display modest amounts of positive tone, ranging from 10-15%.  However, 
noticeable changes exist in the negative tone displayed in stories.  Reports of Vietnam 
were negative about 16% of the time, while Iraq reports went negative much more often, 
in 28% of cases.   
 
Exposure to television news stories of war:  Vietnam versus Iraq 
A most basic question addressed by this research is how often has network 
television news covered wars in which America is fighting?  If war images are to 
influence public opinion, they must reach the citizenry on a regular basis.  Several 
methods exist for measuring the public’s potential exposure to television news reports of 
war.  First, I calculate the percentage of days that networks air at least one lead story 
about war.  For Vietnam and Iraq, the coverage is almost identical by this measure, with 
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networks airing lead stories on war 48% of the time12.  Lead stories tend to be more 
frequent in the first months of a conflict.  For both wars, coverage of the conflicts 
declined as the war continued over several years and saliency decreased.   
For a more detailed measure, I also gauge intensity of war news, (0) if neither 
lead story is about the war, (1) if one of the two lead stories concerns war, and (2) if both 
lead stories center on war.  This measure is the best indicator of when war activities are 
most salient because television news networks air stories deemed most important at the 
beginning of a news broadcast.  If one of the two lead stories is about war, war is likely 
salient to the American public.  If both lead stories report on war, the degree of saliency 
increases even further.  Results show that Vietnam news featured more intense war 
coverage, with 27% of days airing one lead story on war and 21% of days airing both 
lead stories on war.  Iraq coverage was more likely to feature only one lead report per 
day, as is the case for almost 40% of days in the sample.  Just 9% of news days devote 
both lead reports to coverage of war.   
 While television news of Vietnam was more likely to offer multiple lead stories 
on the war than coverage of Iraq, this does not necessarily indicate a greater level of 
public exposure to Vietnam news.  The final measure of exposure, length of news report, 
suggests the length of Iraq reports outlasted Vietnam reports by over 60%.  The mean 
story length (in seconds per story) from Vietnam is 2 minutes 22 seconds, while Iraq 
stories average 3 minutes 50 seconds each. Median length increased by 38% from 
                                                 
12 A potential bias exists because coverage of war tends to be higher in the first months of the war, and 
because the archive does not have data for the first 41 months of the Vietnam war.  In addition to the data 
analysis reported above, I analyzed data from Iraq using only months 41 and greater so as to generate a 
sample equivalent in time to Vietnam.  The results for Iraq change insignificantly, with lead stories airing 
on 46.96% of days, down from 48.80%. 
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Vietnam to Iraq.  Table 2 presents information on the length of stories during the 
Vietnam and Iraq wars.   
 
Table 2:  Average length of Network Television News Stories of War (in seconds) 
 
War  N Mean  Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vietnam  184 142.6196* 130  102.7348 10 430   
Iraq  243 230.9465* 180  161.0821 10 900 
 
*Differences of means tests show differences between all wars (significant at 0.01 level). 
 
 
This finding may seem surprising given that previous studies show evidence of 
shortening television news stories.  Sound bites of political figures reduced upwards of 75 
percent from 1968-1988 (Hallin 1992).  However, this does not appear to translate into 
shorter stories of war.  A closer examination of the style of news during each of the wars 
renders some potential explanations as to why reports of war have increased in length 
over time.   
Television news reports of war during the Vietnam era were typically very 
structured, with segmented stories about specific topics.  For example, on ABC News on 
November 1, 1968, the first three stories of the newscast were about a bombing halt in the 
Vietnam War, initiated that morning.  The first story reported the facts and reactions of 
current political leaders.  After a commercial break, a second story told of the reactions 
American soldiers.  Following a second series of commercials, the third report detailed 
the reactions of Presidential candidates.  While all three stories could have easily fit 
under the umbrella of one story line- the bombing halt- producers chose to divide one 
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newsworthy event into three separate reports.  Instead of one story thirteen minutes in 
length, three much shorter stories result.   
Vietnam news reports from all three news networks follow this 
compartmentalized formula for the duration of the conflict.  With fewer images to capture 
viewer interest, perhaps shorter stories were thought to be more in line with the attention 
span of the average nightly news consumer.  Stories from the Iraq War, on the other 
hand, tend to favor an amalgamated approach.  One or two stories typically encapsulate 
all of a day’s events, united by a loosely-used catch-all like “violence” or “attacks.”  
Unlike Vietnam reports, Iraq War stories are packed with visual content, often jumping 
from one scene to another.   
Another reason Vietnam reports are shorter in length, on average, is the almost 
daily reporting of casualty numbers for both American and enemy forces.  These casualty 
reports are isolated news stories, providing little additional information and averaging 
around only 20 seconds in length.  Casualty reports often led a news cast because war 
deaths were important to the American public.  However, with only projected numbers as 
a visual tool, these stories were not visually appealing.  As such, networks often preferred 
to allocate more premier time to other stories, unless an especially noteworthy war event 
occurred.  Stand alone casualty reports are rarely seen during the Iraq War.  Instead, news 
of war casualties is blended into longer stories.  Histograms of story length, separated by 
war, appear in Figure 12.  Whereas the greatest frequency of Iraq war stories are two to 
three minutes in length, the most common length of Vietnam stories is under forty 
seconds.  On the high end, the longest news story about Vietnam is only 7 minutes 10 
seconds long.  In the sample of Iraq stories, 9 reports exceed 10 minutes.   
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Vietnam War 
 
 
 
Iraq War 
Figure 12:   
Histograms of length of network television news stories of war (in seconds) 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Pe
rc
en
t
0 100 200 300 400 500
time
0
10
20
30
P
er
ce
nt
0 200 400 600 800 1000
time
45 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have documented the vast changes in network television news 
coverage of war that have occurred from the Vietnam era to Iraq, with special attention 
given to war images.  Images offer a separate dimension of information to news 
consumers, an element that must be incorporated in the study of television news if we are 
accurately to model its effects. With the coding scheme advanced here, scholars may 
paint a more complete picture of television news’ burgeoning influence on public 
opinion. 
In chapter three, I expand the data set further, turning to cable presentations of 
war news.  Using the same coding scheme developed in this chapter, I measure content 
from CNN and Fox News coverage of the Iraq War on the nightly news programs.  CNN 
and Fox News are thought by many to be entrenched deeply with liberals and 
conservatives, respectively.  The next chapter digs through stereotypes and exaggerations 
to determine the actual composition of verbal and visual content of the two most 
prominent cable news programs.  I compare the cable news programs to network news as 
well. 
While my data set will be useful for a range of studies in the fields of political 
science and communication, the crux of this dissertation lies in its ability to establish how 
these patterns affect the public’s support for war.  Individuals react emotionally and 
cognitively to visual content.  As such, increasingly graphic, violent and evocative 
images may alter the way the public thinks about military conflict.  Later, chapters four 
and five offer theoretical predictions of the effects of war images, derived from the 
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empirical content established here.  In these chapters, I also turn to empirical tests of my 
hypotheses, using public opinion data, statistical models and an experiment. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
CONTRASTING VISUALS IN FOX NEWS AND  
CNN COVERAGE OF THE IRAQ WAR 
 
 
 
 “It's really not news. It's pushing a point of view. And the bigger thing is that 
other news organizations like yours ought not to treat them that way, and we're 
not going to treat them that way.” 
 
-White House Senior adviser David Axelrod, discussing Fox News13  
 
 
 
“There's not a person in the world, not a sane person in the world who thinks that 
CNN is not as far-left liberal as anybody else in the media is, except CNN.  
Sometimes it seems we're all surrounded [by] general, genuine insanity.” 
 
-Radio personality Rush Limbaugh14  
 
The partisan nature of Fox News and CNN is a widely discussed phenomenon 
among many constituencies in American society.  Conventional wisdom says that Fox 
News is a figurehead of Republican conservatives, while CNN promotes a distinctly 
liberal agenda.  Political elites, like David Axelrod and Rush Limbaugh in their quotes 
above, frequently laud the so-called extreme positions of the other side.  Academics also 
acknowledge the partisan divide within cable news.  Dr. Jay Rosen, a New York 
University professor of journalism, states, 
“Everyone realized at once…how much sense the more partisan system made.  
There is an inescapable logic to it.  The whole political scheme that journalists 
thought they had settled forever with this pact they called ‘objectivity’ is not 
working.  The press will have to become more political (Johnson 2004).” 
 
                                                 
13 Comment made by David Axelrod on ABC Morning News, October 18, 2009. 
14 Comment made by Limbaugh on The Rush Limbaugh Show, November 10, 2010. 
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The public espouses similar beliefs about the ideological tendencies of the two networks 
as well.  In a telephone survey by the Pew Research Center, the greatest percentage of 
respondents (37%) said they thought CNN cable news was mostly liberal, while only 
11% indicated that CNN was mostly conservative.  In regard to Fox News, almost half 
(47%) thought the network was mostly conservative, compared to just 14% who said it 
was mostly liberal.  Figure 13 shows these results. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  The public’s perception of CNN and Fox News ideology 
 
Survey data by Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. Methodology: 
Conducted by Opinion Research Corporation, October 23 - October 26, 2009 and based 
on 1,001 telephone interviews.  (iPoll) 
 
Question wording:   
As I read a list of news networks, please tell me if you think each is mostly liberal, 
mostly conservative, or neither in particular. 
...The Fox News cable channel 
…CNN cable news 
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Based on CNN and Fox News’ reputations, we might expect the two networks to 
produce dramatically different news reports on war.  Looking specifically to potential 
differences in the networks portrayals of violence, there is reason to think imagery would 
be different between the two as well.  If violence decreases public support for war, and if 
Fox News acts as an agent for George W. Bush and the conservatives, we would 
anticipate Fox News to produce less violent images of the Iraq war in its news reports.  
Conversely, as a liberal opponent of the Iraq war, CNN would have an incentive to show 
viewers more graphic images of violence. 
Does empirical evidence support this popular belief?  Do CNN and Fox News 
often choose radically different approaches in broadcasting images of war violence?  Or 
do the cable news networks largely produce similar images of war, in both amount and 
degree?  Their decisions may have important consequences for how the public thinks 
about war.   
In this chapter, I evaluate differences and similarities in Fox News and CNN 
coverage of the Iraq war in their evening news programs, devoting special attention to 
violent news images.  These data are important in measuring the information 
environment available to American voters.  The information environment available to 
citizens is significant because it determines the amount of political knowledge that voters 
can glean from the consumption of television news.  Furthermore, the documentation of 
differences in television media here will provide the basis for analyses in subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation.   
Contrary to prevailing sentiments, analysis of an original data set determines that 
the evening news programs of CNN and Fox News tend to show images of war violence 
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with similar frequency, severity and explicitness.  Surprisingly, there are only slight 
differences in the images viewers see on either network.  Another unexpected finding 
emerges when comparing Fox News and CNN to network news programs.  While we 
might anticipate cable news programs to be more extreme in their presentations of 
violence, they actually offer significantly less violent images of war.                                                           
Notable differences do exist, however, in non-visual components of the news: 
length of stories, tone and frame of violence.  Even so, given that conservatives and 
liberals alike frequently attack the other side as politically radical, the real story is more 
moderate.  Variation certainly exists between Fox News and CNN, but not to the extent 
that many critics or the public would expect.    
With attention to television news reports of war, this chapter offers two important 
contributions.  First, by using the original coding method explained in chapter 2, I capture 
the power of war images on cable television news.  The original content analysis of cable 
news program on the Vanderbilt Television News Archives should add a rich and 
nuanced body of evidence, documenting portrayal of war across two cable networks over 
the course of the Iraq War.  Second, I offer empirical evidence of differences between the 
presentation styles and content of the two networks, including how the ideological 
leanings of CNN and Fox News affect their presentations of war.  Portrayal of war across 
networks is of significant interest to scholars in this age of increasing media polarization, 
and these findings are especially interesting as they do not match with the commonly held 
view of severe differences between cable choices.   
The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I offer a summary of the debate in the 
discipline regarding the relationship between partisanship and cable news.  Next, I 
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present and discuss findings of the content of war images on CNN and Fox News, as well 
as some non-visual characteristics.  I also compare cable news presentations of war to 
network news broadcasts.  Finally, I discuss the implications of this research and explore 
future research possibilities. 
 
Partisanship and cable news polarization 
According to studies by the Pew Research Center (2009)15, consumers of cable 
news exhibit strong partisan preferences.  There is a widening gap in partisan differences 
between viewers of both CNN and Fox News.  The number of Republicans (34%) who 
say they get the majority of their national and international news from Fox News 
outnumbers Fox’s Democrat (10%) consumers by roughly three and half times.  In the 
same way, Democrats cite CNN as their preferred news source over Republicans at a 
margin of more than two to one (29% vs. 13%).  Table 3 presents these survey data. 
Fox News and CNN represent only a subset of the many options available to 
today’s citizen.  Growing choice in media outlets causes individuals to be more isolated 
and less unified in their common beliefs and political behaviors (Prior 2005).  Indeed, 
Fox News and CNN are less polarizing options than many programs, especially 
entertainment-oriented soft news programs like the satirical Daily Show or The Colbert 
Report (Baum 2003).  Nevertheless, Fox News and CNN remain known for their partisan 
viewpoints.  Fox News is both loved and hated for its widely-touted conservatism and 
generally favorable portrayal of Republicans.  CNN is renowned for its more liberal 
interpretations.   
                                                 
15 Previous studies, including those conducted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (1999), The 
Gallup Organization (2003), and an earlier study by the Pew Research Center (2005) reported similar 
results. 
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Table 3:  Partisanship of Cable News Consumers16 
 
Main source for national  July June July July  
and international news  2003 2005 2007 2009  
 
Fox News    % % % % 
Total     22 16 17 19 
 Republican   31 26 28 34 
 De mocrat   17 11 11 10 
 Independent   21 14 16 19 
 
R-D gap    +14 +15 +17 +24 
 
CNN 
Total     27 18 16 22 
 Republican   26 15 13 13 
 De mocrat   32 21 21 29 
 Independent   24 18 14 20 
 
R-D gap    -6 -6 -6 -16 
 
 
Is CNN “the most trusted name in news” with “the best political team on 
television,” as its slogans suggest?  Is Fox News “fair and balanced,” as it proudly 
decrees at the beginning of each broadcast?  Many viewers and critics are doubtful, but 
partisan views on the evening news may not be as pronounced as frequently believed.  
Because both CNN and Fox News offer a range of programming, only a minority of 
which is devoted strictly to daily news, the rumored content of each network’s national 
evening newscasts is often convoluted with other broadcasts that focus more on political 
commentary.  For example, the fact that Fox’s “chat consistently tilts to the conservative 
side may cast an unwarranted cloud on the news reporting, which tends to be 
straightforward” (Kurtz 2001).  A similar story might exist for CNN.   
                                                 
16 Data from The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, results from telephone interviews of a 
nationwide sample. 
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Indeed, a large body of research suggests the content of those programs devoted 
strictly to television news- including those on cable networks- are not ideologically 
biased (Bennett and Entman 2001; Graber 1980; Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Robinson and Clancey 1985; Robinson and Sheehan 1983).  More recent work challenges 
this notion that no bias exists in television news, but there is not consensus on the 
direction of existing ideological forces.  A study by the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA) (2003) provides reason to believe that Fox News viewers are subjected 
to conservative bias.  On the other hand, work by Groseclose and Milyo (2005) claims 
that almost all news media17 demonstrate bias toward liberal preferences.  But perhaps 
even more telling than actual bias is the perception that it permeates cable news.  A 
recent study (Turner 2007) shows that simply attaching a “Fox News Channel” or “CNN” 
label to a news story is sufficient to send an ideological signal to a viewer.  This kind of 
signal can lead viewers to perceive bias even when it does not exist.  The range of 
findings on cable news bias indicates the need for further work on this topic.   
In many ways, cable news is not so different from network news programs.  Even 
if a cable network is known for a certain ideological viewpoint, news programs are 
constrained by the news itself.  Individuals watch news programs because they want 
factual information on current events in the world.  Cable news and network news alike 
must cater to that desire or risk losing viewers.  Whereas people take political 
commentary with a grain of salt, news is intended to be authoritative.  Cable commentary 
on CNN or Fox News may display relatively large levels of political bias while strict 
news programs remain largely untouched.  The biggest difference between cable news 
and network news is length; cable news programs are an hour, while network news last 
                                                 
17 They note exceptions as the Washington Post and Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume. 
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for only thirty minutes.  As such, the cable networks have time to discuss events in 
greater detail with a higher number of news personalities. 
Though strict news programs constitute a minority of total cable news options, 
there are compelling reasons to study them.  First and foremost, this study seeks to 
examine violent images in television news.  Cable news is important in informing news 
consumers about war, and evenings news programs are much more likely to contain 
violent images than chat-oriented shows.  Second, CNN and Fox News evening news 
programs both occur in prime time (7-10 p.m.), the most-watched period for both cable 
networks.  Third, the evening news programs of CNN and Fox News are similar enough 
to traditional network news programs (ABC, CBS, NBC) to make interesting 
comparisons, both over time and across networks.   
Simply because CNN and Fox News are thought to lean toward opposing 
ideological poles does not necessarily mean that they portray news worthy events in 
meaningfully different ways.  It is possible that their political commentary may, at least 
for the most part, stay out of evening news programming.  If such is the case, commonly 
held assumptions about ideologically-based differences in CNN and Fox News programs 
are misplaced.  Furthermore, if the networks share commonalities in their news programs 
and images, the effects of news images may generalize across networks. 
 
Research design 
I conduct an original content analysis of the Vanderbilt Television News 
Archives, evaluating lead stories about war from the national evening news programs 
from Fox News and CNN, the two leading cable news networks.  How much does 
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television news coverage of war actually vary between Fox News and CNN?  Using the 
same original coding scheme explained a length in the previous chapter, I assess changes 
in presentation of war news on cable networks.   
While this study is primarily concerned with images of war violence on cable 
news, a secondary goal is to compare the content of CNN and Fox News stories of war 
more broadly.   Which cable network offers more coverage of the Iraq War?  How often 
to the networks make the same decision to cover/not cover the day’s war events?  I also 
examine the ideological tilt of each network.  How conservative are Fox News reports of 
war?  How liberal is CNN news?  How does cable news coverage of war compare with 
network news coverage of war?  How do these components influence the total amount of 
information available to voters? 
The random sample (in days) from the Iraq conflict has an N of 200 for both Fox 
News and CNN.  I use only one sample (the same days for each network) so as to directly 
compare each day’s coverage between networks.  Footage from the Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive is only available from January 15, 2004; consequently evaluation of the 
Iraq War began at that time and continues through December 31, 2007.  I code only lead 
news stories, or the first two substantive news stories of a broadcast.  Since most 
Americans usually pay little attention to political news of any kind (Althaus 2007, Price 
and Zaller 1993), lead stories are most likely reach the mass public.  Additionally, news 
networks order stories by importance. By evaluating lead stories instead of all stories, I 
am able to observe when war is most salient.   
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Results 
  Analyses of the data show that CNN and Fox News coverage of the Iraq war are 
predominantly similar in the images they broadcast. Largely, depictions of violence and 
violent imagery remain constant across the two networks, with a few exceptions that will 
be discussed in detail below.  However, differences between CNN and Fox News are 
evident in regard to some characteristics of their programming.  One of the most notable 
variations exists between whom the networks show as perpetrators and targets of 
violence.  Differences in war coverage between the two networks is also apparent in 
comparisons of story length, where CNN stories tend to outlast those on Fox News by a 
margin of more than two to one.   The networks tend to display contrasting evaluative 
tones as well.  While the use of positive tone is rare for both cable outlets, CNN uses a 
negative tone much more frequently than does Fox News.  Interestingly, both story length 
and tone are variables that are independent of visual information and factual events. 
 
Coverage of war 
 Before a comparative evaluation of cable news content, it is useful to analyze 
when CNN and Fox News choose to broadcast lead stories about the Iraq War.  How 
often do both networks act together in their decisions to lead their programs with Iraq 
news?  How often do they make the same decisions not to lead with Iraq news?  When 
and how often does the decision to cover Iraq war news vary between CNN and Fox 
News?   Does one cable network show more ownership of the Iraq War as an issue? 
 Largely, CNN and Fox News seem to have similar opinions about which events in 
Iraq are newsworthy.  In over 71% of the sampled days of news coverage, CNN and Fox 
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News made the same decision about whether or not to lead news with a story on Iraq.  
Given the large number of potential new stories, and that this analysis only considers the 
first two substantive stories of a news broadcast, this degree of comparability is quite 
high.  For 44% of the sample, neither network led with Iraq News.   For 27% of the 
sample, both networks produced at least one of their two lead stories on the Iraq War.  
The networks diverged in their war coverage in slightly more than one-fourth of the 
sample.  CNN airs lead Iraq stories (when Fox News does not) 10% of the time.  Fox 
News leads with this war news (when CNN does not) 18% of the time, broadcasting 
slightly more stories on Iraq than CNN.   Figure 14 presents these results.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 14:  Cable News Decision Making 
 
71% of stories:   CNN and Fox News make the same decision; both cover/do not cover 
Iraq. 
 
29% of stories:   CNN and Fox News make different decisions; one covers, one does not. 
Cable News Decision Making:  How often 
do CNN and Fox News cover Iraq?
CNN only
Fox News only
Neither CNN nor Fox News
Both CNN and Fox News
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 Overall, CNN leads its nightly news program with news of Iraq on 37% of days.  
Fox News offers viewers modestly greater coverage of Iraq, beginning its evening 
program with Iraq War news on 45% of days.  Nevertheless, a t-test shows no statistically 
significant differences between the two means.  Thus, we can conclude that neither cable 
network emerges as the clear owner of the Iraq War as an issue.  While consumers of Fox 
News may see slightly more news on the war than their CNN counterparts, viewers are 
likely to receive roughly the same amounts of war coverage regardless of their choice to 
watch the evening news on CNN or Fox News. 
 
Story length 
The most easily observable difference between CNN and Fox News reports of 
war is in length of story.  Table 4 presents these data.  The average CNN story on Iraq is 
6:52, lasting more than twice as long as the average Fox News story at 3:14.  CNN stories 
frequently last more than ten minutes, with the longest story in this sample clocking in at 
18:30.  On the other hand, the longest Fox News story stayed well under the ten-minute 
mark at 8:20.   The large difference in story length between CNN and Fox News in their 
presentations of the Iraq war is a symptom of a larger trend:  CNN gives viewers more 
information.  With a few exceptions, a seven-minute long story of war tells viewers more 
about a day’s war events than a three-minute story.   
An example of how length of story may affect viewer perceptions of war is 
helpful to illustrate the importance of story length differences.  Let us contrast CNN and 
Fox News coverage of an anecdotal war event that made news headlines.  On May 1, 
2004, both CNN and Fox News lead their newscasts with stories on Iraqi prisoner abuse 
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by American and British military forces.  This news came on the heels of a recently 
released fifty-three page internal US Army report, covered by The New Yorker magazine, 
as well as a story and photographs of prisoner abuse in the British newspaper The Daily 
Mirror.   
 
Table 4: 
Average Length of Stories about the Iraq War:  CNN versus Fox News 
 
 Mean length Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
CNN 6 minutes 52 
seconds 
283.98 seconds 10 seconds 18 minutes 30 
seconds 
Fox News 3 minutes 14 
seconds 
102.25 seconds 20 seconds 8 minutes 20 
seconds 
  
 
 CNN devoted seven minutes to the story.  Its story began with graphic photos of 
the prisoner abuse, showing naked Iraqi prisoners in sexually compromising positions, 
being urinated on, beaten or undergoing other acts of torture.  The coverage described the 
pictures as “sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses.”  CNN then showed clips of 
interviews with prominent leaders of various political, military and nonprofit 
organizations, all of whom commented on the abuse.  These included British General 
Michael Jackson, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Amnesty International 
representative Neil Durkin and former British Ambassador to Iraq Harold Walker.  The 
report concluded with an in-depth interview with Duke University professor and former 
Air Force attorney Scott Silliman, who detailed the different facets of the prisoner abuse 
problem, from public relations among coalition members to Muslim sensitivity to nudity.  
In all, the report featured comments from five different public officials or experts.  
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Viewers took away not only the shock of graphic pictures, but an understanding of their 
implications to various populations. 
 The Fox News story on the same topic was far less detailed, lasting for slightly 
more than a minute before moving to other Iraq events.  Like the CNN story, the Fox 
News report began with references to stories in The New Yorker and The Daily Mirror, 
and showed the same photos of prisoner abuse.  While CNN described the abuse 
generally, Fox News talked about it using specific language, such as “sodomizing with a 
broomstick.”  Fox News featured only one interview, a brief statement by Tony Blair; a 
quote from an unnamed British general was also used.  No other public officials or 
experts were included in the story.  Although the same images were shown in both CNN 
and Fox News reports, the shorter Fox News story gave viewers less contextual 
information about the wider ramifications of the pictures.  As such, while CNN and Fox 
News viewers both saw the same images about prisoner abuse, the amount of factual and 
contextual information received was quite distinctive.  
 This anecdotal evidence of CNN’s greater reliance on expert opinion and 
interviews of political leader compared to Fox News is representative of the data as a 
whole.  CNN also uses more reporters per story than does Fox News.  The median CNN 
war news report features two CNN reporters, while the median FOX war story uses only 
1 reporter18.  This again illustrates that the average CNN story offers viewers more 
information and more perspectives on war issues than the typical story from Fox News.  
The implication of this variation is that viewers of CNN will garner greater levels of 
political knowledge, at least in regard to the Iraq War, than viewers of Fox News.  
                                                 
18 Mean number of reporters per story for CNN is 1.77.  Mean number of reporters per story for Fox News 
is 1.51. 
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Heightened levels of political knowledge are associated with a range of political 
phenomena, including voter turnout and other forms of political participation (Prior 
2005). 
While the offering of more information might seem a presumably desirable 
feature of CNN, CNN lags consistently behind Fox News in cable news ratings (Bauder 
2009).   The differing information environments of Fox News and CNN give viewers two 
distinct options when selecting where to watch news programs.  Fox News’ reputation as 
the entertainment-oriented option may hold some truth.  It serves a role for viewers that 
do not possess or seek high political knowledge (i.e., most of the citizenry, Zaller 1992 
and many others) as the less intensive television option, whereas CNN provides a more 
extensive information atmosphere. 
 The mean length of network news reports is very comparable to the length of Fox 
News reports, clocking in at an average of 3 minutes 19 seconds, just 5 seconds longer 
than Fox.  Still, given that network news programs are thirty minutes rather than an hour, 
the  percentage of news coverage devoted to war on Fox News is roughly half that of 
network news programming.  CNN stories dwarf all other evening news options in regard 
to length of report in minutes.  As a percentage of total news time, however, CNN and 
network news devote similar percentages of coverage to war.  Still, the decision between 
CNN and network news options may come down to decisions regarding the degree of 
total information sought by news consumers, where CNN provides twice the amount of 
time in which to package potential knowledge.  As such, these results again speak to 
differences in the information environment of various news options.   
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Images 
 First, let us broadly examine the visual component of the two cable networks’ 
portrayals of violence in the Iraqi conflict.  I evaluate images of violence according to the 
same criteria and method establish in chapter two, coding violence on five dimensions:  
1) personal injury, images in which an aggressor causes or attempts to cause physical 
injury or death to another person; 2) death; 3) explicitness of violence, the amount of 
distance with which physical aggression is shown; 4) graphicness of violence, the amount 
of blood, gore or dismemberment shown; and 5) length of violence, the time (in seconds) 
that violent images appear in a story19.  For the first four measures, I code for the most 
severe depiction of violence in each story.   
Results show that violent images are not ubiquitous in cable news coverage of 
war.  Table 5 summarizes the key findings in detail.  Images of personal injury, death and 
graphic violence appear in only one-third of stories or less.  Although most stories 
convey factual information about violence, a much smaller percentage of reports show 
viewers images of the referenced aggression.  For example, 63% of stories, for both CNN 
and Fox News, reference casualties, but only 11% (Fox News) to 15% (CNN) of stories 
show viewers images of those deaths.   
Difference of means tests are used to determine if CNN and Fox News vary from 
one another in meaningful ways in the images of violence they show.  Of the four 
measures of violence in news imagery, CNN and Fox News are alike in three of them- 
portrayal of death, explicitness of violence, and graphicness of violence.  The networks 
vary somewhat in their portrayal of personal injury. But, interestingly, the differences are 
only statistically significant in regard to the images the networks do not show.  Almost a  
                                                 
19 For detailed information on the coding of these and subsequent variables, refer to chapter 2. 
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Table 5: 
Content analyses of violence in Fox News and CNN coverage of the Iraq War, sample of 
evening news broadcasts 2004-2007    
           CNN  
       CNN  Fox News Diff.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
% stories with images of personal injury 
 No personal injury    17.33  32.26           -14.93** 
 Assumed injury, no images   50.67  33.87            16.80*** 
 Mild injury images    4.00   9.68    -5.68 
 Moderate injury images    16.0 0  11.2 9    5.29 
 Severe injury images    12.0 0  12.9 0   -0.90 
 
% stories with images of death     
 No death     36.0 0  37.1 0  -1.10
 Death referenced, no images   49.3 3  51.6 1  -2.28  
 Dead bodies shown    14.6 7  11.2 9  3.38  
 Moment of death shown   0.00   0.00   0.00  
 
% stories with images of explicit violence 
 No violence     12.0 0  19.3 5  -7.35  
 Violence, no images    16.0 0  16.1 3  -0.13  
 Violent images from a distance   1.33  4.84  -3.51 
 Violent images up close    70.6 7  59.6 8  10.9 9 
 
% stories with images of graphic violence 
 No images of blood or gore   73.3 3  70.9 7  2.36  
 Mild images of blood or gore   9.33   9.68   -0.35  
 Moderate images of blood or gore  6.67  8.06  -1.39 
 Severe images of blood or gore   10.6 7  11.2 9  -0.62  
 
Perpetrator of violence 
 Am erican (and/or allies)   33.3 3  14.0 0  19.3 3** 
 Enemy forces     36.36  56.00            -20.36** 
 Civilians     0.00  2.00  -2.00 
 Mix      30.3 0  28.0 0  2.30  
 
Target of violence 
 All American (allies) forces   16.6 7  6.00   10.6 7* 
 Mostly American (allies) forces   12.12  30.00           -17.88** 
 Both American and enemy forces  25.76  4.00           21.76*** 
 Mostly enemy forces    10.61  10.00  0.61 
 All enemy forces    13.6 4  6.00   7.64  
 Only civilians     10.61  28.00            -17.39** 
 Target unknown    10.6 1  16.0 0  -5.39  
  
Civilians among targets of violence 
 No      63.64  28.00           35.64*** 
 Yes      36.36  72.00          -35.64*** 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
All numbers are percentages.  *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
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third of Fox News stories involve no portrayal of personal injury whatsoever, while CNN 
broadcasts significantly more stories that involve some type of personal injury. Half of 
CNN stories allude to personal injury but do not show viewers images of harm.  There 
are not meaningful differences in the actual images of injury, be they mild, moderate or 
severe.   
When evaluating the full range of news choices, it is useful to determine how 
cable news options compare to the traditional news networks of ABC, CBS and NBC.  
Although cable news programs are quickly gaining ground on network news in attracting 
viewers, the three major networks remain popular for viewers of television news.  It 
should be noted that ABC, CBS and NBC systematically portray war in ways similar to 
one another.  While these major news networks have become much more graphic and 
violent in their presentations of war over time, as shown in the previous chapter, analysis 
of data suggests they evolved together.  T-tests were used to analyze difference of means 
for 14 different variables during each of the three wars.  Each network’s news coverage 
was compared to both other major networks, with separate comparisons for the Vietnam 
War and Iraq War.   Previous studies have shown that these networks vary little in their 
substantive news coverage (Gans 2004), but this study is among the first to compare 
visual content across the major networks.  For both wars studied, ABC, CBS and NBC 
offer substantively similar content to one another, both in regard to verbal and visual 
information.   Little evidence suggests this trend will subside.  Tables of results are 
presented in appendix B.   
Data on cable news images of war violence contrast sharply with equivalent 
network news reports of Iraq.   Table 6 shows a summary of violent war images in 
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network television news coverage of Iraq compared to the same images on CNN and Fox 
News.  Network news20 programs contain much more violent images than CNN and Fox 
News.  These differences are substantively and statistically significant.  Network news 
contains roughly 70% more images of personal injury than CNN and Fox news.  Viewers 
who watch network news see injury in well over half of stories, compared to less than 
one-third on CNN.  Cable news reports show less than half the images of death and a 
third fewer images of graphic violence compared to network news.   
 
Table 6:  Violent war images in television news coverage of Iraq: 
Network news versus cable news* 
 
Violence Measure Network News CNN Fox News 
Images of Personal Injury 56.38% 32.00% 33.87% 
Images of Portrayal of Death 31.28% 14.67% 11.29% 
Images of Explicit Violence 72.84% 72.00% 64.52% 
Images of Graphic Violence 44.44% 26.66% 29.03% 
Average Length of Violent Images 18.22 seconds  
per story 
19.27 seconds 
 per story 
12.18 seconds 
 per story 
 
*These data reflect the percentage of war stories containing images of violence.  All 
images in television news reports are included, regardless of severity.    
 
 
Perpetrators and targets of violence 
 Though CNN and Fox News tend to show viewers similar war images, the two 
networks vary more noticeably in whom they depict as perpetrators and targets of 
violence.  CNN tends to show a relatively higher number of Americans as the 
perpetrators of violence, while Fox News offers portrayals of the enemy as the aggressor 
                                                 
20 Because data analysis showed no differences in ABC, CBS and NBC in images of war violence in 
television news, I aggregate the three together as “network news” for the sake of further comparisons in 
this chapter.   
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in over half of its stories.  Likewise, Fox News tends to portray American forces or their 
allies as the targets of violence, while CNN shows a combination of American and enemy 
forces as victims.  Table 5 shows these data.  Indeed, compared to Fox News, CNN 
shows more than six times the percentage of stories in which both American and enemy 
forces are targeted within the same story.   
Furthermore, a stark contrast exists between cable news depictions of civilians as 
targets of violence.  Fox News almost triples CNN in stories in which civilians are the 
sole targets.  In news were civilians are among the victims, the distinction remains 
evident.  CNN stories include civilian targets 36% of the time, while Fox News discusses 
civilian victims in 72% of all stories.  Relatively few news scenarios exist in which 
civilians deserve the harm that comes to them as targets of war violence.  Most often they 
are portrayed as innocent bystanders, or at a minimum as collateral damage.   
Network news decisions of whom to depict as perpetrators and targets of violence 
typically fall in the middle ground between CNN and Fox News.  If the percentage of 
time that a news station elects to portray x as a perpetrator of violence were a rung on a 
ladder, network news almost always occupies a rung between CNN and Fox News.  See 
Figure 15.  Networks news programs tend to alternate between whom they portray as 
perpetrators and targets of violence to a greater degree than CNN and Fox News.   
 
Tone 
The greatest distinctions between CNN and Fox News exist in non-visual 
depictions of war.  Table 7 presents these results.  As anyone who has come across CNN 
and Fox News stereotypes might expect, a comparison of tone of the two networks yields 
  
 
 
 
American Perpetrators 
 
|            | 
|     CNN   (33.33%)  | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Networks (23.65%) | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Fox News (14.00%)| 
|_________________| 
|             | 
 
 
 
 
Enemy Perpetrators 
 
|            | 
| Fox News (56.00%)| 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Networks (52.71%) | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
|    CNN  (36.36%)    | 
|_________________| 
|             | 
 
 
Mostly American Targets 
 
|            | 
| Fox News (30.00%)| 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Networks (20.20%) | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
|    CNN  (12.12%)    | 
|_________________| 
|             | 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Targets, 
American & Enemy 
|            | 
|     CNN   (25.76%)  | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Networks (18.72%) | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Fox News (4.00%)  | 
|_________________| 
|             | 
 
 
Enemy Targets 
 
|            | 
|     CNN   (13.64%)  | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Networks (12.81%) | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Fox News (6.00%)  | 
|_________________| 
|             | 
 
 
 
 
 
Civilians among Targets 
|            | 
| Fox News (72.00%)| 
|_________________| 
|            | 
| Networks (55.66%) | 
|_________________| 
|            | 
|    CNN  (36.36%)    | 
|_________________| 
|             | 
 
 
 
Figure 15:  Network news shows more moderate presentations of perpetrators and targets 
of violence than Fox News and CNN
 
 
  
 
 
a severe contrast.  I define tone as positive, negative or neutral in relation to the stated 
position of the President.  However, the differences do not manifest themselves in the 
ways we might expect.  Fox News is not the omnipresent advocate of the President.  On 
the contrary, positive tones are scarce commodities indeed in cable news broadcasts, for 
both networks; news tends to be negative.  Instead, the stories differ in whether they tend 
to be neutral (Fox News) or covary between negative and neutral (CNN).  Fox News 
remains neutral in regard to the President about 84% of the time, while CNN is equal 
parts neutral and negative (49%).  We might expect little positive tone given that 
popularity for the Iraq War fell relatively quickly, and these data do not begin until 2004.   
 
Table 7: 
Content analyses of non-visuals in Fox News and CNN coverage of the Iraq War, sample 
of evening news broadcasts 2004-2007  
CNN            Fox News     CNN Diff. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
% of days with > 1 lead story about the Iraq  39.06  45.59  -6.53 
 
% of Personal Interest Iraq stories   3.00  0.00  3.00 
 
% of stories reporting casualties   62.67  62.90  -0.23 
 
Tone21 
 Negative     49.33  12.90         36.43*** 
 Neutral     49.33  83.87        -34.54*** 
 Positive     1.33  3.23  -1.90 
 
Frame of Violence 
 Unjustified Violence    50.67  69.35          -18.68** 
 Justified Violence    6.67  1.61  5.06 
 Unknown/ mixed frame   42.67  29.03  13.64* 
     
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
All numbers are percentages.  *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
                                                 
21 In relation to the stated position of the President and/or members of his administration 
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 As discussed in chapter 2, there are benefits and drawbacks to measuring tone in 
relation to the President and his administration’s position.  Because I am most interested 
in television news approval of the President and his wars (see chapter 4) as it relates to 
public approval, it is important to have a measure that accounts directly for the executive.  
However, the measure may miss negatively tone reports in which the normative voice is 
directly at an entity other than the President.   
 A comparison of network news tone to the tone of CNN and Fox News during the 
same period of time is both expected and surprising.  Expectedly, network news is less 
critical of conservative President George W. Bush than CNN (49.33%) and more critical 
than Fox News (12.90%), taking a negative tone toward the President in just over 30% of 
all stories.  Network news is neutral in regard to the President 61% of the time, compared 
to 49% for CNN and 84% for Fox News.  Surprisingly, network news takes a positive 
tone toward the President and his administration almost three times more than Fox News 
(8.90% vs. 3.23%).  Given Fox News’ conservative reputation, one might expect Fox 
News to praise the President more often than in 3 out of 100 reports, or at least as much 
as network news.  This result again points to the fact that strict news programs are 
inherently different from political commentary.  Fox News’ reputation for conservative 
pundits unfairly colors their news reporting, which, contrary to popular belief, is not 
overtly conservative.   
 
Frame of violence  
Emotionally-charged images of violence grab viewer attention, but we cannot 
understand how images affect the public without a consideration of the frame of violence.  
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The way news anchors and reporters talk about violent images helps viewers interpret the 
visual information, creating a frame.  Was the violence necessary to move the Iraq 
society toward freedom and equality?  Was it a means to an end for a better life for 
Iraqis?  Were the motives of the perpetrator altruistic?  If the answer to these questions is 
yes, the frame employed is that of justified violence.  Alternatively, were civilians 
purposefully harmed?  Were the motives of the perpetrator selfish?  Does the reporter 
condemn the actions of those involved?  If so, a frame of unjustified violence is in place.    
Considering that CNN tends to enact a relatively negative tone compared to Fox 
News, we might expect CNN to frame the violence in its stories as more unjustified than 
Fox.  Data analysis shows that such is not the case.  Fox News frames its stories as 
unjustified violence significantly more often than CNN.  This finding goes hand-in-hand 
with findings of perpetrators and targets of violence.  If Fox News portrays the enemy as 
the sole executor of violence in more than half of its segments, it holds that this type of 
violence would not further the cause of democracy and freedom.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember that a frame of unjustified violence may not necessarily deflate 
support for war.  If the enemy is unjustified, viewers may conclude a greater presence of 
American forces is necessary to combat enemy offenses, thus supporting the conflict. 
The reputations of CNN and Fox News as partisan organizations might lead us to 
think they would be more likely to frame violence as justified or unjustified compared to 
network news programs.  However, the opposite is actually true.  Network news frame 
violence in more than 86% of its stories, most often as unjustified violence (75.63%).  
Fox News frames its violence in 70% of stories, and CNN frames 57%.  CNN gives 
viewers the fewest frames of violence.  However, this is most often the result of the use 
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of mixed frames rather than abstaining from framing altogether.  When both justified and 
unjustified frames of violence are offered to similar degrees in the same story, the 
meaning taken away by a viewer is unclear.  As a result, these stories are not coded as 
containing a justified or unjustified frame of violence.  Though the cable networks do not 
incorporate violence frames as often as network news, they still use them a majority of 
the time.  Most often CNN and Fox News prefer frames of unjustified violence, using 
them in 51% and 69% of Iraq reports, respectively. 
 
Reporting of casualties 
CNN and Fox News do not differ systematically in their reports of casualties.  
The two networks offered almost identical percentages, including news of casualties in 
their reports of war in just under 63% of cases.  The almost identical incidence of 
casualties suggests the cable networks are reacting to and reporting on war events.  
Casualties are facts.  It is difficult to ignore them and inconceivable to report them 
inaccurately while maintaining journalistic standards.  The cable networks’ casualty 
reports mimic those of network news, who report casualties in 67% of stories. 
 
Discussion 
 Regardless of one’s own preferences, likes or dislikes of CNN and Fox News, 
both networks seem to be grounded with a foundation of reports on actual war events.  
Unexpectedly, the nightly news programs of the two cable networks are alike in many 
ways.  The remarkable similarity of data with respect to reports of casualties suggests that 
both networks do center reports on the day’s war happenings.  CNN and Fox News make 
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the same decisions about whether or not to report on the Iraq War over 70% of the time, 
again indicating that their news programs are constrained by the news itself.  They also 
show violence with the same degree of frequency, severity and explicitness.  In light of 
conventional wisdom regarding Fox News’ fanatical conservatism and CNN’s 
pronounced liberalism, the finding that both cable networks use less violent imagery than 
network news programs should come as a surprise.  We tend to think of cable networks 
as extreme conveyors of news, and yet their images are far from extremist, and even less 
so when compared to network news. 
 Nevertheless, CNN and Fox News do differ with their news broadcasts in some 
important ways.  The much longer length of CNN stories compared to Fox News (and 
network news) suggests their reports give viewers a higher amount of information.  
CNN’s relatively negative tone toward the President and his administration stands in 
opposition to Fox News’ neutral tone.  The finding that Fox News employs a neutral 
rather than positive tone again points out flaws in popular beliefs, which would have 
expected the latter.  The two networks also differ in the ways they frame violent war 
events, with Fox News portraying war violence as unjustified behavior significantly more 
often than CNN.  All of these differences may impact a viewer’s perception of whether or 
not to support military conflict. 
While conventional wisdom might lead one to believe that CNN and Fox News 
play a central role in bringing about increased polarization in American politics, these 
data suggest this may not be the case.  Indeed, it may be that the news programs of the 
two cable networks are merely a reflection of existing polarization.  Why might this be 
the case?  Due to high levels of communication technology and easily available 
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information about war events, the cable networks are forced to share many 
commonalities.   CNN and Fox News share in the information they broadcast.  They 
share in the images they show.  Their choices when reporting daily news are somewhat 
limited by these shared constraints, resulting in ideological moderation of news reports. 
 Overall, these data suggest that widely held beliefs about the content of CNN and 
Fox News are somewhat misguided.  While this study cannot speak to the political 
commentary programs of each network, the content of their news programs are the same 
in many ways.  They do not display very high of levels of ideological bias as supposed by 
political elites and the public.  As one of the first studies to compare the content of a large 
sample of cable news programs from the same period of time, these data clarify 
misconceptions about Fox News and CNN, as well as differences in the information 
environment provided by each.  The study’s documentation of disparities between the 
two cable networks also can serve as a foundation for future investigations. 
Indeed, the rest of this dissertation will examine the implications of two cable 
networks’ differences from each other and from network news offerings.  The variation in 
visual content among CNN, Fox News and network news- both in the images themselves 
and how they are situated within a story- highlights the reality that viewers receive 
varying information on wartime happenings depending on which station they watch.  Do 
these differences matter in how individuals react to war?  As war images on television 
news change, both over time and from network to network, does public support for war 
change as well?    
The following chapters seek to address these questions.  In chapter 4, I combine 
longitudinal public opinion data with collected data from chapter 2 to analyze the effects 
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of violent imagery in television news on aggregate public opinion.  Reactions to violent 
war imagery are a small, albeit important part of a complicated calculation to determine 
public support for war.  When models of public support include this visual information, 
scholars glean a more complete understanding of public opinion formation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
EFFECTS OF TELEVISED IMAGES OF VIOLENCE  
ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WAR 
 
 
 
How does the public react when television news images put them on the frontlines 
of battle?   News coverage is a powerful factor in influencing public opinion, but past 
empirical works largely neglect the visual component of television news.  Most media 
studies of public opinion about war have focused on spoken or written content, 
identifying correlations between battlefield events and amount of public support as 
evidence of the effect of news without directly examining news imagery22.  However, 
without a consideration of visuals, we capture only part of this causal story.  Emotion-
laden imagery may evoke powerful reactions that are independent of a news story’s 
verbal information (Sears 1993; Brader 2006).  If war imagery is now a fundamental 
component of information received by citizens, models of public support must be revised 
in a way that consider that impact of visual information on public opinion.   
Through a large-scale content analysis of network news programs, preceding 
chapters of this dissertation provided evidence that television news coverage of war has 
changed dramatically since the Vietnam era.  Modern televised images of violence dwarf 
their predecessors, both in frequency and severity.  In this chapter, I explain the effects of 
this ubiquitous violence, investigating the relationship between public support for war 
and television news images of the battlefield.  Integrating research on violence and 
framing with information-based theories of political choice, I show that war images do 
                                                 
22 Exceptions exist, see Baum 2003; Fan 1993; Iyengar and Simon 1994; Prior 2005. 
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indeed shape public opinion.  Though violence wears a normative label of negativity in 
contemporary society, it is not that violent images uniformly suppress support for war.  
Instead, consistent with the “justified violence” theory I put forth in this chapter, the 
effects of violent images are conditioned by reasons for war violence, as framed by news 
reporters.  To a large degree, the way viewers interpret an act of violence is dependent on 
the perpetrator’s perceived motive for engaging in such behavior. 
I present evidence from a five-year span of the Iraq war to come to this 
conclusion.  Combining data from my content analysis of network news with aggregate 
public opinion data, I demonstrate a strong relationship between images of war violence 
and public support for the Iraq war.  As network news programs broadcast more severe 
images of justified violence, public support for Iraq increases.  Likewise, as networks 
increase images of unjustified violence, public support for the war wanes.   In the end, 
this analysis of visual information has broad implications for our understanding of public 
opinion.   
 
News coverage and determinants of public support for war 
Ever since John Mueller first demonstrated that aggregate support for war was 
negatively related to the log of casualty rates, the view of public support for war as a sort 
of rational calculation has permeated political science (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; 
Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Larson 1996, 
2005; Mueller 1973, 1994).  However, the connection between casualties and support is 
not absolute.   Take the following example.  Public support for both the Vietnam War and 
the war in Iraq started at relatively high levels only to fall dramatically over following 
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years.  One of Gallup’s key indicators of war support for both the Vietnam War and the 
present war in Iraq asks Americans whether it was a “mistake” to send troops to these 
countries.  The data for both wars are presented in figure 16.  In order to present 
comparable results, the data have been aggregated into quarterly averages, based on the 
first quarter of the year each war began, August 1965 for Vietnam and March 2003 for 
Iraq.   
 
 
Figure 16:  Percentage of citizens agreeing it was a mistake to send troops to war:  
Vietnam versus Iraq 
 
Public support for Iraq clearly declined much more quickly than support for 
Vietnam.  However, if battlefield deaths are the primary cause of opinion change, we 
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would expect support for the Vietnam War to diminish many times more quickly than 
Iraq, as thousands more American lives were lost compared to Iraq.  Since our 
expectation was not met, some other force is working to systematically influence public 
opinion.   
Indeed, recent scholarship has shown that individuals evaluate a set of related 
factors when deciding whether to support a war effort, including monetary costs, benefits 
of victory, perceptions of winning and losing, and amounts of elite consensus in addition 
to battlefield deaths (among others, Burk 1999; Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; 
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Johnson and 
Tierney 2006; Kull and Ramsay 2001; Russett and Nincic 1976; Zaller 1992, 1993).  
Additional studies also moved beyond Mueller’s basic theory and offered greater 
specifications23.   Still, his work remains a prevailing explanation of public support for 
war among policymakers and academics alike (Burk 1999; Klarevas 2002). 
Taken together, this body of literature asserts that it is the events in a particular 
conflict that directly influence public support for war.  The basic logic for Mueller’s 
argument and those that followed him is the same:  as rational actors, the mass public will 
support conflict if, and only if, the events of war cause the perceived benefits of victory 
to outweigh the human and monetary costs of military involvement (Berinsky 2007).  
Nevertheless, most citizens have no direct exposure to a war on foreign soil.  The vast 
majority of war events thought to influence the mass public is conveyed to them through 
news media.  While news coverage can be a powerful force on public opinion in any 
subject area, it is especially influential in shaping beliefs about war.   
                                                 
23 For example, Gartner and Segura (1998, 2000) emphasized the importance of local casualty rates in 
shaping public opinion about war. 
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Nevertheless, empirical works have largely neglected the content of the news 
coverage itself.  Most studies of news have analyzed written or spoken content alone, 
finding effects of news on public opinion vis-à-vis correlations between war events and 
levels of public support for the conflict.  These studies are important, giving us a 
foundation upon which to build an understanding of citizen support for war.  However, 
they also result in a literature revolving around aggregate-level analysis of war support at 
the expense of substantive examinations of individual-level theories of attitude formation 
(Althaus and Coe 2008; 2011).  In order to advance this valuable strain of research, 
scholars must demonstrate more convincing relationships between aggregate-level data 
and the connected progression of attitude change among individuals.  I propose that 
violent war images lead to attitude change through the associated mechanism of 
emotional and physiological arousal.   As today’s television news programs provide more 
visual information than ever before, and because television is the main venue through 
which most citizens learn about political dialogue (Mutz 2007), it is of particular 
relevance to evaluate the influence of images.   
 
Hypotheses 
 
As I develop hypotheses to ground this study, I look to the relationship between 
attitude change and violence.  Television news images of war consistently revolve around 
themes of violence.  It is a powerful emotional force, acting as a magnifying glass for 
existing feelings and innate reactions.  Violence is thought to affect individuals via the 
emotional mechanisms of anger, fear, sadness, disgust, hostility or contempt (Bushman 
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and Geen 1990).  From a psychological perspective, individuals typically react negatively 
to violence, particularly when high levels of violence exist (Huesmann and Taylor 2006).   
In contemporary society, violence tends to wear a normative label of negativity.  
We punish our children if they exhibit violent behavior.  We restrict entrance to violent 
films.  We pay for programs to limit violence on city streets.  We criminalize violent acts 
of all kinds against fellow human beings.  We even criminalize violence against animals.  
Simply, violence in everyday society is unacceptable.  If violence is indeed unacceptable, 
and if war violence on today’s television news is omnipresent, a most basic hypothesis 
follows: 
HI: Increased levels of violent war imagery in television news will decrease 
public support for war.   
 
However, there is reason to believe that political violence may affect individuals 
differently from other forms of violence. Unlike most methods of violence which society 
deems as unacceptable, political violence may be justified.  Some scholars argue that acts 
of political violence can never be justified in a democracy because they conflict with a 
democracy’s obligation to obey the law (Wolff 1969).  Persons in a democracy exist 
under the presence of either an innate duty or a societal obligation to adhere to the law 
and to consequently avoid violence (Rawls 1971).  Nevertheless, another group of 
scholars (Honderich 1976) asserts the justification of some political violence does exist.  
While some acts of political violence may undoubtedly result in a system of government 
much less democratic than if the violence had not occurred, this does not necessitate that 
all acts of violence are unjustified.  As philosopher Ted Honderich stated, “The ends 
which are thought to be served by the rules of democracy are at least sometimes served 
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by the breaking of the rules (1976, p. 108).”  As long as the acts of violence advance a 
society toward freedom and equality, they may be considered justified.    
Furthermore, our understanding of an act of violence depends to a large extent on 
an individual’s motives for engaging in such behavior (Wilson et al 1997).  Individual 
soldiers, like all human beings, also have the right to protect themselves and those close 
to them from harm.  If the violence they inflict on others is motivated by protection or 
retaliation to another’s aggression, it may be considered justified violence as well.  This 
distinction is especially clear in cases of war, but holds in domestic environments as well.  
For example, suppose a father shoots someone who is attempting to kidnap his son.  
Particular motives such as self-defense and defense of family and friends seem justified 
to viewers, and they may be relieved to see the father kill the kidnapper.  In the same 
way, soldiers are justified in protecting themselves and their fellow soldiers.  Hence, I 
define justified violence as injurious physical force or action committed with the intent of 
furthering the cause of freedom and equality or the intent of protection or retaliation.   
 In the case of justified violence, an act of violence does not serve as repellant to 
public support for war.  On the contrary, it acts as a stimulus of emotional arousal, 
drawing one’s attention to the story at hand (Mutz 2007).  If images of violence are 
portrayed as justified, or desirable, the emotional arousal caused by viewing violence will 
magnify that justification, bringing about positive feelings of support toward the conflict 
in excess of those that would have existed without the violent images.  Conversely, the 
lack of justification of violent images will intensify an individual’s affect of dislike.  A 
set of alternative hypotheses result: 
 
 82 
 
 
 H2A: Violence framed as a justified means will increase public support for war. 
 
 H2B: Violence framed as an unjustified means will decrease public support for  
  war. 
 
When evaluating the frame of violence, I refer to Entman’s (1993) definition, “to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, 
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation.”  Television news networks may frame 
violent images by the words they say, by the use of other contextual images, or by a 
combination of the two. 
 The third set of hypotheses assumes that the evaluative tone employed by 
television news reporters shapes viewer perceptions of news they receive.  The tone of 
the reporter may also influence the impact of imagery.24  Frame and evaluative tone often 
move together (data are correlated at 0.42), such that frames of unjustified violence 
coincide with negative evaluative tones, or frames of justified violence work in tandem 
with positively toned reports.  Nevertheless, they are distinct story elements.  If 
evaluative tone is positive or negative, it may have a measurable effect on public opinion. 
 H3A:  Positive-toned stories will increase support for war 
 
 H3B:  Negative-toned stories will decrease support for war.   
 
The final hypotheses of this study focus on perpetrators and targets of war violence.   The 
identities of individuals who inflict violence on others, as well as the identities of those 
                                                 
24 I measure tone as positive, negative or neutral in relation to the stated position of the President.  There 
are advantages and disadvantages to measuring tone in this way.  An important benefit of this measure is 
that it increases the ability to measure television news approval of the President. This will be particularly 
useful as I evaluate how television news influences public support for the President and his wars.   On the 
other hand, it is possible for a story to be positive or negative, and yet coded as neutral provided the 
normative tone is directed at someone or something else other than the President and his administration.  
This measure does not code for those nuances in tone. 
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who receive violence, are also likely to affect public support for war.  This is partially 
due to the public’s raw feelings toward certain demographics, and partially because some 
demographics lend themselves more easily to a justified or unjustified frame.  While I 
will be unable to disentangle completely the reasons, I can test if the presence of various 
demographics increases or decreases aggregate support for war. 
Civilians are all too often the collateral damage of war.  The public generally does 
not approve of violence against civilians.  These negative feelings are exacerbated when 
women and children are the targets.   Hypothesis 4 follows. 
H4:   The portrayal of civilians as targets of violence is negatively related to the 
level of support for military action. 
 
 American perpetrators of violence are more likely to receive our support than 
foreign perpetrators of violence.  While American perpetrators can be portrayed by the 
media (and often are) to participate in unjustified violence, they are present overseas, at 
least ostensibly, for a justifiable reason.  News producers have a relatively difficult time 
painting foreign perpetrators as engaged in justified violence.   Hypotheses 5 and 6 
follow. 
H5:  The portrayal of Americans as the perpetrators of violence is positively 
related to the level of support for military action. 
 
H6:  The portrayal of foreigners as the perpetrators of violence is negatively 
related to the level of support for military action.  
 
 
  
Methods and data 
Public support for Iraq began at relatively high levels (75% approval in March 
2003) and gradually declined to less than 36% approval in 2007.  While opinion certainly 
trends downward over time, the public’s support for war ebbs and flows in response to 
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events surrounding the conflict (see figure 17).  These fluctuations are useful in 
discovering determinants of war support.   
 
Figure 17:  Public support for the Iraq War over time 
Each data point represents the level of public support determined by a given public 
opinion poll. 
 
 
 
Countless survey questions have been used to measure the public’s reactions to 
America’s wars, gauging opinions on a myriad of categories of war events.  The 
abundance of existing detail can complicate understanding of broad trends of support.  To 
combat this problem, I analyze only one category of opinion polls:  those that ask 
respondents whether or not it was appropriate for the United States to take military action 
against Iraq in the first place.   The literature has shown that these “worth fighting,” 
“mistake,” “right thing” and “right decision” questions accurately gauge prevailing 
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opinions about war (Althaus and Coe 2008; Mueller 1973).  Using the Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research’s iPoll database, I identify survey questions about the Iraq war 
that were asked at least 20 times during the period of study and that used “worth 
fighting,” “mistake,” “right thing,” or “right decision” question wording (n = 287).  These 
data points include six question trends across the first five years of the Iraq war, from the 
onset of combat in March 2003 through January 2008.  These trends are described in 
table 8.   
Each opinion poll is assigned a data point determined by the percentage of poll 
respondents who answered in support of the war.  Though the six question trends have 
slightly different question wording, they move together, suggesting that the wording of 
any one trend does not cause respondents to systemically indicate increased or decreased 
support compared to other question wordings.  Figure 18 shows all question trends 
together.  To control for potential variation in response across question wording, I 
employ robust clustered standard errors in the regression model, clustering by question 
trend.   
Though these longitudinal public opinion data are useful in separating out causes 
for change in war support over time, it is important to note their limitations.  Aggregate-
level polls are imperfect for this study because they do not differentiate between 
television news consumers and those that do not watch television news.  As I argue that 
images in television news are the impetus for change in opinion25, this may be a serious 
shortcoming.  If we know that a large portion of the citizenry does not consume television 
news at all, how can we trust these data?    
                                                 
25 The independent variables of most interest come from my content analysis of network television news of 
Iraq, 2003-2007.   
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Table 8 Support Trends Available for the Iraq War26 
 
Organization and 
Question 
Wording N of 
Cases 
First Poll Last Poll 
ABC/POST “Worth 
Fighting”  
“All in all, considering the costs to the 
United States versus the benefits to 
the United States, do you think the 
war with Iraq was worth fighting, or 
not?”  
53 4 /29/2003 1/11/2008 
CBS/NYT “Right 
Thing”  
“Looking back, do you think the 
United States did the right thing in 
taking military action against Iraq, or 
should the US have stayed out?”27 
65 1 2/12/2003 1/11/2008 
Gallup “Mistake”  
 
“In view of the developments since 
we first sent our troops to Iraq, do you 
think the United States made a 
mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or 
not?”   
68 3/ 25/2003 12/1/2007 
PSRA “Right Thing”  “From what you know now, do you 
think the United States did the right 
thing in taking military action against 
Iraq last March (2003), or not?”28 
58 3 /21/2003 12/26/2007 
PSRA “Right 
Decision”  
“Do you think the United States made 
the right decision or the wrong 
decision in using military force 
against Iraq?”  
23 7/ 25/2003 
 
8/2/2007 
Quinnipiac “Right 
Thing”  
“Do you think going to war with Iraq 
was the right thing for the United 
States to do or the wrong thing?”  
20 9 /13/2003 10/26/2007 
 
Total cases = 287 
                                                 
26 Includes only support trends with number of cases greater than or equal to twenty. 
27 The initial question in this poll was rephrased slightly:  “Do you think the United States did the 
right thing in starting military actions against Iraq now, or should the United States have waited 
and given the United Nations weapons inspectors more time?” 
28 Beginning in March 2004, this question was given a slightly different phrasing:  “From what you 
know now, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq 
[last year/two years ago], or not?” 
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Figure 18:  Support trends of the Iraq War by question wording 
 
 
While it is true that many respondents in the polls undoubtedly do not watch 
television news on a regular basis, the use of lead stories may help alleviate some of the 
problem.  Lead stories, because of their saliency, are more likely to reach the public in 
some other form (internet, newspapers, interpersonal conversations, etc.), making the 
relationship more likely to exist. Research has shown a great degree of similarity in the 
reporting of various media outlets (Benton and Frazier 1976; Grabe et al 2009).  
Newspapers, mainstream internet news providers and television news all tend to report on 
the same events each day.  If the public consumes a different type of media, they may 
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still see images similar to those on television news programs, as the same images present 
in television news replicate in multiple media forms.  Hence, though limited, these data 
may serve well as a proxy for the public support of television news consumers.   
To create a data set sufficient for detecting the effects of war imagery on public 
support for war, I convert the unit of analysis of my original data set, discussed in chapter 
2, from news story to public opinion poll.  Figure 19 shows the distribution of polls by 
month.  Public support is the dependent variable.  As current public opinion is influenced 
by news stories from the recent past, independent variables from my content analysis are 
assigned a value for each poll equal to the average of that variable for all sampled news 
stories29 over the month prior to the opinion poll.  The most important of these is the 
severity of violent images and the frame of the violence as justified or unjustified.  To 
access my secondary hypotheses, I include variables for tone, American perpetrators of 
violence, enemy perpetrators of violence and civilian targets. 
My analysis includes separate controls for the passage of time, casualties and the 
occurrence of major events.  I expect support for Iraq to decline over time.  This month of 
war variable also allows for the possibility that variation in war support may be higher in 
the earlier months of the conflict, when attitudes about the war are less crystallized and 
thereby more easily swayed (Althaus and Coe 2009).  Consistent with the casualty 
literature discussed earlier, increased numbers of casualties should suppress support for 
war.  Though the log of cumulative casualties has often been used in statistical models to  
                                                 
29 Using a random number generator, I drew a sample of 437 days (one-fourth of the total numbers of days 
in the population of study, March 20, 2003-December 31, 2007) from the Iraq war.  For each day in the 
sample, I analyzed the broadcast’s two lead stories.  The sample was randomly divided between the 
networks of ABC, CBS and NBC.  Research in Chapter 2 showed ABC, CBS, and NBC broadcast similar 
content and images of violence.   
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Figure 19:  Distribution of Iraq public opinion polls, by month 
 
study this effect, it is strongly correlated with the passage of time.  To get around the 
overlap between log of casualty rates and time, I measure the raw number of American 
casualties in the month prior to each opinion poll30.  This measure is consistent with the 
monthly averages of independent variables in television news.   
Additionally, the study controls for sudden changes in support caused by the 
occurrence of major events.  These “rally events,” as they are known in the literature on 
public support for war, may cause either drops or increases in levels of support.  The 
common bond of rally events is their salience in the minds of the public.  To determine 
major war events of the Iraq war, I conducted an additional content analysis of the 
                                                 
30 This approach modifies methods use by Gartner and Segura (1998), Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 
(1997), and Gartner (2008), who used data of the marginal number of Americans killed between support 
measures. 
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Vanderbilt Television News Archives.  I identified those events that made the news, on 
average, at least once a night (on the evening news programs of any of the major 
networks, ABC, CBS, CNN, or NBC) during the month following their occurrence.  
Consequently, when modeling support for war, I include dummy variables for each of the 
eight events that fit my criteria.  A list of the events and news counts are included in 
Table 9.  The events themselves are not of particular interest to this study; instead, I rely 
on these dummy variables to control for unusual, event-related cases of support change 
that might otherwise wield disproportionate influence on the regression model.   
 
Table 9:  Major Events in the Iraq War, 2003-200731 
 
 Date:   Event:                Number of news stories 
 
July 20, 2003    US kills Hussein's sons       35  
  
December 13, 2003   US captures Hussein       67 
  
January 25, 2004   Kay report says the US misjudged Iraqi WMDs    64 
  
April 28, 2004  Abuses at Abu Ghraib revealed    183 
  
May 11, 2004  American Nick Berg decapitated    35 
  
Jan. 30, 2005  Iraq's first free elections     64 
  
December 15, 2005 First parliamentary elections    40 
  
June 7, 2006    Terrorist leader al-Zarqawi killed    76 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Major events determined by content analysis of the Vanderbilt Television News Archives, including 
those events that made the news, on average, at least once a night (on the evening news programs of any of 
the major networks, ABC, CBS, CNN, or NBC) during the month following their occurrence. 
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Description of data 
The data set shows a considerable amount of variation in television news 
broadcasting of war events and violent imagery over time.  The severity of violent images 
fluctuates greatly depending on the period of war examined.  Some months, such as mid-
May to mid-June of 2004, contain almost no violent imagery.  During this period of time, 
the House of Representative’s decision to approve $447 billion in military spending 
dominated television news rather than activities on the battlefield.  American casualties 
over this time period were significantly below the monthly mean as well, potentially 
contributing to network decisions to broadcast much lower levels of violence.  On the 
other hand, some months average extreme displays of war violence.  For example, attacks 
by coalition and Iraq forces on rebel armies in Fallujah in November 2004 led to 
hundreds of deaths.  Television news programs showed viewers particularly graphic 
coverage of civilians killed during those attacks (averaging up to 11 out of a 13-point 
scale of violence).  Early March to early April of 2006 is representative of average 
displays of violent imagery on network news (5.5 out of a 13-point scale).  Noteworthy 
events of this time included calls for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation 
and the tripling of homicide rates in Baghdad.   
 Additionally, these data offer evidence that network news programs change the 
way they frame war violence over the course of the war.  At one extreme, such as Iraq 
news stories during the month following the capture of Saddam Hussein in mid-
December 2003, networks framed violence as completely justified.  At the other extreme, 
networks sometimes painted violence as completely unjustified for relatively long 
periods.  Such was the case for most of a three-month stint from August-October, 2005.  
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During this time, news programs highlighted the rising civilian death toll, including a 
chaos-induced stampede that killed 1,000 Iraqis in a single day.  Over an average 30-day 
period during the Iraq war, networks frame war violence as relatively unjustified, or -0.51 
on a scale where -1 is unjustified, 0 is neutral and 1 is justified.   Early January – early 
February of 2007 is representative of this predominantly unjustified frame.  News 
programs focused on George W. Bush’s plan to send 20,000 additional troops to Iraq and 
the United Nation’s report that 34,000 Iraqis died from war violence in previous year.  
Summary statistics of all variables are noted in table 10.    
Findings 
 I examine the effects of violent images on television news on public support while 
controlling for time, casualties, intensity of war news and major events.  I predict that 
violent imagery will either decrease or increase public support for war, depending on how 
the images are framed.  High levels of violence will draw viewer attention to news stories 
and amplify the framing effects used by news reporters.   
As a preliminary investigation of the relationship between public opinion and 
television news images, key variables from the content analysis of network television 
news programs and control variables were subjected to bivariate correlations with 
measures of public support from the polling data.  Positive correlations suggest the 
variable is likely to increase public support for war, while negative correlations indicate a 
probable decrease in support.  These correlations offer insight into (a) the comparative 
utility of categories as I have conceived them, and (b) the statistical relationships between 
components of television news and public opinion.  Table 11 presents these results. 
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Table 10 Summary Statistics, opinion poll as unit of analysis 
 
Dependent Variable        
    Scale   Mean  St. Dev        Minimum Median        Maximum 
Public Support  0 – 100    47.79  8.59  33 46  75 
 
Key Independent Variables        
    Scale   Mean  St. Dev        Minimum Median        Maximum 
Severity of Violence 0 (none) -13 (extreme)   5.55  2.10  0 5.25  11 
 
Frame of Violence -1 (unjustified) – 1 (justified) -0.51  0.53  -1 -0.67  1 
 
Violence x Frame  -13 (high, unjust) - 13(high, just) -2.89  3.06  -11 -3.3  6.5 
 
Tone   -1 (negative)  - 1 (positive)  -0.17  0.40  -1 -0.13  1 
 
American Perp  0 (not American) – 1 (American) 0.21  0.27  0 0  1  
 
Enemy Perp  0 (not enemy) – 1 (enemy)  0.61  0.33  0 0.67  1 
 
Civilian Target  0 (not civilian) – 1 (civilian)  0.57  0.33  0 0.60  1 
 
Control Variables 
    Scale   Mean  St. Dev        Minimum Median        Maximum 
Intensity of war news 0 (neither lead story) – 2 (both leads) 0.70  0.42  0 0.60  2 
  
Deaths in month prior to poll     71.89  27.07  6  71  142 
 
Month of War      28.85  16.20  1 29  58 
 
Stories per poll      8.64  2.72  1  9  19 
 
Events: 
 Hussein’s Sons Killed    0.01  0.10  0 0  1 
  
 Hussein Captured     0.03  0.16  0 0  1 
 
 Kay Report     0.02  0.13  0 0  1 
 
 Abu Ghraib Abuses     0.03  0.17  0 0  1 
  
Nick Berg Decapitated    0.02  0.15  0 0  1 
 
Iraq’s first free elections    0.01  0.11  0 0  1 
 
First parliamentary elections    0.02  0.14  0 0  1  
 
Al-Zarqawi Killed     0.01  0.12  0 0  1
 94 
 
 
 Analysis of the data shows no statistical association between public support and 
severity of violent images, the variable of primary interest.  However, this null finding is 
consistent with the second set of hypotheses.  Violent images alone may not 
systematically increase or decrease support for war.  Instead, violence may affect viewers 
positively or negatively, depending on the frame employed by reporters.    
 Small but statistically meaningful correlations do emerge among several elements 
of television news programs.  Reporters’ framing of violence as justified, the presence of 
severely violent images conditioned by justified frames, positive evaluative tone, images 
of American perpetrators of violence and high news intensity are all associated with 
increases in public support for war.   As expected, images of foreign perpetrators of 
violence, images of civilian targets, and higher deaths in the month prior to opinion polls 
are likely to decrease levels of support.  The control variable for month of the conflict 
exhibits the strongest correlation, suggesting that support for war is likely to decrease 
over time.  Finally, examining control variables for major events, the killing of Saddam 
Hussein’s son and his capture were likely to inflate opinions about Iraq.   
I next use linear regression to investigate the influence of violent images in 
television news.  First, to test hypothesis 1, I evaluate the influence of violent images 
alone.   The first model I examine is 
 
APPROVAL = p0 + p1VIOLENCE + p2TONE + p3AMERICANPERP + 
p4ENEMYPERP + p5CIVTARGET + p6INTENSITY + p7DEATHS + p8MONTH 
+ p9STORIESPERPOLL + p10HUSSEINSONS + p11HUSSEIN + p12KAY + 
p13ABUGHRAIB + p14BERG + p15FIRSTELECT + p16PARELECT + 
p17ALZARQAWI + e. 
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Table 11:  Correlations between Polling Data and Variables from content analysis 
Variable Correlation 
Key Variables 
Severity of Violent Images -0.117 
Frame of Violence (Justified) 0.368 
Violence x Frame (Justified) 0.405 
Tone (positive) 0.330 
Images of American Perpetrators 0.333 
Images of Foreign Perpetrators -0.307 
Images of Civilian Targets -0.166 
Control Variables 
Intensity 0.173 
Deaths in month prior to poll -0.291 
Month of War -0.852 
Stories per poll -0.010 
Hussein’s Sons Killed 0.194 
Hussein Captured 0.273 
Kay Report 0.093 
Abu Ghraib Abuses 0.044 
Nick Berg Decapitated 0.067 
Iraq’s first free elections  0.027 
First parliamentary elections -0.033 
Al-Zarqawi Killed -0.063 
Correlations in bold print are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.   
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APPROVAL represents the percentage of Americans signifying that they support 
the war (wording varies slightly by question, as discussed earlier).  Opinion poll is the 
unit of analysis.  VIOLENCE represents the average severity of violent images 
broadcasted in the month prior to the opinion poll.  TONE is the average evaluative tone 
taken by reporters (in relation to the stated position of the President and his 
administration) in the month prior to the poll.  AMERICANPERP represents the 
percentage of stories in the month prior to the poll in which Americans were portrayed as 
the primary perpetrators of violence.  Likewise, ENEMYPERP is the percentage of 
stories in the month prior to the poll in which enemy forces were portrayed as the primary 
perpetrators of violence, and CIVTARGET is the percentage of stories in the month prior 
to the poll in which civilians are portrayed as targets of violence.  INTENSITY represents 
the average number of lead stories about the Iraq war in the month preceding the poll.  
DEATHS is the number of American casualties in the month prior to the poll.  MONTH 
represents the numerical month of the conflict, counting from the beginning of hostilities 
on March 20, 2003.  STORIESPERPOLL is the number of sampled news stories per poll.  
Variables 10 through 17 represent the major war events of the killing of Saddam 
Hussein’s sons, Saddam Hussein’s capture, the release of the Kay report, the revelation of 
abuses at Abu Ghraib, Nick Berg’s decapitation, Iraq’s first free elections, Iraq’s first 
parliamentary elections, and the killing of al-Zarqawi, respectively. 
Using severity of violent images as the independent variables of primary interest, 
this model fails to confirm hypothesis 1, that increased levels of violent war imagery will 
decrease public support for war.  The first column in table 12 reports these results.   
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The second model I examine is  
 
APPROVAL = p0 + p1VIOLENCE + p2FRAME + p3VIOLENCEF + p4 TONE + 
p5AMERICANPERP + p6ENEMYPERP + p7CIVTARGET + p8 NTENSITY + p9 
DEATHS + p10MONTH + p11STORIESPERPOLL + p12HUSSEINSONS + 
p13HUSSEIN + p14KAY + p15ABUGHRAIB + p16BERG + p17FIRSTELECT + 
p18PARELECT +p19ALZARQAWI + e. 
 
 
 
This model is identical to the first with two notable exceptions.  I include 
FRAME, which represents the average frame of violence (justified versus unjustified) 
employed by reporters in the month prior to the poll.  VIOLENCEF is an interaction 
variable that multiplies the average effects of severity of violent images and frame.  
With the addition of the interaction variable, violent images x frame, results confirm 
hypotheses 2A and 2B:  Violence framed as a justified means of action will increase 
public support for war, and violence framed as an unjustified means will decrease public 
support for war.  Results from Model 2 are presented in the second column of table 12. 
The results for the influence of violent images, conditioned by frame of violence, 
are substantively meaningful.   This model suggests violent images can exert significant 
influence on public opinion.  The higher the level of violence viewed by television news 
consumers, the greater this capacity for opinion change.  For example, earlier I discussed 
that news networks broadcasted especially violent images in November of 2004 in 
connection with bloody attacks on the Iraq city of Fallujah.  These levels of violence, 
when combined with consistent framing of either justified or unjustified violence, can 
move aggregate public support upwards of six points on a 100-point scale.  Even average 
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Table 12:  Predicting Support for U.S. Involvement in Iraq 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Key Variables  
Severity of Violent Images -0.195 
(0.178) 
0.117 
(0.251) 
Frame of Violence (Justified) n/a -2.495 
(1.212) 
Violence x Frame (Justified) n/a 0.552 
(0.186)* 
Tone (positive) 3.258 
(0.895)* 
3.009 
(0.799)* 
Images of American Perpetrators 3.639 
(0.818)* 
3.872 
(1.137)* 
Images of Foreign Perpetrators -2.281 
(1.210) 
-1.576 
(1.107) 
Images of Civilian Targets -0.124 
(0.464) 
-0.341 
(0.633) 
Control Variables  
Intensity 0.980 
(1.227) 
1.014 
(1.232) 
Deaths in month prior to poll -0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
Month of War -0.412 
(0.022)* 
-0.402 
(0.020)* 
Stories per poll 0.018 
(0.012) 
0.038 
(0.053) 
Hussein’s Sons Killed 9.239 
(2.439)* 
9.278 
(2.490)* 
Hussein Captured 1.130 
(1.057) 
2.427 
(1.137) 
Kay Report -1.151 
(1.603) 
-0.999 
(1.429) 
Abu Ghraib Abuses -4.591 
(1.096)* 
-4.420 
(0.940)* 
Nick Berg Decapitated 0.644 
(0.738) 
0.903 
(0.771) 
Iraq’s first free elections  -1.394 
(2.092) 
-1.044 
(2.014) 
First parliamentary elections -0.923 
(1.073) 
-0.611 
(1.111) 
Al-Zarqawi Killed -0.686 
(1.127) 
-0.422 
(1.249) 
Constant 61.648 
(1.882)* 
59.739 
(2.348)* 
R-squared 0.80 0.81  
N 275 275  
 
OLS Regression coefficients with robust clustered standard errors (by opinion poll question trend).  Bold 
coefficients with asterisks are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
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levels of television violence are capable of changing aggregate opinions by 
approximately three points on a 100-point scale.   
The models also offer interesting results for the secondary hypotheses of this 
study.  Both models lend support to hypotheses 3A and 3B, that stories with a positive 
evaluative tone will increase support for war, just as negative-toned stories will decrease 
support for war.  This study suggests the substantive impact of tone can affect aggregate 
public opinion by approximately three points on a 100-point scale.  The data confirm 
hypothesis 5 as well, showing that the portrayal of Americans as the perpetrators of 
violence is positively related to the level of support for military action.  These results are 
also substantively rigorous, able to move aggregate opinion almost four points on a 100-
point scale.  The data do not confirm hypotheses 4 and 6, though the signs of the 
coefficients are in the expected directions.  Further works must be done before we can 
make definitive claims about the bearing of images of enemy perpetrators of violence and 
civilian targets on television news.   
 
Discussion 
Taken together, this study confirms that television news networks have the 
necessary tools to shape public opinion in meaningful ways.  Using the findings of this 
study alone, aggregate opinion may move up to 13 points as the direct result of television 
news images and the way news reporters talk about them.  Violent images can serve as 
powerful manipulators of public support in either direction, but a frame must be applied 
to the violence in order for it to systematically affect support for war.  By grabbing 
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viewer attention, violent imagery increases the power of story frames and provides 
greater opportunity for television’s already pervasive influence. 
There are a few limitations to drawing inferences from these data that should be 
recognized.  While some relationship clearly exists between the framing of war violence 
and public support for war, we cannot tell from these data which way the causal arrow 
points.  Do television news programs shape public opinion with framing of war violence, 
or are television news programs simply framing violence in a way that matches public 
opinion of the time?  Nevertheless, this work highlights the need for future research to 
clearly disentangle causal connections between war images, framing and public opinion.  
In the next chapter, I use a randomized experiment to pinpoint individual-level sources of 
public opinion change in reaction to images of war violence.  This experiment will also 
gauge the causal mechanisms at work in bringing about changes in public support. 
In conclusion, reactions to violent war imagery are just a small, albeit important 
part of a complicated calculation to determine public support for war.  Individual political 
predispositions most certainly interplay with the valence of network news coverage, 
making media messages conditional and varying in their effects on support for war.  In 
this study I highlight the importance of images of television news violence and their 
surrounding frames in determining support for war.  My data lay the foundation for future 
works to further explore how changes in news presentation and graphic imagery affect 
public support for war.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
TELEVISION NEWS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WAR: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF IMAGES  
 
 
 
The omnipresence of violent images in television news stories of war begs the 
question:  how do individuals react to graphic imagery of war violence?  The preceding 
chapter of this dissertation provided evidence that violent images influence the opinions 
of the citizenry at the aggregate level.  Here I expand that research to the individual level, 
investigating the interplay between violence and an individual’s decision making calculus 
about support for war.  Because citizens react to violence both cognitively and 
physiologically (Gleitman, Reisberg and Gross 2007), violent images may interact 
uniquely with existing attitudes and political predispositions to shape opinions about 
military conflict.   
Scholarship has shown that individuals consider a wide array of factors when 
deciding whether to support war.  Building from John Mueller’s (1973) discovery of the 
negative relationship between support for war and casualty rates, models of public 
support for war have expanded to include a large number of considerations.  Over time, 
the analysis of these factors has increased the level of detail in our understanding of the 
formation of public opinion.  By expanding these models to include measures for 
exposure to violent imagery, my work will further nuance the conceptualization of public 
support for war.  As such, my intention is to improve on existing public opinion models 
rather than to discard or change them in fundamental ways. 
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This chapter provides new evidence that violent images do indeed mold 
individuals’ opinions about war.  By designing a randomized, controlled experiment, I 
examine the effect of graphic violence and framing on public support for war.  The 
results suggest that viewing violent war imagery significantly lowers opinion about war.  
Likewise, the frame of the story systematically influences one’s level of support.  
Violence framed as an unjustifiable course of action consistently lowers support for 
conflict.  However, violent images framed as justified by the perpetrator’s desire for 
some democratic good increase support.  
 
Determinants of public support for war among individuals 
 Individuals make complex choices when deciding whether to support war, 
evaluating a number of related variables.  Considerations include perceptions of winning 
and losing, casualty tolerance, benefits of victory, monetary costs, initial support for war, 
levels of elite consensus, number of war deaths from one’s own district, context of 
casualties and others (among others, Burk 1999; Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 
2004; Gartner 2008; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 
1999; Johnson and Tierney 2006; Kull and Ramsay 2001; Oppenheimer and Gross 2007; 
Russett and Nincic 1976; Zaller 1992, 1993).  While clear relationships among many of 
these variables and level of public support emerge at the aggregate level, making 
definitive connections using cross-sectional, individual-level data is much more difficult.  
The establishment of causation becomes murky when many variables are highly 
interconnected (Berinsky and Druckman 2007).   
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 For example, Mueller continues to espouse the belief that overall support for war 
is a function of casualties (1973; 2006).  Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler, on the other hand, 
argue that tolerance of war casualties is dependent on the perceived level of success of 
the war and one’s initial level of support for it (2006).  An obvious endogeneity problem 
surfaces, with arguments about the causal direction of related variables emerging on both 
sides (Berinsky and Druckman 2007).  Clearly, more work is required to tease apart 
which factors direct the public’s feelings about war.   
 In regard to media’s effect on public opinion, research shows that elite rhetoric, 
framing and priming consistently impact individuals’ views of foreign policy issues 
(Baum and Groeling 2005; Berinsky 2007).  However, the exact dynamics of these forces 
may depend largely on the media messages themselves.  Messages from competing elites 
may undermine each other, while ubiquitous or particularly vivid messages can have a 
relatively large impact.  Furthermore, all media messages must be filtered through 
individual-level variables like knowledge, partisanship, and values, making media 
messages conditional in their effects (Druckman 2001; Druckman and Holmes 2004; 
Iyengar 1991).       
 Though the impact of violent images of war on public opinion is a component of 
media effects that remains unclear, there is reason to believe that exposure to violent 
imagery will affect individuals’ levels of public support for military conflict.   
Scholarship has demonstrated that images affect opinions in other areas of political 
science, including assessments of political candidates and voting (Grabe and Bucy 2009; 
Graber 2001).  The emotional and physiological changes brought on by the viewing of 
violence should amplify the cognitive effects of what a viewer sees.  Indeed, the brain 
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processes images so quickly that affective responses take place before an individual is 
conscious of their occurrence (Barry 2005).  As a result, violent images of war may 
routinely shape public support.  Nevertheless, as with other media effects, individual- 
level variables are likely to interact with the effects of violence. 
 
Research design and expectations 
To test the effects of violent images on public opinion about war, I conduct an 
experimental study.  Experiments offer an appealing method to test for the effects of 
ubiquitous war images on public opinion.  Experiments eliminate the problem of self-
reported overestimations of media exposure (Prior 2008), and allow for control of both 
content and levels of exposure.  With existing opinions randomly distributed and 
theoretically equalized across groups, differences in levels of support will be the result of 
the experimental manipulations.   
In this study I examine how different presentations of war, both visual and verbal, 
affect public support for military conflict.  A computerized survey experiment is the best 
tool to test my hypotheses about the effect of television news images of war.  By 
randomly assigning participants to conditions and systematically manipulating the 
independent variable, I maintain control of external sources of variance (Kinder and 
Palfrey 1993).  The study utilizes a nationally-representative sample to test for the effects 
of violence.  I will discuss the specifics of the research and then report results. 
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Experimental study 
 In the experimental study, conducted in January 2011, participants were 840 
adults from across the United States.  The survey was distributed by YouGovPolimetrix, 
a nonpartisan polling firm based in Palo Alto, California.  YouGovPolimetrix’s 
PollingPoint panel is an opt-in survey panel comprised of 1.5 million U.S. residents.   
PollingPoint uses the Internet as a platform for polling rather than traditional polling 
methods.  Participants are recruited over the Internet as well, primarily through web 
advertising campaigns that appear based on keyword searches32.  In exchange for their 
participation, participants earn points that can be redeemed for prizes. By maintaining a 
database of each participant’s demographic information, YouGovPolimetrix employs 
block randomization to approximate a random sample of all U.S. residents.   
 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of five conditions:  high violence images 
in a justified frame, high violence images in an unjustified frame, low violence images in 
a justified frame, low violence images in an unjustified frame, or the control condition 
(no treatment)33.  Subjects took the study on their own computers at a location of their 
choosing, linking to the online study through an email invitation.   
As subjects began the study, the computer prompted them to follow on-screen 
instructions.  Before random assignment to one of the conditions described above, 
subjects answered a series of questions on political predispositions (gauging partisanship, 
ideology and knowledge), emotions, personality, and attitudes.  Subjects then were asked 
                                                 
32 Opponents of internet survey methods argue that biases in sampling may occur if the panel is selected 
over the internet (for example, access is limited to those who are more technologically proficient, and the 
poor have less access).  However, online polling companies can identify problems with traditional survey 
approaches, such as telephone surveys being based on those at home at the right time and those with 
landlines, and individuals tend to give socially desirable responses when traditional methods are used 
(Kellner 2004).   
33 Each condition contained 168 participants. 
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to watch one of four different three-minute television news stories on Afghanistan that 
contained the experimental treatments (or they did not watch a video if in the control 
condition).   Following the video, subjects were asked to rate their emotions.  They then 
evaluated a series of questions about Afghanistan which will make up the key dependent 
variables for the data analysis, as well as questions about media consumption and 
preferences.  To conclude, subjects were debriefed and thanked. 
 
Treatment manipulation 
The experimental manipulations occurred within edited television news stories.  
These stories were based on a real ABC Evening News story from June 13, 2010.  The 
story line involved the upcoming offensive attack of Afghanistan’s Kandahar province 
and the battle’s importance to the Afghanistan conflict as a whole.  Based on open ended 
responses to a pilot study34, extra care was taken to use the actual language of real news 
reports whenever possible, including within the manipulation of the story frame.  The 
edited story used language from several news clips35 to more closely mimic a real 
television news story, such that 95% of the words from the edited compilation came from 
actual news transcripts.   
The treatments varied in two ways, by amount of violent imagery and by the 
frame of violence, as justified or not justified in relation to efforts to promote democracy 
and freedom.  Editing was used to vary image content while holding spoken content 
constant, so that groups one and three, and two and four, received the same verbal 
                                                 
34 The pilot study was conducted in November 2009.  Participants were 241 undergraduate students at a 
private research university.  More information on the pilot study is available by contacting the author. 
35 Language from the following news programs was used to compile the edited transcript:  ABC World 
News on February 8, 2009.  ABC News, Good Morning America on July 3, 2010.  NBC Nightly News on 
July 10, 2010.  NBC Nightly News on July 14, 2010. 
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information, while groups one and two, and three and four, received the same visual 
information.   
Specifically, the stories varied as follows: High violence images consisted of dead 
bodies, exploding bombs and visible bloodshed from an up close viewing perspective.  
Low violence images showed landscapes, crowds or patrolling soldiers, but no dead 
bodies, bloodshed or acts of violence.36  The justified violence frame led subjects to 
believe that the battle for Kandahar province would be likely to increase security and 
democracy in Afghanistan, while the unjustified frame portrayed the upcoming battle as 
promoting skepticism among Afghans in America’s ability to bring democracy to 
Afghanistan.  Transcripts of the story, in both justified and unjustified frame treatments, 
follow.  Bold-face words indicate framing effects that vary between treatments. 
 
Justified frame: 
 
Charles Gibson:  This week we’re going to look at the stakes of the war in 
Afghanistan, which President Obama has placed at the top of his foreign policy 
agenda.  Martha Raddatz reports on where things stand. 
 
Martha Raddatz:  Nine years later, $210 billion spent, 1,948 international troops 
dead.  But Afghanistan is freer.  Its people more hopeful, and its government 
more democratic than any time since the war began.  Security is improving as 
the US is planning to send 30,000 more troops on top of the 32,000 already here.  
The US refuses to neglect this war. 
 
General Mark Milley:  We need to improve the security situation in Afghanistan 
in a very real way, and we also need to improve the perception of security in the 
minds of the Afghan people, no question about it. 
 
Martha Raddatz:  Even though the US has been in Afghanistan for more than 9 
years, the last year was by far the most dangerous since 2001.  The cloud of 
violence comes with a silver lining as Afghans look forward to increased 
human rights and a better lifestyle.  With the fight for Kandahar looming, the 
                                                 
36 All treatments were pre-tested in advance by a sample of undergraduates to confirm that violent images 
evoke reactions.   
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biggest offensive since 2001, the struggle here is expected to be intense.  As US 
soldiers seek local support to combat rising levels of violence, US commanders 
look for national endorsement.  Today, the US flew Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai to Kandahar.  His mission?  Convince people to back the single largest 
operation of the war.   “I want your cooperation,” he says.  “You have to be 
brave.”   
 
He asked the Afghan people if they’re with him.  But many still have doubts.  In 
the past, the US tried but failed to secure Kandahar.  But today, the police and 
government are much better equipped.  The US considered Karzai’s call today a 
green light.  
 
General Stanley McChrystal:  He looked at the people and he asked them if they 
were willing to sacrifice and had the, the strength to do this.    
 
Martha Raddatz:  And the people came back with a strong, resounding, 
indication that they were.  US Commanders say that the goal of the surge is to 
bring trust and confidence to the Afghan people through better security, and 
increasingly that’s looking like it’s having the desired effect.  And so the hard 
part begins.  The battle for Kandahar will be bloody, but fortunately it could lead 
to greater democracy for all Afghan citizens.  Winning Kandahar could mean 
winning Afghanistan.  Martha Raddatz, ABC News, Kandahar. 
 
Charles Gibson:  And we’ll have more on where things stand later in the week.   
 
 
Unjustified frame: 
 
Charles Gibson:  This week we’re going to look at the stakes of the war in 
Afghanistan, which President Obama has placed at the top of his foreign policy 
agenda.  Martha Raddatz reports on where things stand. 
 
Martha Raddatz:  Nine years later, $210 billion spent, 1,948 international troops 
dead.  And Afghanistan is less free.  Its people less hopeful, and its government 
less democratic than any time since the war began.  Security has deteriorated to 
the point where the US is planning to send 30,000 more troops on top of the 
32,000 already here.  The US admits it neglected this war. 
 
General Mark Milley:  We need to improve the security situation in Afghanistan 
in a very real way, and we also need to improve the perception of security in the 
minds of the Afghan people, no question about it. 
 
Martha Raddatz:  Even though the US has been in Afghanistan for more than 9 
years, the last year was by far the most dangerous since 2001.  The cloud of 
violence hovers over Afghans as they see none of the promised changes in 
their quality of life.   With the fight for Kandahar looming, the biggest offensive 
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since 2001, the struggle here is expected to be intense.  As US soldiers seek local 
support to combat rising levels of violence, US commanders look for national 
endorsement.  Today, the US flew Afghan President Hamid Karzai to Kandahar.  
His mission?  Convince people to back the single largest operation of the war.   “I 
want your cooperation,” he says.  “You have to be brave.”   
 
He asked the Afghan people if they’re with him.  But many still have doubts.  In 
the past, the US tried but failed to secure Kandahar.  And still today, the police 
and government are woefully underequipped.  The US believed Karzai’s call 
today was unlikely to affect public sentiment. 
 
General Stanley McChrystal:  He looked at the people and he asked them if they 
were willing to sacrifice and had the, the strength to do this.    
 
Martha Raddatz:  And the people came back with skepticism and hesitation. US 
Commanders say that the goal of the surge is to bring trust and confidence to the 
Afghan people through better security, but increasingly that’s looking like it’s 
having just the opposite effect.   And so the hard part begins.  The battle for 
Kandahar will be bloody, but sadly it is unlikely to further democracy for all 
Afghan citizens.   If so, losing Kandahar could mean losing Afghanistan.  Martha 
Raddatz, ABC News, Kandahar. 
 
Charles Gibson:  And we’ll have more on where things stand later in the week.   
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Figure 20 shows treatment conditions and number of subjects within each.  A full 
transcript of the experiment can be found in appendix C. 
Images and content from the Afghanistan war alone were used in order to hold 
other influencing factors on public support constant.  All adult participants were alike in 
the sense of sharing some degree of personal familiarity with Afghanistan events, having 
lived through them.  Such is not the case with Vietnam, where younger individuals may 
have no personal experience with the conflicts.  The Iraqi war, while current, is not a 
good test case because public opinion is already overwhelmingly negative.  As such, 
experimental manipulations are unlikely to change opinion to a great extent.  The 
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Afghanistan war is less salient, and public opinion toward the conflict is much more 
neutral.37 
 
 
Control Condition Treatment 1, 168 subjects 
 
  
Justified Violence Frame 
 
Unjustified Violence 
Frame 
 
Low Violence Images 
 
Treatment 2 
168 subjects 
 
Treatment 3 
168 subjects 
 
High Violence Images 
 
Treatment 4 
168 subjects 
 
Treatment 5 
168 subjects 
Figure 20:  Treatments and subjects of experimental study 
 
Dependent variables 
Subjects were asked to answer several questions designed to gauge their level of 
support for the war in Afghanistan.  Responses were coded to run from least supportive 
of the war to most supportive of the war.   
                                                 
37 This was especially true when the pilot of the experiment was conducted in November 2009.  In 2010, 
the Afghanistan War received more negative media attention, but opinions are still distributed in such a 
way that many Americans support the conflict..   
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Data for the dependent variable- support for the Afghanistan war- was derived by 
combining participants’ responses to three questions. The first question served as a broad 
gauge of support for the conflict.   
1.  “Do you AGREE or DISAGREE with this statement:  All things 
considered, US involvement in Afghanistan was a mistake?”   
 
To indicate level of support, respondents answer on a five-point scale anchored by 
“strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.”  Questions about whether or not a given war is 
a mistake are some of the most commonly tools used to gauge American public opinion 
about military conflicts.  Gallup used a “mistake” question to measure public opinion 
throughout the Iraq conflict38 
The next two questions asked about specific components of the Afghan conflict.  
These lines of inquiry function as indirect but relevant measures of support.  They are 
likely to avoid some of the partisan baggage of more direct questions about absolute 
support for the conflict.  As many citizens already have their opinions set about whether 
they support the Afghanistan conflict in an absolute sense, these questions are more likely 
to force careful consideration of the issues at hand.   
2. “Do you AGREE or DISAGREE with this statement:  US involvement 
in Afghanistan will ultimately increase the personal freedoms enjoyed 
by Afghans.”   
 
To indicate level of support, respondents answer on a five-point scale anchored by 
“strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.”   
3.  “Has the United States’ use of force in the war in Afghanistan been 
effective?” 
 
                                                 
38 The Gallup question uses slightly different wording, “In view of the developments since we first sent our 
troops to Iraq, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not?”   
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To indicate level of support, respondents answer on a five-point scale anchored by “not 
effect at all” and “very effective.”   
By using a compiled scale of the three questions rather than just one in modeling 
determinants of public support, I increase the likelihood of measuring the existing 
opinions of individuals rather than tapping question wording effects or other artifacts 
unrelated to actual level of support.  Using multiple questions to measure the dependent 
variable also follows conventional wisdom that states public support for war is best 
measured by the use of several indicators (Berinsky and Druckman 2007; Burke 1999; 
Eichenberg 2005).  On the resulting scale, individuals’ levels of support ranged from 3 
(least supportive of the war) to 15 (most supportive of the war), with a mean of 9.25 and 
a median of 9.  The variation in responses approximates a normal distribution, as seen in 
figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21:  Distribution of support for the war in Afghanistan 
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Explanatory variables 
The primary focus of the data analysis is on the effects of the experimental 
manipulations of violent imagery and frames.  To build further support for the results 
suggested by the difference of means tests, I model public support for war and include 
dummy variables for each treatment group and the control group.  If violent images 
uniformly suppress support for war, exposure to violent images should decrease support 
across high violence treatment groups, reflecting the following expectation: 
H1:  Exposure to high levels of violent war imagery in television news will  
        decrease support for war.  
 
 I ask a number of control questions and include independent variables to control 
for each of them.  I anticipate individuals identifying themselves as Democrats are less 
likely, and Republicans are more likely, to support the war.  Independents and others 
should fall somewhere in between (Baum 2002).  The variable PartyID ranges from 1 
(very strong Democrat) to 7 (very strong Republican).  Ideology should also play in a role 
in decisions about war support.  The variable Ideology ranges for 1 (very liberal) to 7 
(very conservative).  Expectedly, those participants who embrace conservative political 
ideology should be more likely to support war. 
Gender also matters in decisions about war, as women tend to be conflict averse 
compared to men (Eichenberg 2003; Nincic and Nincic 2002).  The dummy variable 
Female is set at 1 for females and 0 for males.  I ask one question about feelings toward 
the future of the United States.  This variable, Pessimism, ranges from 1 (very optimistic) 
to 5 (very pessimistic).  I expect those individuals predisposed to view U.S. affairs in a 
pessimistic way to have lowered opinions about the war.   
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Political knowledge has been shown to be an important factor in mitigating the 
effects of information-based experimental manipulations (Kam 2005).  Political 
knowledge also may limit the influence of the effects of violent images.  That is, for 
individuals who possess higher levels of knowledge about Afghanistan, violent pictures- 
like other media effects- are noticeable, but do not overshadow existing storehouses of 
additional information (Gartner 2008).  Political knowledge is also positively correlated 
with increased support for war.  Although the reasons are not fully understood, many 
studies have shown that higher levels of knowledge increase the likelihood that citizens 
will support war.  This finding has held for wars including World War II (Berinsky 
2009), the Vietnam War (Verba et al 1967; Zaller 1992) and the Persian Gulf War 
(Iyengar and Simon 1994; Zaller 1996).  Thus, I create the variable PoliticalKnowledge, 
using a battery of seven multiple choice and open-ended questions39.  The variable takes 
values from 0 to 7 depending on the number of questions answered correctly.   
The variable Veteran is coded 1 for those respondents who identify themselves as 
veterans of the Armed Forces, and 0 otherwise.  I expect veterans to show heightened 
levels of support for military conflict (Feaver and Gelpi 2004).  I also create a variable to 
capture the number of days a week that subjects watch television news.   This variable, 
DaysTVNews, ranges from 0 to 7 and can account for subjects who are bombarded with 
violent images on a regular basis.  Finally, I construct variables for demographic 
characteristics, including Education, Age, ChildrenUnder18, and Income.  These 
variables will serve as controls in the study.  As the model accounts for party 
                                                 
39 Multiple choice questions asked respondents about the responsibilities of various political officials.  
Opened ended questions named a politician and asked respondents to identify his or her position. Exact 
question wording can be found in Appendix C. 
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identification that might otherwise correlate with some of these variables, I have no 
expectations for their behavior.   
 
Results 
A comparison of means of the dependent variable across treatment conditions 
reveals that the some of the treatment conditions affected the amount of public support 
for Afghanistan expressed by participants.  The control group’s level of support for 
Afghanistan was 9.55.  Only the low violence, justified frame treatment group exhibited 
higher levels of support for the conflict, with a mean of 9.85.  The other treatment groups 
displayed less support for Afghanistan relative to the control.  Participants in the low 
violence, unjustified treatment averaged 9.47.  The level of support in both of these 
treatment conditions is not statistically distinguishable from the control group. 
However, those subjects in the other two treatment groups displayed statistically 
significant differences in levels of public support for Afghanistan.  In the high violence, 
justified frame treatment group participants had a mean support score of 8.88.  
Participants in the high violence, unjustified frame group exhibited the lowest levels of 
support at 8.49.  Mean public support scores for each treatment group are found in table 
13.  Because of the random sample, note that other characteristics that typically predict 
levels of public support for war are equally distributed across groups.   
Although the analysis of aggregate data in the previous chapter suggested an 
interaction effect might exist between violent imagery and frame, these data suggest that 
is not the case.  When evaluating the data apart from the control group, imagery and 
frame both appear to have effects, but they are independent of one another.  When 
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holding frame constant, exposure to highly violent imagery lowers the mean support 
score by approximately one point compared exposure to low violence images.  This holds 
for participants in both the justified and unjustified treatment conditions.  Likewise, when 
holding violent imagery constant, those participants in the justified frame conditions 
expressed higher levels of support for war (about 0.3 of a point) than those in the 
unjustified frame conditions.  The size of the effect of violent imagery is more than triple 
the effect of framing.     
 
 
 
Table 13:  Differences of means of key variables 
 
 Control 
Group 
Low 
violence, 
justified 
High 
violence, 
justified 
Low 
violence, 
unjustified 
High 
violence, 
unjustified 
Dependent Variable 
Level of support 
for Afghanistan  
 
9.55 
 
9.85 
 
8.88* 
 
9.47 
 
8.49* 
Independent Variables 
Party ID  3.97 3.77 3.88 3.97 3.85 
Ideology 3.40 3.25 3.61 3.32 3.44 
Education 3.46 3.34 3.42 3.29 3.35 
Gender 1.53 1.49 1.52 1.52 1.51 
Income 8.45 8.36 8.05 7.79 8.15 
Age 49.90 48.92 48.13 49.79 50.77 
 
*Statistically distinguishable from the control group 
 
 
 A close look at a question gauging support for Afghanistan again shows that 
exposure to a treatment condition high in violent images suppresses support for the war.  
Participants were asked if U.S. involvement in Afghanistan will ultimately increase the 
personal freedoms enjoyed by Afghans.  Of all participants exposed to an experimental 
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treatment high in violence (high violence/unjustified and high violence/justified), 27.67% 
indicated a response against the war (disagree or strongly disagree with the statement), 
while 19.5% of those exposed to low violence gave the same response.  The 8.17% 
difference is statistically significant a p < 0.01.  Even more indicative of the effects of 
violence, subjects in the high violence/unjustified frame condition displayed greater 
dearth of support compared to low violence/unjustified frame subjects, with 35.12% 
opposing the war in the violence condition and 22.02% opposing in the low violence 
treatment group.  Again, the difference between groups (12.96%) is statistically 
significant at p < 0.01.   
 Subjects given a violence treatment within the justified frame were exposed to 
competing forces.  The negativity of the violence was partially counteracted by the 
positivity of the justified frame.  Of those in the high violence/justified condition, 20.24 
opposed the war, while 14.29% in the low violence/justified condition gave the same 
response.  This difference of 5.95%  has marginal statistical significance at p < 0.1.  
Figure 22 illustrates these results.  This analysis lends support to the hypothesis that 
violence suppresses support for war.   
In addition to producing differences in levels of support for the Afghanistan war, I  
expected measures of exposure to images of violence and frames to further our overall 
understanding of individual determinants of public support for war.  If such is the case, 
reactions to violent images and frames should behave in an expected fashion with other 
known individual-level predictors of war support.  To test this, I regressed war support 
for Afghanistan40 on a set of predictor variables. The independent variables of most 
                                                 
40 Dependent variable is measured through the three-item compilation of support questions discussed in the 
previous section. 
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interest are the dummy variables representing experimental treatments.  As controls, the 
model also employs independent variables for gender, party identification, ideology, 
pessimism toward the future of the United States, political knowledge, veteran status, 
days a week watching television news, education, age, children under age 18 and income.  
The results of these analyses are displayed in table 14. 
 
 
Question:  Do you AGREE or DISAGREE with this statement:  US involvement in 
Afghanistan will ultimately increase the personal freedoms enjoyed by Afghans. 
 
 
 
High violence images suppressed support for Afghanistan by 8.17% (statistically significant at p 
< 0.01) 
 
Figure 22:  Violence suppresses support for Afghanistan 
 
0
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 119 
 
 
 
 
High violence images suppressed support for Afghanistan by 12.96% (statistically significant at p 
< 0.01) 
 
 
High violence images suppressed support for Afghanistan by 5.95% (statistically 
significant at p < 0.1) 
 
The key finding is that experiment treatments had observable effects on 
participants’ levels of support for war.  In regard to the variable of most interest- images 
of violence- there is support for hypothesis one.  Exposure to high levels of violent war 
imagery in television news decreases support for war. These effects are most apparent in  
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Table 14:  Predicting support for war 
 Coefficients  Standard Errors 
Low violence, justified frame 0.48* 
 
0.29 
Low violence, unjustified 
frame  
-0.53* 0.29 
High violence, justified 
frame 
0.13 0.29 
High violence, unjustified 
frame 
-1.00*** 0.28 
Female -0.41** 0.21 
 
Party ID 0.31*** 0.05 
 
Ideology 0.22*** 0.08 
 
Pessimism -0.37*** 0.08 
 
Political Knowledge 0.17*** 0.05 
 
Veteran 0.35 
 
0.25 
Days TV News 0.08** 
 
0.04 
Education 0.01 
 
0.06 
Age -0.01* 
 
0.01 
Children under 18 
 
-0.18 0.21 
Income 0.01 
 
0.02 
Constant 8.29*** 
 
0.69 
Number of cases 827 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 
 
 
Entires are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in following column.  The dependent variable 
is coded so that a higher score indicates a greater level of support for the war in Afghanistan.  *p < .10; **p 
< .05;  ***p<.01 
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conjunction with the unjustified frame, as violence and unjustified frame work 
individually and in the same direction to lower support for war.  Other key comparisons 
among independent variables merit further explanation below. 
 
Effects of framing 
Overall, the effects of framing behave as expected.  Unjustified frames of 
violence decrease support for Afghanistan, while justified frames increase support for the 
conflict.  These outcomes are most apparent when comparing the effects of frame within 
violence treatments.  For example, treatment groups 2 and 3 both received images low in 
violence.  Holding images constant, the frame alone caused treatment group 2 (low 
violence, justified frame) to express more support for war than the control group, while 
group 3 (low violence, unjustified frame) demonstrated less support relative to the control 
group.  In the same way, treatment groups 4 and 5 both received images high in violence.  
Those in group 5 (high violence, unjustified frame) expressed sizable and statistically 
significant decreases in support relative to the control group.  Though group 4 (high 
violence, justified frame) is not different from the control group in their expressed 
support, they display higher support for Afghanistan than group 5.  These results suggest 
that highly violent images can either counteract or increase the influence of frames.  As 
framing is a known and powerful factor in shaping public opinion, this finding is of great 
consequence.   
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Effects of violent images 
The effect of highly violent images in the unjustified frame condition serves to 
further decrease support for Afghanistan beyond the lowering of public support caused by 
the frame alone.  These effects are the largest of any of the treatment groups.  Findings of 
this study show that highly violent images within justified frames of violent still serve to 
suppress support for war.  This goes directly against the second set of hypotheses 
advanced in Chapter 4, that violence in a justified frame might increase support by 
drawing more attention toward the positive frame.  Instead, the positive effects of the 
frame appear to be mitigated by negative effects of the violence.  Whereas the justified 
frame of violence bolsters support for war relative to the control group when low 
violence images are present, the positive changes in support caused by justified framing 
disappear when combined with highly violent images.   
Control variables behaved largely as expected.  Republicanism, conservative 
ideology and political knowledge predicted increased support for the war.  Female gender 
and pessimism toward the future of the United States predicted decreased support.  
Income and education had no measurable effect, nor did veteran status despite its typical 
power to boost support.  Days a week spent watching TV news predicted increased 
support for war, while those individuals older in age were less likely to favor the war.   
 
Conclusion 
This experimental study offers the opportunity to advance our scholarly 
understanding of the public’s support for war.  By sorting out causation through 
experimental design, I can offer new insights to important questions about the effects of 
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violent imagery on public opinion.  The study shows that violent images suppress public 
support for war regardless of frame.  Two realities exist in today’s media environment.  
One, violence in television news is now common place.  Images of violence inundate 
citizens’ living rooms as news programs are broadcast across America.  Two, today’s 
coverage of war tends toward the negative.  When considering these facts together, the 
findings of this research seem particularly important.  Violent images like the ones in 
these experiments reach the citizenry on a consistent basis, and researchers should 
consider their effects when modeling public support for war.   
It is essential to note that while many scholars have demonstrated the influence of 
media framing, very few have systematically examined how visual information 
influences viewers apart from framing effects.  These experimental studies build a 
foundation for the role of imagery in public opinion formation, establishing a measurable 
role of violent images in the formation of public support for war.   
Technology will only expand, bringing more and more images of violence into 
our homes and our consciousness.  The intellectual merit of this project seems especially 
clear as the public and our leaders wrestle with the Iraqi and Afghanistan conflicts.  In 
fact, the impact of these findings may extend beyond the academy.  Policy makers should 
find the results of value as they struggle with finding the kinds of policies that the public 
will support.  The next and final chapter of this dissertation explores these ideas as I 
conclude.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 Violence and military conflict go hand in hand.  Often the simple mention of a 
war will bring to mind a picture of the horrors of battle.  In some ways the Vietnam War 
has become synonymous with the widely-disseminated photograph of a naked little girl, 
screaming as she runs from her napalm-covered village (see figure 1).  Likewise, it is 
difficult for some to think of the Iraq war without envisioning rows of flag-covered 
coffins in the hull of an aircraft carrier (see figure 2).  We remember these images 
because they touch us deeply.  We react to them emotionally.  They affect the way we 
think about war.   
 
 
Figure 23:  Vietnam photo:  young child running 
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Figure 24:  Iraq photo:  flag-draped coffins 
 
This dissertation has examined the relationship between images of violence in war 
and public support for military conflict.  It demonstrates that violent images do affect 
public opinion, separate from spoken content alone.  The impact of news visuals deserves 
attention in large part due to their overwhelming prevalence on television news today.  
Compared to the Vietnam Era, the amount and degree of violence on today’s news 
programs has increased exponentially, as seen in Chapter 2.  Today’s viewers of 
television news see images of injury in more than 56% of war stories, compared to just 
16% during the Vietnam War.  The degree of violence in modern news images is quite 
high, showing moderate or strong violence in over 40% of stories.  Vietnam news 
produced similar degrees of violent imagery in just 7% of reports.  These images of 
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violence permeate cable news outlets as well as network programs.  Although cable news 
programs CNN and Fox News show similar levels of violence, the length of their stories 
and type of commentary shades the overall effect of the violence, as shown in Chapter 3.   
The violent imagery in television news affects aggregate support for war, 
although as observed in Chapter 4, these effects depend largely on how news reporters 
justify the reasons for violent actions in the spoken content of their reports.  More 
extreme effects are observed when the violence is framed repeatedly in the same fashion 
over a period of time.  In such cases, images of violence can shift aggregate public 
support in meaningful ways.  Empirical tests in Chapter 5 provide further evidence of the 
effects of violent images at the individual level, suggesting that high degrees of violence 
suppress public support for war regardless of frame.  Images of violence changed an 
individual’s level of support for war between 6%  – 13% on a 100-point scale.   
 As a result of these findings, we now know more about how the public develops 
opinions and beliefs about military engagements.  Visual information is an important 
though often overlooked component of public opinion formation.  In and of themselves, 
violent images evoke emotional reactions that shift levels of public support beyond what 
occurs through the processing of spoken or written information.  Models of public 
support for war should be revised in such a way that consider the impact of violent 
images.   
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Contributions 
One of the biggest stumbling blocks to including visuals in studies of political 
communication has been measurement.  Scholars have made vociferous calls for more 
research on the importance of imagery for upwards of twenty years.  Though some 
projects made important contributions to the study of images, no method for measuring 
images gained a foothold in the field (Grabe and Bucy 2009).  Coding methods suffered 
from being too specific and difficult for others to replicate, or too broad to offer detailed 
insights into political processes and decision making.   
The coding method I advance in Chapter 2 is an important contribution of this 
dissertation.  My method, which modifies a coding scheme used in research on the effects 
of violence in video games and translates it for use by social scientists, is both systematic 
and reproducible.  By measuring violence in five different ways- portrayal of personal 
injury, portrayal of death, explicitness, graphicness and length of violence- I obtain a 
highly specific yet practical measure of violent images.  This research establishes a 
foundation on which future research projects can build models of support for war that 
consider both verbal and visual information. 
A second contribution of this dissertation is the data from content analysis of 
television news in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 using the above coding scheme.  The data set 
analyzes ABC, CBS and NBC coverage of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, as well as 
CNN and Fox News coverage of the Iraq War.  Over 1,350 days of war coverage are 
analyzed, resulting in one of the first detailed content analyses of network news coverage 
of war over time.  The data set is the first to measure specifically violent images of war 
on nightly television news programs, and it provides information on variation between 
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news networks and changes in coverage of war over forty years.  These data make an 
important empirical contribution to the field of political communication, as well as mass 
communication more broadly, by detailing the evolution of television news stories of 
war.   
Given the enormous change in violent images on modern television news 
programs since the Vietnam War, as demonstrated in these chapters, it stands to reason 
that a change in our conception of public support for war is warranted as well.  Today’s 
television news consumer is inundated with imagery on an almost constant basis.  In 
regard to stories of war, the high level of violence in these images makes them especially 
evocative of emotion and likely to prime later judgments regarding opinions of a conflict.  
While an individual’s reaction to violence will vary from person to person based on her 
unique experiences and personal characteristics, all individuals are alike in that they 
process visual information in the brain more quickly than words.  This primacy of vision 
causes emotional reactions to linger within a person’s consciousness, making it largely 
responsible for observed shifts in the public’s opinions. 
While the methodological improvements and empirical findings discussed above 
ground the dissertation, the findings from chapters 4 and 5 make a theoretical 
contribution to the literature on framing.  Past research has shown that framing can be 
successful in activating desired considerations, and we know that news reporters often 
frame reports of political news with the aim of promoting a certain world view (Entman 
1993).  We know less about how other media techniques can impede or facilitate framing 
effects.  To add to this body of work, I show that violent images work in conjunction with 
frames to cause shifts in public opinion.  By considering visuals in tandem with a frame, 
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at least at the aggregate level, we observe different effects than if we had measured the 
effects of framing alone.   
Chapter 4 provided evidence of this phenomenon in an aggregate analysis of 
American public opinion about the Iraq war.  When television news programs showed 
high levels of violent images, aggregate public support moved up to 13 points on a 100-
point scale.  Violent images are capable of manipulating public sentiments in both 
positive and negative directions, depending on the frame applied to the violence.  Images 
of extreme violence appear to capture viewers’ attention beyond what would normally 
take place, increasing the capacity of story frame to affect public support.  
As suggested by the experimental data in Chapter 5, the vividness of war images 
attracts viewers to pay increased attention to the news stories in which the images are 
shown.  The influence of violent images appears most strongly in conjunction with 
unjustified frames.  The negativity of both the images and the frame amplify one another, 
leading to the significant suppression of public support compared to framing effects 
alone.  Effects of violent images continue to suppress support when they are framed as 
justifiable actions, although the negative effects of violent images are counteracted by the 
positive effects of a justified frame, causing the two treatments to cancel each other out.  
Evidence of this can be seen in tests of subjects’ emotions immediately after viewing 
high levels of violence.  For subjects in conditions high in violent images, negative 
emotions increased even for subjects in the justified frame condition (though the increase 
was not as high as for subjects in the unjustified frame condition).  As visuals have a 
constant presence in the modern media environment, this information is essential for 
understanding the framing effects of television news. 
 130 
 
 
By studying the role of violent images through the lens of both aggregate and 
individual level data, I make a strong case for the validity of this dissertation.  The 
individual-level data produced from the experimental study provide a high degree of 
internal validity.  By isolating the effects of violent images in a controlled environment, I 
observe measurable and image-specific effects.  The aggregate-level data from Chapter 4 
provide external validity.  The persistence of aggregate effects in a diverse sample yields 
convincing evidence that the effects of images endure beyond a laboratory environment 
and into the real world.   
 
Implications 
 
Implications for understanding news media 
Understanding images as a form of opinion-altering information will require 
questioning and then changing entrenched assumptions about what information news 
media provide.  Traditionally, political scientists have understood and studied media 
through words.  Both the sending and receiving of political messages was thought to take 
place primarily through verbal communication.  But looking at political issues in such a 
manner grossly narrows the actual scope of politics.  Individuals can and do form 
opinions and garner knowledge as a result of their experiences viewing political images.  
There are several compelling reasons to take visuals seriously.  In today’s new 
media environment, saturated with visual information, the role of media has changed.  
Unlike during the Vietnam era, images are now a fundamental component of news 
consumption.  Psychological evidence shows that individuals rapidly make inferences 
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from the images that they see.  These inferences affect the subsequent processing of 
information, even if individuals themselves are not consciously aware of the visual 
influences taking place (Damasio 1999).  In this way, images complement verbal 
information to shape the criteria by which citizens evaluate war.  Neither words nor 
visuals exert sole influence on what a media consumer takes away from watching news.  
Instead, words and visuals each affect public support for war.  Nevertheless, distinctions 
can be made between information gleaned from words versus visuals.  These distinctions 
can be made in regard to cognition, biology and culture.   
On a cognitive level, images are easier to recall than words (Barry 2005).  
Additionally, whereas information taken from words is most useful in conjunction with a 
political schema, visual information is primarily independent of such frameworks (Grabe 
and Bucy 2009).  Those without a foundation of political knowledge can still derive 
useful knowledge from images.  Finally, images allow for quick inferences of relevant 
information (Newell 1990), including information relevant to politics, whereas words 
provide for similar inferences at a comparatively slower rate.  Regardless of someone’s 
cognitive ability, she is more likely to receive and retain information from images.   
In regard to biology, images have much longer history in the evolutionary process 
than do words (Parker 2003).  Specialized centers in the brain exist solely for visual 
processing; no equivalent brain centers are present for reading (LeDoux 1996).  While 
words are processed only at the cognitive level, at a rate of 500 milliseconds and above, 
images are sorted cognitively and biologically.  Within the biological band of processing, 
sorting takes place ten times more quickly than cognitive assessments, at 50 milliseconds 
and above (Libet et al 1991).   
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The place of images and words within the American culture is also distinct.  
Words are viewed as an indicator of intellect, while images are less esteemed (Briggs and 
Burke 2005; Lesy 2007).  For example, suppose there are two men, a highly paid 
stockbroker and a Union coal miner.  One gets news from reading the New York Times 
and the other watches network television news.  Which one would you guess watches 
television news?  Because elite sophisticates are more associated with reading the New 
York Times than watching network television news, most people would likely guess the 
miner watches TV news.  Words in culture are exclusionary.  They divide the public into 
social classes, those with high vocabularies and reading comprehension and those without 
(McChesney 2004).  Images, to the contrary, are equalizing.  Everyone can understand 
them.   
All of these reasons highlight the importance of considering imagery as an 
information source in modern media.  Taken together, there is support for the notion that 
images are, at minimum, as useful as words in spreading the types of political knowledge 
that are essential for the proper functioning of a democracy.  If democratic ideals truly 
value the participation of all citizens, models of public support must be altered in ways 
that consider visuals as a tool for gaining political information.   Existing models of 
public opinion in political science must continue to move forward, painting a more 
detailed and complete portrait of the American news consumer.  While studies in mass 
communications have done work to investigate the role of images, my study adds a new 
systematic measure than advances what we know about images in the fields of both 
political science and communications.  Television news and other image-laden media 
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may positively affect the inner-workings of democracy in ways not previously 
considered.    
 
Implications for understanding the responsiveness and accountability of political 
leaders 
 
 News images play a part in determining whether the public will back political 
leaders and their decisions.  As political leaders wrestle with the kinds of policies the 
public will support, they consider the public’s potential reactions to violent imagery.  The 
past actions of Presidents and other political leaders indicate that they think images 
matter in shaping public sentiment.  The photographs of military coffins referenced 
briefly at the beginning of this chapter are prime examples of this type of behavior.  In 
1991, President George H. W. Bush enacted a policy which banned news photographs of 
coffins or similar items that held the remains of American military personnel as they 
arrived at Delaware’s Dover Air Force Base from the Middle East.    For eighteen years, 
with relatively few exceptions, the media were prohibited from photographing or filming 
these flag-draped coffins.  While President Bush said the policy was designed to protect 
the privacy of families of the dead, many political activists and most media organizations 
saw political motivations behind the ban.  Was President Bush fearful that images of 
coffins would lower support for his Persian Gulf War?  The ban was lifted by President 
Barack Obama in late February 2009, with the reasoning that freedom of the press was 
paramount.  Still, Obama had made his stance against involvement in Iraq known 
throughout his campaign for President and into his Presidency.  Would he had lifted the 
ban had it not advantaged him politically? 
 134 
 
 
 This begs the question:  how much war violence will the public tolerate?  Imagine 
if today’s media existed during the United States Civil War.  Over 625,000 war deaths 
occurred during the four years of that conflict, with an average of 428 casualties per day 
for every single day of the war.  Suppose television news crews were present for the 
Battle of Gettysburg in Pennsylvania during July of 1863, where more than 51,000 
casualties occurred over the three day struggle.  Images of such carnage would have filled 
every inch of viewers’ television screens.  Moreover, the magnitude of the atrocity would 
have merited around the clock news coverage.  How long would the public have 
supported the war if they were exposed to that level of violence on a regular basis?   
Would such a blood bath be permitted by today’s society?  If even a fraction of 
the number of lives lost at Gettysburg were taken during a battle in Afghanistan, news 
networks would flood American media with images of the violence.  A severe reaction 
from the public would be inevitable.  People would decry the conflict in mass numbers.   
Conceivably, they would take to the streets in protest, demanding that political leaders 
end United States involvement in the conflict immediately.  If leaders failed to respond, 
their political futures would certainly be in jeopardy.   
But, just as reactions to everyday war violence on television news are dependent 
on frames, the public’s reaction to levels of extreme war violence is likely also dependent 
on the stakes of the conflict.  Whereas United States involvement or victory in 
Afghanistan is not essential to its existence, some wars have much more consequential 
outcomes.  If the United States were invaded and its sovereignty questioned, perhaps no 
human costs would be too high to ensure our freedom.  For lesser causes, (i.e., anything 
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short of a foreign invasion) on the other hand, the American public would likely erupt 
with outrage and calls for impeachment if a President did not end the war immediately.   
 Though these scenarios are hypothetical, they demonstrate the high probability 
that violent images have a role in the responsiveness of political leaders.  Politicians 
know that reporters and their high-tech equipment will be embedded with troops in 
today’s wars.  The public will undoubtedly see heightened levels of violence as a result of 
their presence.  As evidenced by support for Iraq dwindling more quickly than support 
for Vietnam in spite of far fewer casualties, seeing violence matters in shaping public 
support.   
As shown in Chapter 5, it is possible for the negative effects of violence to be 
mitigated by positive framing.  The media can broadcast high levels of violent imagery 
(at least to a point) without suppressing support for war if the violence is talked about in a 
way that justifies its occurrence.  Historically, however, as shown in Chapters 2 and 4, 
the media are only likely to do this while overall support for the war remains high.  As 
political leaders look ahead to reelection for themselves or their party, this fact that war 
violence can and often does suppress popular Presidential support helps hold them 
accountable to the American public.   
If the public helps hold politicians accountable, who then ensures responsible 
behavior by the media?  The media has a large degree of discretion in showing images of 
violence.  As discussed in the opening example of this dissertation, sometimes media 
outlets are divided in their decisions as to whether certain events are too violent for the 
public to see.  In the introductory example, Fox News deemed the violence against U.S. 
civilians too terrible to broadcast.  Conversely, CNN chose to show viewers horrific 
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images of the violence, bucking even the White House’s plea to cover the event 
responsibility.  Indeed, sometimes media outlets appear to seek out the most extreme 
violence in order to shock the public.   
The decentralization of the press enables new networks to cater to the preferences 
of their target audiences, whatever those may be.  When faced with hard decisions about 
whether or not to broadcast extreme images of violence, news networks may consider the 
kinds of reports their viewers want to see.  Perhaps it was not a coincidence that Fox 
News’ decided not to broadcast images of the bodies of the civilian contractors while 
CNN freely aired them.   Fox News is ostensibly more supportive of the war, and the 
terrible images would not have helped their cause.   CNN, on the other hand, had no 
desire for the public to approve of U.S. involvement in Iraq, and their lack of censorship 
may have been influenced by such considerations.  Given that few constraints exist to 
limit the amount or degree of violence that media outlets chose to show, our best course 
of action is to continue to seek understanding of how media broadcasts affect the public.   
 
Final thoughts 
News imagery transmits substantive political information to television news 
consumers.  Consequently, it should be viewed as a viable source of political knowledge, 
acting in tandem with verbal cues to shape public opinion.  The visually informed news 
consumer uses an array of verbal and visual information from television news and other 
sources to form opinions about foreign policy and the world around her.  News 
consumers informed by visual information may not hold high levels of technical 
knowledge about given conflicts or historical memories of why the conflicts occurred, 
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but they may be surprisingly proficient at piecing together the information they do have 
to make a well-informed assessment of war.   
As videos and their accompanying images increasingly permeate the Internet, 
there is even more reason for scholars to evaluate the influence of visual information.  It 
is questionable if television news will remain the number one source of political 
information throughout the next century.  Indeed, in my experimental study, 53% of 
citizens between 18 and 29 listed online sources as their primary supplier of news.  
Nevertheless, images will certainly remain on the forefront of politics in some form or 
another.  As the younger generations flock to the Internet for social networking, news and 
the sharing of all types of information, considering visuals will become increasingly 
essential to our understanding of public opinion formation and democratic discourse 
more generally. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 
Violence in network television news: 
Aggregate of ABC, NBC, and CBS Evening News 
 
                  
                 VIETNAM 
 
injury    N Percent  Cum.  
0          97 52.72  52.72 
1          57 30.98  83.70 
2           17 9.24  92.93 
3          10 5.43  98.37 
4          3  1.63  100.00 
   
death    N Percent  Cum.  
0 1 20 65.22  65.22 
1 5 1 27.72  92.93 
2 12  6.52  99.46 
3 1  0. 54  100.00 
   
explicit   N Percent  Cum. 
0 1 00 54.35  54.35 
1 5 3 28.80  83.15 
2 10  5.43  88.59 
3 21  11.41  100.00 
 
graphic   N Percent  Cum.  
0 1 65 89.67  89.67 
1 8 4 .35  94.02 
2 11  5.98  100.00 
3 0  0. 00  100.00 
 
 
Amount of Violence, In Seconds 
 N Mean SD      Min        Max 
Acts:      184 2.15 9.74 0 90 
 
Precursor 
acts: 184 0.98 5. 05 0  45 
 
Injury: 184 2 .76 11.21 0 90 
 
 
                     IRAQ 
 
injury    N Percent  Cum.  
0          41 16.87  16.87 
1          65 26.75  43.62  
2           40 16.46  60.08 
3          85 34.98  95.06  
4          12 4.94  100.00 
   
death    N Percent  Cum.  
0 8 7 35.80  35.80 
1 8 0 32.92  68.72 
2 73 30.04  98.77  
3 3  1. 23  100.00 
  
explicit   N Percent  Cum. 
0 4 0 16.46  16.46 
1 2 6 10.70  27.16 
2 2 9 11.93  39.09 
3 1 48 60.91  100.00 
 
graphic   N Percent  Cum.  
0 1 35 55.56  55.56 
1 39 16.05  71.60  
2 5 2 21.40  93.00 
3 17  7.00  100.00 
 
 
Amount of Violence, In Seconds 
 N Mean SD      Min        Max 
Acts:     243 9.22 14.46 0         120 
 
Precursor 
acts:       243 2.80 5.75 0 40 
 
Injury:   243 6.20 9. 17 0  45 
 
 140 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
 
Characteristics of network television news stories of war: 
Aggregate of ABC, NBC, and CBS Evening News 
 
 
                 VIETNAM 
 
lead stories: war   N  Percent 
0 (no lead) 139  43.03  
1 (lead)  1 84  5 6.97 
 
intensity  N  Percen t  
0  1 38  4 2.72  
1  7 3  2 2.60  
2  1 12  3 4.67  
 
perpetrator N  Percent  
1 (American) 24  27.91 
2 (Enemy) 32  37.21 
3 (civilian) 1  1.16 
4 (mix)  27   31 .40 
9 (unknown) 2  2.33 
 
target  N   Perce nt  
1 (all American) 23  27.06 
2 (mostly American) 8  9.41 
3 (Am.&enemy) 21  24.71 
4 (mostly enemy) 9  10.59 
5 (all enemy) 9  10.59 
8 (all civilians) 13  15.29 
9 (target unknown) 2  2.35 
 
casualties  N  Percent  
0  119  64.67  
1  65  35.33  
 
justified violence N  Percent  
-1 (unjustified) 25  28.74 
0 (no frame) 31  35.63 
1 (justified) 31  35.63 
  
evaluative tone N  Percent  
-1 (negative) 30  16.30 
0 (neutral) 135  73.37 
1 (positive) 19  10.33 
 
 
 
 
general news N  Percent  
0 (per. interest) 1  0.54 
1 (general) 183  99.46 
                          
                                       
 
                                                                                      IRAQ 
 
lead stories: war    N  Percent 
0 (no lead) 215  46.94 
1 (lead)  2 43  5 3.06 
 
intensity  N  Percen t  
0  2 15  4 6.94  
1  1 67  3 6.46 
2  7 6  1 6.59 
 
perpetrator N  Percent  
1 (American) 48  23.65 
2 (Enemy) 107  52.71 
3 (civilian) 2  0.99 
4 (mix)  42   20 .69 
9 (unknown) 4  1.97 
 
target  N   Perce nt  
1 (all American) 18  8.87 
2 (mostly American) 41  20.20 
3 (Am.&enemy) 38  18.72 
4 (mostly enemy) 18  8.87 
5 (all enemy) 26  12.81 
8 (all civilians) 53  26.11 
9 (target unknown) 9  4.43 
 
casualties  N  Percent  
0  83  34.16  
1  160  65.84  
 
justified violence N  Percent  
-1 (unjustified) 135  66.18 
0 (no frame) 25  12.25  
1 (justified) 44  21.57 
 
evaluative tone N  Percent  
-1 (negative) 69  28.40 
0 (neutral) 138  56.79 
1 (positive) 36  14.81 
 
 
general news N  Percent  
 0(per. interest) 6  2.471  
1(general) 23 7  97.53
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APPENDIX B 
 
CHAPTER III APPENDIX 
 
NETWORK DIFFERENCES IN COVERAGE OF WAR:  ABC, CBS AND NBC 
 
 
 
Percentage of Days with Lead stories on War 
 
Vietnam     Iraq 
  N Percent    N Percent 
CBS   51 53.68     64 50.79 
ABC   76 58.46     106 57.61 
NBC   57 58.16     73 49.32 
 
*Differences of means tests show no statistically significant differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intensity of War News:  Number of Lead Stories on War per Broadcast 
 
  Vietnam         Iraq* 
# lead stories 0 1  2     0 1         2 
CBS  43 19 33    62* 48* 16* 
  (45%) (20%) (35%)    (49%) (38%) (13%) 
    
ABC  54 37 39    78* 66* 40* 
  (42%) (28%) (30%)    (42%) (36%) (22%) 
 
NBC  41 17 40    75* 53* 20* 
  (42%) (17%) (41%)    (51%) (36%) (13%) 
 
*During the Iraq War only, difference of means tests show ABC differed from NBC (significant at 0.05 
level) and CBS (significant at 0.10 level), offering more intense news coverage  of war than the other 
networks.   
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Percentage of Lead Stories featuring War Casualties 
 
Vietnam     Iraq 
  N Percent    N Percent 
CBS   51 33.33     64 64.06 
ABC   76 38.84     106 63.21 
NBC   57 35.09     73 71.23 
 
*Differences of means tests show no statistically significant differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percentage of Lead Stories reporting General News 
 
Vietnam     Iraq 
  N Percent    N Percent 
CBS   51 100.00     64 100.00 
ABC   76 98.68     106 96.23 
NBC   57 100.00     73 97.26 
 
*Differences of means tests show no statistically significant differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences in Framing of War Violence:  CBS, ABC, NBC 
 
  Vietnam          Iraq 
Frame  unjust neutral   just     unjust neutral   just 
CBS  9 8 8    32 8 13 
  (36%) (32%) (32%)    (60%) (15%) (25%) 
    
ABC  9 11 14    58 10 21 
  (26%) (32%) (41%)    (65%) (11%) (24%) 
 
NBC  7 12 9    45 7 10 
  (25%) (43%) (32%)    (73%) (11%) (16%) 
 
*Differences of means tests show no statistically significant differences. 
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Differences in Tone of Reports of War:  CBS, ABC, NBC 
(In relation to the stated position of the President) 
 
  Vietnam         Iraq 
Frame  negative neutral   positive     negative neutral   positive   
CBS  11 33 7    13 41 10 
  (22%) (65%) (14%)    (20%) (64%) (16%) 
    
ABC  17* 51* 8*    34 54 18 
  (22%) (67%) (11%)    (32%) (51%) (17%) 
 
NBC  2* 51* 4*    22 43 8 
  (4%) (89%) (7%)    (30%) (59%) (11%) 
 
*Differences of means tests (ABC, NBC) significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences in Amount of Images of War Violence:  CBS, ABC and NBC41 
 
VIETNAM    N Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Total Violence                
CBS    51 7.156863 22.00579 0 125 
ABC    76 6.342105 17.68129 0 90 
NBC    57 4.122807 15.72994 0 110 
 
Acts of Violence 
CBS    51 3.333333 11.56143 0 60 
ABC    76 1.578947 5.842974 0 30 
NBC    57 1.842105 11.97585 0 90 
 
Precursor Acts of Violence 
CBS    51 1.372549 5.922705 0 40 
ABC    76 1.118421 5.750286 0 45 
NBC    57 .4385965 2.719096 0 20 
 
Injury after Violence 
CBS    51 2.45098 10.55332 0 65 
ABC    76 3.644737 14.31522 0 90 
NBC    57 1.842105 5.87303 0 30 
                                                 
41 Data are measured in seconds, per story. 
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IRAQ    N Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max  
 
Total Violence            
CBS    64      16.5625     16.80597 0 75 
ABC    106     17.54717     21.39476 0 120 
NBC    73     20.64384     23.48426 0 110 
 
Acts of Violence 
CBS    64 8.90625 10.63346 0 50 
ABC    106 8.396226 16.49743 0 120 
NBC    73 10.68493 14.27204 0 65 
 
Precursor Acts of Violence 
CBS    64 3.359375 5.274579 0 20 
ABC    106 2.358491 5.657172 0 30 
NBC    73 2.945205 6.28245 0 40 
 
Injury after Violence 
CBS    64 4.296875* 6.776897 0 35 
ABC    106 6.792453* 10.02826 0 45 
NBC    73 7.013699* 9.547386 0 40 
 
*Differences of means test (CBS, ABC; CBS, NBC) significant at 0.10. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
 
YOUGOV/POLIMETRIX QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Instructions (on screen):  During this survey you may be asked to watch a brief video. 
Please verify that you are able to view this video by playing the TEST MOVIE below and 
answering the questions. 
 
If you are unable to view the video, please make sure that you have the most recent 
version of Adobe Flash Player installed on this computer. 
 
 
What did you see in the video clip? 
Space shuttle launch 
Countdown 
Soccer game 
Unable to view video 
 
What sound did you hear while watching the video? 
Drum 
Bark 
Beep 
Unable to hear sound 
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<If incorrect or unable to view or hear, discontinue.> 
 
Instructions (on screen):  Thank you for your willingness to participate. This survey will 
ask you questions to gauge your feelings and opinions about politics. During this survey, 
you will read instruction pages like this one. The study consists of different types of 
questions. Depending upon the question type, you will use the mouse or keyboard to 
indicate your answer. Instructions for answering questions appear at the bottom of each 
question's screen, and sometimes precede the questions as well. 
 
We would like to begin by asking you some questions about your background, your 
interests, and your opinions. 
 
 
A1. What is your age in years?    
(open-ended text) 
 
A2.  What is the highest level of education you have achieved, as of today? 
1 Some high school 
2 High school graduate 
3 Associate degree 
4 Bachelors degree 
5 Masters degree 
6 Ph.D. or professional degree 
 
A3.  What is your gender? 
1 Female 
2 Male      
 
A4.  What racial or ethnic group best describes you? 
1 Asian 
2 Black 
3 Hispanic-Latino 
4 Native American 
5 White 
6 Other ______________ 
 
A5.  Do you have children under the age of 18? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
 
A6  What is your annual household income? 
1 Under $25,000 
2 $25,001 - $40,000 
3 $40,001 - $60,000 
4 $60,001 - $80,000 
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5 $80,001 - $100,000 
6 Over $100,000 
 
A7.  Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? 
a. Republican 
b. Democracy 
c. Independent 
d. Other 
 
A7a.   
If they select “a” or “b” to A7:  Would you call yourself a strong Republican /Democrat 
or a not very strong Republican/Democrat?   
 
A7b. 
If they select “c” or “d” to A7:  Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican 
Party or to the Democratic Party? 
 
A8.  We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.  Here is a seven-
point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative.  Where would you place yourself on this 
scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
 
Very 
liberal  
Liberal Som ewhat 
liberal 
Neutra
l 
Somewhat 
conservativ
e 
Conservativ
e 
Very 
conservativ
e 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I haven’t thought much about this __8__ 
 
 
How well do the following statements describe your personality? 
I see myself as someone who… 
B1.  …is reserved  (1-5, disagree strongly; disagree a little; neither agree nor disagree; 
agree a little; agree strongly) 
B2… is generally trusting 
B3.  …tends to be lazy 
B4.  …is relaxed, handles stress well 
B5. …has few artistic interests 
B6. …is outgoing, sociable 
B7. …tends to find fault with others 
B8. …does a thorough job 
B9. …gets nervous easily 
B10. …has an active imagination 
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Now we have some general questions about politics.  These are questions to which not 
everyone knows the answers.  If you do not know an answer, feel free to guess or indicate 
that you don’t know. 
 
 
 
C1.  Which party has the most members in the Senate in Washington? 
 
1 Democrats 
2 Republican 
 
 
C2.  Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not? 
 
1 President 
2 Congress 
3 Supreme Court 
 
 
C3.  Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts? 
 
1 President 
2 Congress 
3 Supreme Court 
 
 
C4.  What job is currently held by Robert Gates?   
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
C5. What job is currently held by Harry Reid?   
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
C6. What job is currently held by David Cameron?   
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
C7.  What job is currently held by John Roberts?   
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
C8.  What job is currently held by Nancy Pelosi?   
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every 
person thinks that some are more important than others.  Below we present pairs of 
desirable qualities. For each pair please mark which one you think is more important for a 
child to have:  
                                                                                 
D1.  Independence or respect for elders                           
              ------------------------------------------------------------       
                                                                                 
1.  INDEPENDENCE                                               
5.  RESPECT FOR ELDERS                                         
 
D2. Obedience or self-reliance                                                    
              -----------------------------------------------------------        
                                                                                 
1.  OBEDIENCE                                                  
5.  SELF-RELIANCE                                              
 
D3.  Curiosity or good manners                                                       
              -----------------------------------------------------------        
                                                                                 
1.  CURIOSITY                                                  
5.  GOOD MANNERS                                               
 
 
D4.  Being considerate or well behaved                                        
                                                                                                                                                       
1.  BEING CONSIDERATE                                          
5.  WELL BEHAVED                                               
 
 
 
****************** 
Module 1: 
IMAGE EXPERIMENT  
 
CONTROL GROUP:  NO VIDEO (Skip to Questions F) 
 
Pre-treatment briefing 
Television has become the medium through which most citizens learn about politics.  
We’d like to show you a brief television news story that took place a few months ago.  
Please answer the questions after the stories to the best of your ability. 
 
 
****Jennifer Anderson is currently editing the videos.  Images in the videos are all 
taken from actual nightly network news segments.  The most severe images are 
similar to the photos below.**** 
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TREATMENT 1:  (Nonviolent_Just video) 
 
CHARLES GIBSON (ABC News): 
This week we’re going to look at the stakes of the war in Afghanistan, which President 
Obama has placed at the top of his foreign policy agenda.  Martha Raddatz reports on 
where things stand. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
Nine years later, $210 billion spent, 1,948 international troops dead.  But Afghanistan is 
freer.  Its people more hopeful, and its government more democratic than any time since 
the war began.  Security is improving as the US is planning to send 30,000 more troops 
on top of the 32,000 already here.  The US refuses to neglect this war. 
 
GENERAL MARK MILLEY  
We need to improve the security situation in Afghanistan in a very real way, and we also 
need to improve the perception of security in the minds of the Afghan people, no question 
about it. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
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Even though the US has been in Afghanistan for more than 9 years, the last year was by 
far the most dangerous since 2001.  The cloud of violence comes with a silver lining as 
Afghans look forward to increased human rights and a better lifestyle. 
 
With the fight for Kandahar looming, the biggest offensive since 2001, the struggle here 
is expected to be intense.  As US soldiers seek local support to combat rising levels of 
violence, US commanders look for national endorsement.  Today, the US flew Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai to Kandahar.  His mission?  Convince people to back the single 
largest operation of the war.   “I want your cooperation,” he says.  “You have to be 
brave.”   
 
He asked the Afghan people if they’re with him.  But many still have doubts.  In the past, 
the US tried but failed to secure Kandahar.  But today, the police and government are 
much better equipped.  The US considered Karzai’s call today a green light.  
 
GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL (Commander of International Forces, 
Afghanistan) 
He looked at the people and he asked them if they were willing to sacrifice and had the, 
the strength to do this.    
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
And the people came back with a strong, resounding, indication that they were.  US 
Commanders say that the goal of the surge is to bring trust and confidence to the Afghan 
people through better security, and increasingly that’s looking like it’s having the desired 
effect.   
 
And so the hard part begins.  The battle for Kandahar will be bloody, but fortunately it 
could lead to greater democracy for all Afghan citizens.  Winning Kandahar could mean 
winning Afghanistan.  Martha Raddatz, ABC News, Kandahar. 
 
CHARLES GIBSON: 
And we’ll have more on where things stand later in the week.   
 
TREATMENT 2:  (Nonviolent_Unjust video) 
 
 152 
 
 
 
CHARLES GIBSON (ABC News): 
This week we’re going to look at the stakes of the war in Afghanistan, which President 
Obama has placed at the top of his foreign policy agenda.  Martha Raddatz reports on 
where things stand. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
Nine years later, $210 billion spent, 1,948 international troops dead.  And Afghanistan is 
less free.  Its people less hopeful, and its government less democratic than any time since 
the war began.  Security has deteriorated to the point where the US is planning to send 
30,000 more troops on top of the 32,000 already here.  The US admits it neglected this 
war. 
 
GENERAL MARK MILLEY  
We need to improve the security situation in Afghanistan in a very real way, and we also 
need to improve the perception of security in the minds of the Afghan people, no question 
about it. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
Even though the US has been in Afghanistan for more than 9 years, the last year was by 
far the most dangerous since 2001.  The cloud of violence hovers over Afghans as they 
see none of the promised changes in their quality of life.    
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With the fight for Kandahar looming, the biggest offensive since 2001, the struggle here 
is expected to be intense.  As US soldiers seek local support to combat rising levels of 
violence, US commanders look for national endorsement.  Today, the US flew Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai to Kandahar.  His mission?  Convince people to back the single 
largest operation of the war.   “I want your cooperation,” he says.  “You have to be 
brave.”   
 
He asked the Afghan people if they’re with him.  But many still have doubts.  In the past, 
the US tried but failed to secure Kandahar.  And still today, the police and government 
are woefully underequipped.  The US  believed Karzai’s call today was unlikely to affect 
public sentiment. 
 
GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL (Commander of International Forces, 
Afghanistan) 
He looked at the people and he asked them if they were willing to sacrifice and had the, 
the strength to do this.    
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
And the people came back with skepticism and hesitation. US Commanders say that the 
goal of the surge is to bring trust and confidence to the Afghan people through better 
security, but  increasingly that’s looking like it’s having just the opposite effect.   
 
And so the hard part begins.  The battle for Kandahar will be bloody, but sadly it is 
unlikely to further democracy for all Afghan citizens.   If so, losing Kandahar could mean 
losing Afghanistan.  Martha Raddatz, ABC News, Kandahar. 
 
CHARLES GIBSON: 
And we’ll have more on where things stand later in the week.   
 
 
 
 
TREATMENT 3:  (Violent_Just video) 
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CHARLES GIBSON (ABC News): 
This week we’re going to look at the stakes of the war in Afghanistan, which President 
Obama has placed at the top of his foreign policy agenda.  Martha Raddatz reports on 
where things stand. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
Nine years later, $210 billion spent, 1,948 international troops dead.  But Afghanistan is 
freer.  Its people more hopeful, and its government more democratic than any time since 
the war began.  Security is improving as the US is planning to send 30,000 more troops 
on top of the 32,000 already here.  The US refuses to neglect this war. 
 
GENERAL MARK MILLEY  
We need to improve the security situation in Afghanistan in a very real way, and we also 
need to improve the perception of security in the minds of the Afghan people, no question 
about it. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
Even though the US has been in Afghanistan for more than 9 years, the last year was by 
far the most dangerous since 2001.  The cloud of violence comes with a silver lining as 
Afghans look forward to increased human rights and a better lifestyle. 
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With the fight for Kandahar looming, the biggest offensive since 2001, the struggle here 
is expected to be intense.  As US soldiers seek local support to combat rising levels of 
violence, US commanders look for national endorsement.  Today, the US flew Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai to Kandahar.  His mission?  Convince people to back the single 
largest operation of the war.   “I want your cooperation,” he says.  “You have to be 
brave.”   
 
He asked the Afghan people if they’re with him.  But many still have doubts.  In the past, 
the US tried but failed to secure Kandahar.  But today, the police and government are 
much better equipped.  The US considered Karzai’s call today a green light.  
 
GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL (Commander of International Forces, 
Afghanistan) 
He looked at the people and he asked them if they were willing to sacrifice and had the, 
the strength to do this.    
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
And the people came back with a strong, resounding, indication that they were.  US 
Commanders say that the goal of the surge is to bring trust and confidence to the Afghan 
people through better security, and increasingly that’s looking like it’s having the desired 
effect.   
 
And so the hard part begins.  The battle for Kandahar will be bloody, but fortunately it 
could lead to greater democracy for all Afghan citizens.  Winning Kandahar could mean 
winning Afghanistan.  Martha Raddatz, ABC News, Kandahar. 
 
CHARLES GIBSON: 
And we’ll have more on where things stand later in the week.   
 
 
TREATMENT 4:  (Violent_Unjust video) 
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CHARLES GIBSON (ABC News): 
This week we’re going to look at the stakes of the war in Afghanistan, which President 
Obama has placed at the top of his foreign policy agenda.  Martha Raddatz reports on 
where things stand. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
Nine years later, $210 billion spent, 1,948 international troops dead.  And Afghanistan is 
less free.  Its people less hopeful, and its government less democratic than any time since 
the war began.  Security has deteriorated to the point where the US is planning to send 
30,000 more troops on top of the 32,000 already here.  The US admits it neglected this 
war. 
 
GENERAL MARK MILLEY  
We need to improve the security situation in Afghanistan in a very real way, and we also 
need to improve the perception of security in the minds of the Afghan people, no question 
about it. 
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
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Even though the US has been in Afghanistan for more than 9 years, the last year was by 
far the most dangerous since 2001.  The cloud of violence hovers over Afghans as they 
see none of the promised changes in their quality of life.    
 
With the fight for Kandahar looming, the biggest offensive since 2001, the struggle here 
is expected to be intense.  As US soldiers seek local support to combat rising levels of 
violence, US commanders look for national endorsement.  Today, the US flew Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai to Kandahar.  His mission?  Convince people to back the single 
largest operation of the war.   “I want your cooperation,” he says.  “You have to be 
brave.”   
 
He asked the Afghan people if they’re with him.  But many still have doubts.  In the past, 
the US tried but failed to secure Kandahar.  And still today, the police and government 
are woefully underequipped.  The US  believed Karzai’s call today was unlikely to affect 
public sentiment. 
 
GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL (Commander of International Forces, 
Afghanistan) 
He looked at the people and he asked them if they were willing to sacrifice and had the, 
the strength to do this.    
 
MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC News): 
And the people came back with skepticism and hesitation. US Commanders say that the 
goal of the surge is to bring trust and confidence to the Afghan people through better 
security, but  increasingly that’s looking like it’s having just the opposite effect.   
 
And so the hard part begins.  The battle for Kandahar will be bloody, but sadly it is 
unlikely to further democracy for all Afghan citizens.   If so, losing Kandahar could mean 
losing Afghanistan.  Martha Raddatz, ABC News, Kandahar. 
 
CHARLES GIBSON: 
And we’ll have more on where things stand later in the week.   
 
 
 
********* 
E1..  How much information did you learn from the story? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Nothing Little Some Much Very much 
 158 
 
 
 
 
 
E2.  In your opinion, how important was the story to American politics? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
important 
Not very 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very important 
 
 
F.  Post-stimulus:  
PANAS (II) 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.  
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.  Use 
the following scale to record your answers: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little  Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
Items in order: 
Upset 
Sad 
Hostile 
Happy 
Surprised 
Ashamed 
Inspired 
Angry 
Nervous 
Contempt 
Determined 
Attentive 
Disgusted 
Afraid 
Active 
 
 
Now we have some questions about issues currently in the news. 
G1.  Compared to the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan now, should the number of 
troops in Afghanistan three months from now be more, less or about the same? 
Much less – somewhat less – about the same – somewhat more - much more 
 
 
G2. How likely do you think it is that the US will suffer an attack as serious as the ones 
in New York and Washington, DC sometime in the next 12 months?   
 Very likely – somewhat likely – somewhat unlikely – very unlikely 
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G3.   Do you think the war in Afghanistan has caused the chance of a terrorist attack in 
the United States to increase, caused it to decrease, or has it had no effect on the 
chance of a terrorist attack in the U.S.? 
__ Increase [1] 
__ Decrease [2] 
__ No effect [3] 
 
 
G4.  If the US government were to spend more money on the U.S. military, would the 
chances of a terrorist attack in the United States increase, decrease, or stay the same? 
 
 
G5.  If the US government were to do more to stop terrorists from entering the United 
States, would the chances of a terrorist attack in the United States increase, decrease, or 
stay the same? 
 
 
G6:  Do you AGREE or DISAGREE with this statement:  All things considered, US 
involvement in Afghanistan was a mistake? 
Strongly agree – agree – neither – disagree – strongly disagree 
 
 
G7.  Do you AGREE or DISAGREE with this statement: This country would be better 
off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of 
the world.' 
Strongly agree – agree – neither – disagree – strongly disagree 
 
 
G8:  Do you AGREE or DISAGREE with this statement:  Collateral damage is an 
inevitable part of war. 
Strongly agree – agree – neither – disagree – strongly disagree 
 
 
G9:  Do you AGREE or DISAGREE with this statement:  US involvement in 
Afghanistan will ultimately increase the personal freedoms enjoyed by Afghans. 
Strongly agree – agree – neither – disagree – strongly disagree 
 
 
G10:  Has the United States’ use of force in the war in Afghanistan been effective? 
Not effective  
at all 
   Very effective
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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G11.  Some people think it is important to protect the nation’s security even if it means 
giving up some civil liberties, like having to carry a national identification card or having 
phone calls monitored.  Others feel that we should preserve our civil liberties above all, 
even if it means risking the nation’s security.  How about you?  On a scale of 1 to 7, 
where a 1 indicates that we should protect the nation’s security at all costs and a 7 
indicates that we should protect civil liberties at all costs, where would you place 
yourself? 
 
Protect Nation’s 
Security at All 
Costs 
 
   Protect Civil 
Liberties
at All
Costs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
G12:  Thinking back to the news story, how violent did you find the images? 
Not violent  
at all 
   Very violent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
G13:  Thinking back to the news story, did you think the news reporters showed personal 
opinions about whether America should be involved in the Afghanistan war? 
1 Very biased against American involvement in Afghanistan  
2 Somewhat biased against American involvement in Afghanistan 
3 Balanced 
4 Somewhat biased in favor of American involvement in Afghanistan 
5 Very biased in favor of American involvement in Afghanistan 
 
 
G14:  Have you ever served in the US military? 
1 No 
2 Yes 
 
 
G15:  Do you have family or close friends who serve in Iraq or Afghanistan? 
1 No 
2 Yes 
 
G15a:  If they select “2” to G15, what is your relationship with the person serving who is 
closest to you?  
1 Immediate family member (spouse, father, mother or sibling) 
2 Other family member 
3 Friend 
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H1.  When you think about your own personal future, are you generally optimistic, 
pessimistic, or neither? 
Very optimistic – somewhat optimistic – neither – somewhat pessimistic – very 
pessimistic 
 
 
H2.  And when you think about the future of the United State as a whole, are you 
generally optimistic, pessimistic, or neither? 
Very optimistic – somewhat optimistic – neither – somewhat pessimistic – very 
pessimistic 
 
H3:  On average, how much TV do you watch a day? 
1 I rarely watch TV 
2 Less than 1 hour 
3 1-2 hours 
4 2-3 hours 
5 3-4 hours 
6 4-5 hours 
7 5 hours or more 
 
 
H4:  What are three of your favorite television shows?  (open text) 
 
 
H5:  Where do you go for news mostly frequently? 
1 Newspapers 
2 News magazines 
3 Network TV news programs 
4 Cable TV news programs 
5 Online 
6 Conversations with others 
7 I don’t often follow the news 
 
H6:  How many days in the last week did you watch news on television? 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
H7:  How many days in the last week did you read or watch news online? 
0 
1 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
H8:  How often do you play video games? 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
 
H8a:  If they answer 2, 3, 4 or 5 on H7:  What types of video games do you most prefer?  
(open text) 
 
 
H9:  On average, how often do you watch movies, either at home or at the theater? 
1 Less than once a month 
2 1-3 times a month 
3 Weekly 
4 Several times a week 
5 Daily 
 
 
H10:  What types of movies do you most prefer?   
1 Action 
2 Adventure 
3 Comedy 
4 Drama 
5 Science Fiction 
6 Crime/War 
7 Other 
 
 
 
********************** 
Next, I’d like to ask you questions about your remembrance of the news story about 
Afghanistan that you viewed earlier in the study. 
 
I1:  How many years have US forces been in Afghanistan? 
1. 5 
2. 7 
3. 8 
4. 9 
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5. 11 
 
 
I2:  How many additional troops did the story say the US was planning to send to 
Afghanistan? 
1.  10,000 
2. 15,000 
3. 20,000 
4. 25,000 
5. 30,000 
 
I3:  Who is the President of Afghanistan? 
1.  Hamid Karzai 
2. Mullah Omar 
3. Babrak Karmal 
4. Hafizulla Amid 
5. Burhan Rabbani 
 
I4:  What is the name of the Afghan province where the upcoming battle will take place? 
1.  Nangarhar 
2. Kabal 
3. Kandahar 
4. Samangan 
5. Takhar 
 
I5:  Name one of the two US generals interviewed in the story.  (open text) 
 
I6:  Name the female reporter in the story.  (open text) 
 
****************** 
*DEBRIEFING* 
Thank you very much for participating in this study.  This study was interested in 
examining the impact of visual framing on opinions about war.  If you watched a video 
on Afghanistan as part of this study, it was an edited compilation of television news 
stories. It did not air on ABC news.  
 
If you have any questions about the content of the study, please contact Jennifer 
Anderson (jennifer.o.anderson@vanderbilt.edu).  She will be happy to answer your 
questions.  Thanks again for participating in the study! 
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